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ABSTRACT
Following the work of Dixon (197'^ ) some experiments 
were performed to investigate two aspects of perception 
without awareness, the handling of emotional stimuli 
and the relation between subliminal perception and 
selective attention.
Apparatus was designed which utilized the phenomenon 
of binocular rivalry, so that an image (above identification 
level when presented alone) could be masked by a brighter 
image to the other eye and thus perceived without awareness. 
An experiment of Smith et al. (1959) was replicated with 
improved controls. It was shown that responses to words 
presented outside of awareness tended to be meaning-related, 
the same words yielding structure-related responses when 
presented supraliminally.
%>ence (1967) proposed an explanation of perceptual 
defence in terms of the interaction of arousal and memory. 
Some experimental support for this idea was obtained.
Further experiments on the handling of emotive stimuli led 
to the conclusion that individual differences in perception 
are an important factor to be controlled. Similarly, 
further to Brown (1965, 1971) it was concluded that the 
stimulus characteristics of emotive words used as 
experimental stimuli need to be better controlled. An 
explanation of word association phenomena in terms of the 
interaction of arousal and attention was discussed and the 
perceptual defence and WAT situations contrasted.
Finally, two brief experiments illustrated aspects 
of the selective attention paradigm relevant to perception 
without awareness: pre-attentive processes (Neisser, 1967) 
and incidental stimulation (Eagle et al, 1966).
Following a review of selective attention experiments, 
including evidence of unattended channel processing, 
some tentative proposals were made which might encompass 
the material presented. Utilizing a model suggested by 
HacKay (1972) it was proposed that the phenomena of 
perception without awareness represent the functioning 
of an early stage in the normal perceptual process 
essential both to the handling of emotive stimuli and 
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Two questions have consistently plagued the author of 
this thesis during the three years that he has brooded 
about, ruminated on, played with and sometimes cursed the 
phenomenon of perception without awareness. The first was, 
does perception without awareness have a specific function?
The second was, how do you explain the paradox of partial 
awareness (the relative effects of structure and meaning 
on discrimination) ? These considerations have in one 
fashion or another structured this series of experiments, 
which in no way represents a systematic investigation of 
perception without awareness. Neither was it expected 
that satisfactory answers would be forthcoming. It was 
decided that the exercise would be justified if enough 
additional questions, hopefully, some of them thought- 
provoking, could be raised along the way.
This first section comprises a discussion of the concept 
of awareness and the initial experimental work which simply 
tried to show that the apparatus which had been designed 
was suitable for the investigation of perception without 
awareness.
Dixon (1971) has observed that if discrimination without 
awareness a reality and can result in a variety of 
behavioural and physiological phenomena, two conclusions 
follow. First, it would seem that subliminal stimulation 
constitutes a useful tool in further attempts to explore the 
bases of many psychological phenomena. Second, we are one
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stage nearer understanding the nature of consciousness 
itself. In Dixon's opinion the change from believing 
that to be affected by a stimulus is to be conscious of 
a stimulus to knowing that consciousness of a stimulus 
is something over and above being affected by the stimulus, 
is a considerable step forward. This idea is explored 
further by, first, examining what we know of the nature of 
awareness.
AVAREIÆSS
As one begins the investigation of a phenomenon or 
psychological process it is traditional to attempt to 
define the terms one uses. In this case any attempt to 
define "perception" and "awaiaiess" seems doomed to failure. 
Perception and awareness seem inextricably related, yet 
the degree to which one is the necessary condition for the 
other seems at first to be a matter of psychological dogma.
For example "the essence of a sensory experience is that 
it is conscious and if we do not 'notice' it, it simply 
does not exist as a sensory experience, regardless of what 
afferent events there may be (Taylor, 1962 p.296)." On the 
other hand "The process of visual perception should not be 
confused with what is generally called percepts, which are 
products of the process fitted into a frame of reference of 
outside reality ... only rarely do we become aware of our 
perceptual processes (Smith, 1957 P- 306)." Finally,
"the relation between subliminal perception and endogenously 
generated percepts ... might shed some light on ... the 
nature of awareness itself. Subjective phenomena that are
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not attributable to concurrent external stimuli may be 
thought of as lying along a continuum from normal waking 
imagery at one end to visual and auditory hallucinations 
at the other. Eidetic imagery, hypnagogic and hypno- 
pompic imagery and normal night dreams would fall some­
where in between. It can be argued that this represents 
part of a larger continuum of reality contact and that 
these various phenomena differ from each other in degree 
rather than in kind (Dixon, 1971 P- 310). " The term 
awareness is preferred to "consciousness". The latter 
has too many connotations of the mind-body issue, a ready 
catalyst of fruitless controversy (Burt, 1968; Powell, 1969; 
Burt, 1969, a, b; Place, 1969; Taylor,1970; Boden, 1970 
etc., etc.).
Each of these quotations serves to introduce a 
discussion of one or more of the major attributes of 
awareness and also at least one kind of orientation to 
the problem. One approach, favoured by the behaviourist 
school, is embodied in the first quotation, which is 
taken from a discussion in which Taylor aims to show that 
the twin ghosts in the machine - consciousness and attention, 
are not necessary to a psychology of behaviour. This view 
is echoed in a symposium edited by Eriksen (1962) where 
each contributor attempts to define awareness in such a 
way as to make the concept redundant.  ^Awareness is replaced 
by the study of subjects introspective reports or of "self­
generated verbal operants" or the study of attention and 
immediate memory traces. The exception in this symposium
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is provided by Hilgard ' s paper "what becomes of the input 
from the stimulus?" which is concerned instead with the 
effects of stimulation at or near threshold where "the 
problems of awareness (other than self-awareness) most 
often intrude themselves into the interpretation of 
psychological data. " Hilgard sees the stimulus as 
"... the entering wedge into perception" and attempts 
to throw some light on the larger problem of awareness 
by considering how stimulus input is processed in the 
act of perceiving. Hilgard makes the important 
distinction between registration and awareness, implicit 
in Taylor's statement. The difference lies in the fact 
that Taylor dismisses "afferent events" such as this 
whereas Hilgard invokes the concept of 'activation'.
Activation is defined as a detectable influence of the 
stimulus by the subject. Where there has been registration 
there may be activation. As Hilgard sees it, activation 
can bring above threshold some derivative of the stimulus 
input in a number of ways (indicators include guessing, 
word associations, fantasy productions, dreams and influence 
upon some secondary cognitive task) ; to the extent that 
these derivatives can be established we have learned 
something about what happens to a registered stimulus 
that has not been perceived. In other words, activation 
is equated by Hilgard with the recovery of some (possibly 
transformed) component of the input, into awareness.
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Awareness; as a limiting process: The second quotation
is from an article on the genetic approach to problems 
of visual perception (based on the Leipzig microgenesis 
school). Smith's point is that awareness is a fairly 
late stage in perception. Lashley (1954) similarly 
states "A point of fundamental importance for a theory 
of the neural basis of perception is that there is never 
awareness of the integrative activity of the brain while 
it is in progress. The perceived items are always the 
product of preceding and complex integrative processes 
(p. 424)." This leads to a psychophysiological approach 
to the function of the processes of perception and awareness. 
The 1968 paper of Burt's referred to above is partly a 
review of a symposium edited by Eccles entitled "Brain 
and Conscious experience. " Several of the contributors 
quote William James "The study of the distribution of 
consciousness shows it to be such as we might expect in 
an organ, added for the sake of steering a nervous system 
grown too complex to regulate itself." McKay (1966) sees 
this function from an information-processing viewpoint. 
Conscious experience represents a remarkably low information 
handling rate (e.g. 7 ± 2) compared to the number of bits 
of information handled simultaneously by the sense organs. 
Redundancy and automated control sequences ensure that 
decision processes are brought witnin this capacity.
Similarly, Schaefer (1966) examines the system in the 
context of psycho—somatic disease. Consciousness receives 
only a very small amount of the sensory input, the majority 
of which remains below the conscious level, as do the
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activities of the self-regulating mechanisms, hy and large.
The latter, the "unconscious organizing system" is self­
conducting and emotionally driven. Its action is compulsory 
as long as consciousness has no information about its acquired 
patterns. However, as soon as consciousness is informed, 
the integrative action gets lost and becomes controlled by 
the conscious "context".
Both these views support the idea of the restricting
effects of awareness, a term coined by Donald %>ence. In
the one case, the number of events processed by consciousness
i5 postulated to be restricted in a purely functional way
(possibly to allow serial processing to operate) and in the
second, cognitive processes are assumed to actively inhibit
or alter the effects of unconscious processes. Spence
(%)ence and Holland 1962; %)ence and Bressler, 1962) has
demonstrated that the reduction of awareness changes the
patterning of cognitive activity, with different associative
processes operating in the two conditions. When the
recipient is unaware of the stimulus, the number of associates
evoked by it exceeded that elicited by the same stimulus
*
above the awareness threshold. Hilgard describes a like
♦NOTE:
Spence borrows the terms unconscious, preconscious and conscious 
to describe the relative effects he observes. Dixon (p.90) 
takes issue with his use of the term "preconscious" to describe 
antecedent physiological processes which do not have phenomenal 
representation, as he sees nothing to justify the invoking of ' 
the psychoanalytic concept of an antechamber of mental life, 
lying between the conscious and unconscious mind. Klein (1970, 
p.262) also criticizes the use of the term "preconscious 
perception", from a psychoanalytic viewpoint, as in the strict 
sense of "consciousness" as a structural concept, it is more 
misleading than helpful. "In spealcing of registrations without 
awareness, instead of preconscious perception, we are thus 
alerted to the superordinate organization - the state of 
conscious - in which such registrations occur, the elaborations 
to which they are subject in primary - or secondary - process 
terms, and the controlling organizations that shape their 
emergence in different forms of experience, as images or 
perceptions, for example."
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process from the input side and speculates on the possible 
fate of the 'lost' information: a) the usual act of 
perception rapidly assimilates perceptual input to 
cognitive structures, thus categorizing and identifying 
the stimulus pattern in a way commonly appropriate to 
reality confirmation, b) In this process of structural 
assimilation some information is excluded, even though 
it is registered, c) Stimulus inputs un-assimilated to 
structure may endure for some time in a state of readiness 
for assimilation to an available cognitive structure.
The cognitive structures of fantasies are particularly 
available for assimilating this unstructured residue, 
hence recovery in fantasy is to be expected. Hilgard 
concludes "the Freudian concepts of primary and secondary 
process are the best available conceptualizations of these 
processes, although there are related formulations from 
other sources. In any case, a full account of the processes 
of perception does well to consider the relationship between 
veridical perception and fantasy formation. In both cases 
events intervene between the stimulus and response that 
are not represented in awareness (p. 69)."
In short, the limited capacity of awareness has a 
dual significance. Firstly, it provides an avenue for 
superordinate control. Shallice (1972) argues that 
consciousness is a scientifically acceptable concept, 
as it refers to a particular type of brain process and 
can be mapped into an information-processing concept.
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Using a cybernetic analogy he suggests that the main 
characteristic of cognitive processes is that only one 
"action system" (similar to a plan: Miller, Galanter and 
Pribram, 1960) can be maximally activated at any time, 
but that other such systems may be more weakly activated 
(systems are mutually inhibitory). Part of the model, 
the selector input to the dominant action system, has 
properties which correspond to those of consciousness.
The selector input has the function of selecting which 
action system is dominant and of setting its goal.
Awareness and skills Shallice's ideas are based on 
concepts designed to provide a model of skilled performance. 
In this area the operations of awareness and attention are 
closely linked. Descriptions of both perception and motor 
skills embody the idea of different kinds or levels of 
awareness or attention operating together or reciprocally. 
Hochberg (1970) and Neisser (1967) use the term focal 
attention to refer to the allotment of analyzing mechanisms 
to a limited region of the field. Since the processes of 
focal attention cannot operate on the whole visual field 
(to use this modality as an example) simultaneously they 
can come into play only after preliminary operations have 
already segregated the figurai units involved. These 
preliminary operations Neisser calls preattentive processes 
to emphasize that they produce the objects which later 
mechanisms are to flesh out and interpret. The requirements 
of this task mean that the preattentive processes must be 
generally "global" and "wholistic". Each figure or object
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must be separated from the others in its entirety, as a 
potential framework for the subsequent and more detailed 
analyses of attention. Neisser feels that this is an 
acquired skill, very difficult for young children and 
illiterates for example.
Polanyi (1958) also uses the terms focal awareness 
and subsidiary awareness in his discussion of motor skills. 
The two kinds of awareness are mutually exclusive. If a 
pianist shifts his attention from the piece he is playing 
to the observation of what he is doing with his fingers 
while playing it, he gets confused and may have to stop.
An even better example is that of hammering a nail.
Polanyi says "when we use a hammer to drive in a nail, we 
attend to both nail and hammer, but in a different way 
when we bring down the hammer we do not feel that its 
handle has struck our palm but that its head has struck 
the nail. Yet in a sense we are certainly alert to the 
feelings in our palm and the fingers that hold the hammer. 
They are not watched in themselves; we watch something 
else while being intensely aware of them. I have a 
subsidiary awareness of the feeling in the palm of my 
hand which is merged into my focal awareness of my driving 
in the nail (p.55)*"
These two examples suggest that the system labelled 
awareness can itself be thought of as a skill - a hierarchi­
cally organized system which must be developed by interaction 
with the environment. Adrian (1966) discusses just such 
a model, the work of Scliilder on the body image.
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Scnilder concludes that the body image is constructed 
gradually, by trial and error. Consciousness (or 
awareness) is not an independent phenomenon but consists 
of the process of trial and error in perception and 
thought "until the object and the outside world is 
reached.. Consciousness is the attempt to bring 
experience within a context, we may call this context 
the ego, from an analytic point of view." Adrian notes 
the closeness of this viewpoint to genetic epistemology. 
These considerations conveniently introduced the second 
feature of the limited capacity of awareness, that it 
represents a focus for activity in both external and 
internal environments. We cannot look in two directions 
at once nor can we move in two different directions at 
the same time. In this respect awareness functions as 
a fulcrum for external and internal activity.
Exogenous and endogenous processes Teuber (1966) suspects 
that some form of interaction between primary (specific) 
and non-specific (general) systems might hold important 
clues as to how consciousness arises. He gives the example 
of a simple test that was performed poorly by many of his 
patients with localized brain lesions, although any lobe 
might be involved. This task required the visual analysis 
of line patterns in which a simpler pattern was concealed 
by surrounding and overlapping contours. This hidden- 
figure task thus brought out a general, non-specific deficit 
in the same population of patients in which other tasks had 
disclosed extremely specific symptoms. Teuber feels that
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this coexistence of specific and general symptoms in the 
same cases of selective cerebrsil lesions suggests that 
general and specific mechanisms do interact in perception 
and conscious awareness.
Dixon (1971) reaches a similar position via a different 
route. Having established that selective attention and 
subliminal perception can be seen as end points on a 
continuum of information handling, he goes on to show that 
the notion of subliminal perception implies that a system 
mediating phenomenal experience exists in parallel with 
that subserving overt behaviour. Dixon argues that the 
independence between the two systems, as evidenced by the 
existence of states activated by the internal environment 
(described in the third quotation which prefaces this 
discussion), is closely bound up with the reciprocal 
relationship which holds between the limbic and classical 
arousal systems (Routtenberg, 1966; 1968). Thus 
representation or awareness is postulated to be a function 
of neocortical desynchronization which can be produced in 
two ways. Firstly, by a specific system (in the sense used 
by Teuber, in that the ascending system is here used by the 
cortex as a device for amplifying or attei\Lirting chosen 
signals) which mediates normal waking perceptual experience, 
reality-oriented cognitions with focal attention and 
inhibition of associative activity. Alternatively 
desynclironization can be produced by the limbic system, 
which gives rise to endogenously generated perceptual 
experience (imagery, dreams, hallucinations) and primary 
process cognitions with deafferentation from the external 
environment and inhibition of motor outflow.
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Two minor criticisms can be raised. Dixon writes 
that "the common denominator of subliminal perception 
and endogenously generated perceptual experience is 
that both involve unawareness of external stimulation, 
both predispose towards endo-psychically determined 
primary process cognitions and both, so it is believed, 
entail a shift in the balance of those two sources of 
arousal upon which cortical processing evidently depends 
(p- 317)•" Firstly, the statement is rather misleading, 
as is the notion of subliminal perception and selective 
attention as end points of a continuum. While the states 
defined by Dixon are those which have been demonstrated 
to be optimal for the retrieval of subliminally acquired 
information it is not true to say that "organismic states 
conducive to selective attention are antithetical to those 
which favour subliminal perception (p. 306). " Many 
experiments which have successfully demonstrated the 
effects of stimuli of which the subject was not aware 
involve presentation of the stimuli under conditions of 
high arousal. It is the inhibitory effects of focal awareness 
on activation of subliminal inputs that "... seem to support 
Freud's contention that barriers are more disciplinary and 
selective on the outgoing side of an organism’s behaviour. 
Getting into the system seems to be less difficult than 
emergence in awareness (Klein, 1970 p. 231)- " The orientation 
that Dixon proposes therefore allows of only minimal attention 
to the interaction of the two types of information handling 
process - the extent to which subliminal inputs without
22
obvious activation might affect ongoing processes (and 
even shape activity) in the alert, waking organism.
However, this is perhaps at a tangent to the present 
discussion (but see section D)- The second criticism, 
in relation to awareness, is that Dixon's model fails 
to encompass the states of altered consciousness normally 
described in the clinical setting. By characterizing 
only phenomena not attributable to concurrent external 
stimuli, to set against waking, veridical perception 
Dixon limits the explanatory capacity of his model.
To take a specific point, although visual hallucinations 
per se may entail some degree of deafferentation, other 
perceptual-cognitive phenomena which are seen in the 
clinical situation, such as illusions, misinterpretations 
and even delusions, do not. In depersonalization for 
example, awareness is altered so that cognition of personal 
identity, perception and recognition of objects are all 
retained but the feelings associated with them are lost, 
there is no conviction about them (Eapaport, 1957)* It 
is suggested, therefore, that a third approach to awareness 
is to look at the problem from the starting point of the 
inner world and explain altered states of consciousness as 
a step towards understanding perception and the relation 
to the external world.
Altered states of consciousness The framework which is 
most appropriate is not that of traditional psychoanalysis 
but that of contemporary ego psychology and the work on 
individual differences in perception which stems from it.
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Early psychoanalysis laid great stress upon motivations 
and their gratification process. The development of ego 
psychology added an equal stress upon the relatively 
enduring organizations that not only subserve the defence 
against and control of these motivations but may give 
rise to new motivations and may also subserve the 
adaptation of the organism to its environment. In this 
respect ego psychology is still theoretically more or 
less unique. Dixon gives scant mention to psychoanalytic 
theory itself although he uses the terms primary and 
secondary process descriptively a great deal. In many 
respects Dixon appears to be considerably less "eugenic- 
minded" than the average academic psychologist. That is 
to say, the psychoanalyst may suggest that "if this theory 
is weak by the yardstick of academic psychology, the latter 
has not yet proposed a better one to account for these 
phenomena and the poet's words may well apply: #i-jhither 
we cannot fly, we go limping; the Scripture saith, limping 
is no sin\Eapaport, 1957, P- 659)”, but the academic 
psychologist seems to feel that, for the sake of purity 
of thought, euthana'^sia by exclusion is the appropriate 
prescription for lameness. In a later section (PD review : 
section B) the possibility of adapting psychoanalytic 
concepts to cognitive psychology is discussed. Here, 
Klein's (1970) account of consciousness in psychoanalytic 
theory is briefly described because Eapaport's assertion 
still seems to be valid, it is the only account which 
attempts to explain differing states of awareness and the 
effects of the individual's motives on cognition.
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According to Klein, Eapaport has pointed out that 
Freud never consolidated the several formulations of his 
theory of consciousness- Particularly, he never integrated 
the "economic" or energy conception of his topographical 
model with the properties of the structural model (ego-id- 
superego). Eapaport (1959) revived Freud's early idea of 
consciousness as a cathexis - or attention-dispensing 
function of the ego system. In Eapaport ' s conception 
this is coupled with the notion that ego structures 
influence the development of attention. Basic to the 
theory is the assumption that an energic quantum - 
attention cathexis - is responsible for awareness, its 
amount is determinate at any given time it can be 
mobilized and deployed among the different structures 
responsible for different qualities of experience and 
feeling - the different ways we can be aware of things. 
Hence, both amount of attention-cathexis and pattern of 
its deployment among component ego structures determine 
conscious experience, and different configurations of the 
deployment of attention cathexis describe different states 
of consciousness. Once it is postulated that internal 
events, as well as external ones, can become conscious, 
that cathexes can be withdrawn from the external to the 
internal, it leads one to suggest that the conflict between 
the two can determine where attention cathexes are to be 
invested - in short, that there can be a strategy of 
deployment of cathexis.
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In this view, perception is an experience that is not 
unvarying from one state of awareness to another. For all 
the immediacy and experience of direct contact with things 
that it gives, veridical perception, in contrast to 
imaginai modes of experience, is also a cognitive event, 
framed hy a context of meanings or concepts. Both the 
capacity to "know" objects perceptually and the meaning 
given by perception will vary from one state to another.
Both range of perceptual content and intensity of perceptual 
experience will vary according to the balance of activated 
drive, control and defence. One of the key features is 
the nature of the schemata (meanings) to which registrations 
will be recruited. This goes some way to answer the'question, 
if motives influence perception, how is it we can perceive 
so effectively? Motives are constantly governing cognitive 
organization but the motives involved may vary on a hierarchy 
ranging from reality-coordinated intentions and their 
associated conceptual schemata to primary drives and their 
schemata. The drive level presumably governs the extent 
to which secondary or primary processes are involved in 
these elaborations of registrations. A proper evaluation 
of the incursion of motives in the cognitive act must take 
into account both the organization of the particular state 
of consciousness in which it occurs and the types of 
controls that characterize it.
The question of controls brings individual differences 
to the fore. As stated so far, this psychoanalytic model 
seems to have flexibility but also little more than
26
descriptive value. In relation to individual differences 
and habitual controls there are at least two overlapping 
areas where such ideas have been applied. Firstly,
Gardner, Holzman, Klein, Linton and %ence (1959) specify 
a range of cognitive behaviours which have been shown to 
represent relatively stable structures in cognition.
These cognitive controls represent organizational tendencies 
which control within the person the interaction of the 
matrix of structures which limit and mediate motivational 
influences. In this context cognitive style is a description 
of the way in which behaviourally specified cognitive 
controls cluster in multivariate analysis although the 
work of demonstrating the psychological reality and 
reliability of such constructs continues. To give a 
concrete example, one kind of control principle is that 
of "levelling - sharpening" which describes inter-subject 
differences in field articulation with a sequence of stimuli. 
This control principle has been shown to be closely related 
to individual differences in the handling of subliminal 
stimuli (Shevrin et al., 19^0) as will be discussed in 
section B.
A second application has been developed by Julian 
Silverman (1968). According to Silverman the term "altered 
states of consciousness" is an inference from behaviours 
and verbal reports which are indicative of nonconçensually 
validated, supernatural and mystical experiences. In the 
ordinary waking state subjective events are usually 
verifiable and explicable on the basis of logically related 
sequences of events. In an aJtered psychological state
27
significant deviations in subjective experience and 
psychological functioning occur; these deviations are 
from specific norms which apply during the ordinary, 
alert state. Silverman proposes that the complex 
process of paying attention both in normal and abnormal 
states be analyzed in terms of tln?ee attention response 
factors which regulate reception and utilization of 
environmental and internal stimuli. Each of the three 
response factors is derived from factor analytic studies 
of sensory, perceptual, cognitive and physiological 
test responses and from electroneurophysiological studies 
of sensory functioning in humans (averaged evoked responses: 
Buchsbaum and Silverman, 1968). For each of these factors, 
stimulus intensity control, scanning control and field 
articulation control, a theoretical construct has been 
developed, which describes both a response dimension and 
a hypothetical response mechanism which is postulated to 
underlie performances on tests which correlate with that 
factor.
Within this framework a particular constellation of 
attention response characteristics which a person evidences 
constitutes his "attentional style. " Some of the dimensions 
incorporate tests derived from ego psychological formulations, 
others are from different sources. To be more specific, 
the intensive aspect of attention refers to a) detection 
of subliminal and marginal stimuli (sensitivity) and b) 
responses to high intensity stimulation (intensity modulation).
28
J-be extensiveness aspect refers to the degree to which 
elements in a stimulus field are sampled (scanning — 
information search). The selectiveness of attention or 
"field—articulation" refers to responses which determine 
which elements in a stimulus field exert a dominant 
influence on the perceiver and combines a) degree of 
differentiation in responses to different stimulus 
configurations and b) degree of susceptibility to 
interference from conflicting stimulus elements in a 
configuration. Silverman's approach like that of the 
other workers in the field of cognitive style is of 
great interest because it represents a means by which 
the structures bounding the internal and external 
realities can be studied and, as he points out, it makes 
possible systematic investigation of the potentially 
constructive aspects of altered states of awareness.
SiiTmnary The features of awareness that have emerged from 
this discussion can be summarized as follows :-
1) the relationship between perception and awareness is 
in fact extremely complex.
2) registration is the first stage of a process which 
does not necessarily result in some form of awareness. 
This is of importance to the notion of perception 
without awareness but reflects a more general principle. 
The concept of awareness as a system in parallel to that 
subserving overt behaviour only reflects the fact that 
much of behaviour, both receptor and effector, is 
P0Pa_i;ively automated and requires minimal active control
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5) Awareness can be conceptualized as a skilled cognitive 
■process; developed by interaction with the environnent 
and hierarchically organized.
4) On the other hand, a characteristic of awareness not 
emphasized so far, is that the term refers both to
and content, which can give rise to confusion.
The process of,awareness, it is suggested, operates 
like other skills. A description of the content of 
awareness however, may give some clues as to its function.
5) A view of awareness as a limited capacity channel 
emphasizes the voluntary aspect of its function i.e. 
that it is the avenue for volition. Two components 
can be described a) utility for control - serial 
decision processes and b) selection of competing inputs 
from external and internal environments.
6) Individual differences reflect the habitual aspects of 
the function of awareness. The complex interaction of 
external and internal environments e.g. the effects of 
motives on perception can be seen in terms of
a) normal function - cognitive controls and
b) pathological functions - altered states of consciousness, 
although this distinction may ultimately prove to be 
unhelpful.
From this formulation, four areas of approach are
suggested which could be (or are being) fruitfully investigated.
I Developmental : further investigation of the hierarchical
levels of awareness and its development
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II Clinical : the nature of altered states of awareness
- to what extent is the process of perception 
continuous and to what extent organized 
differently in differing states of awareness?
III Personality: an investigation of the handling of emotive
stimuli is a possible means by which the 
nature of individual differences and 
cognitive controls can be studied
IV Cognitive : the relation of perception and selective
attention to the handling of information 
inside and outside of awareness is also 
of considerable interest.
In conclusion, loosely speaking, the last two areas 
mentioned above are those which are explored in the 
experiments to be described. Both are fields where the 
role of perception without awareness has been studied; 
in the former case via the phenomenon of perceptual defence 
and in the latter, in relation to the retrieval of subliminal 
inputs, although the comparatively recent (and possibly 
incomplete O  acceptance of the phenomenon has meant that 
the role of perception without awareness in veridical 
perception and related phenomenon has barely been considered.
As a first stage in the investigation some apparatus 
was designed which could be used to demonstrate and study 
perception without awareness phenomena. In order to test 
the apparatus an attempt was made to replicate an earlier 
experiment in the subliminal field, that of Smith et al.
(1959).




One way of investigating perception without awareness 
is to utilize the phenomenon of binocular rivalry. The 
dichoptic viewing situation can be so arranged that a 
stimulus may be above identification level (when presented 
alone) but masked by contiguous stimulation i.e. a brighter 
image to the other eye.
This experimental situation was used to replicate an 
experiment of Smith et al. (1959) which claimed to demonstrate 
that differences in meaning between words registered below 
recognition threshold could affect associated conscious 
thoughts. In the experiment reported here, a neutral face 
was paired with affect words presented subliminally and 8s 
were asked to rate its expression using a forced-choice 
indicator. Additional controls to those of Smith et al. 
were used.
It was established that words presented outside of 
awareness had an effect on semantically-related judgements, 
which was at least as great as that with the same words 
presented supraliminally. However, it was not possible to 
establish a qualitative difference in handling of stimuli 
between the two sessions.
One of the subclasses of unconscious perception is 
subliminal perception. Dixon (1971) points out that the 
latter is nowadays "... defined not in terms of psycho­
physical thresholds but rather in terms of a reported 
total absence of phenomenal representation of the 
stimulus." In other words, subliminal perception is 
best considered as perception without awareness.
One situation where this may occur is when the stimulus
is "above identification level (when presented alone), but
k
masked by contiguous stimulation" (Hilgard, 1962^.
Following an idea of Dr. J. Sandler's, it seemed reasonable 
to achieve this situation by reducing the intensity of one 
of the two images in a binocular set-up so that it would 
always be completely suppressed when presented in the 
company of the other image, but still remain visible when 
presented alone. When the images were presented together 
the subject would only be aware of the brighter of the two.
There are two facts which recommend this procedure. 
Breese (1899) showed that when red and green squares were 
in rivalry, if the illumination of one of the squares was 
increased, it predominated. Secondly, it was discovered 
during pilot experiments that many subjects, when presented 
with a bright image to one eye and being unaware that the 
other eye was being stimulated by a dimmer image, firmly 




The binocular rivalry paradigm has been used twice 
before in this field to investigate factors affecting 
suppression, rather than the effects of a suppressed 
stimulus, as here. Davis (1959), using a Keystone 
prism stereoscope, showed that words with strong 
emotional content would be suppressed more often than 
words with little emotional content. Frequency of word 
usage also had an effect and differences in stereoscopic 
perception between normals and psychotics were demonstrated.
Van de Castle (I960) investigated personality differences 
in the binocular rivalry situation, using an Engel slide 
stereoscope. He predicted and obtained differences in the 
perception of aggressive words which were related to 
performance on the Rorschach.
Davis reports that "all subjects clearly showed eye 
dominance in the majority of their responses" and he only 
scored responses where a given word of a pair was reported 
both when presented to the right eye and the left eye.
Van de Castle adjusted illumination for each subject to 
obtain approximately equal numbers of reports of words to 
right and left eyes, and used a score of +5 to -2 depending 
on how clearly the key word of a pair was seen.
In both these studies eye dominance was a problem and 
was relevant because the binocular rivalry was not such that 
complete suppression of one image would always or nearly 
always occur. In fact Van de Castle's method of adjusting 
illuminations allows neither for fluctuations in dominance 
during the course of the experiment (Whittle, 1965) nor for
temporal/nasal field differences (Sampson, 1969; Bower & 
Haley, 1964). In the experiment described here, dominance 
should not be a relevant factor, because the experimental 
situation was such that fluctuations in dominance would 
not be sufficient to alter the relative strengths of 
input stimuli. For each subject, given a stimulus of a 
certain intensity to one eye (clearly visible when 
presented alone), there will be some intensity of 
stimulation to the other eye which will reliably suppress 
phenomenal representation of the former stimulus when 
presented simultaneously. No such suppression occurs if 
both stimuli are presented to the same eye.
It was predicted that material presented to the 
"masked" eye (from here on, the eye which is shown the 
dimmer image will be referred to as the "masked" eye and 
the other, attended-to eye, as the "target" eye) would be 
handled in the same way as subliminal material. Therefore 
an attempt was made to replicate the principal findings 
of an experiment by Smith, Spence and Klein (1959).
Smith et al. showed subjects a line drawing of a 
neutral, expressionless face paired with the words ANGRY 
and HAPPY in a partially alternating series of increasing 
exposure (starting at < 40 msec.). The face was clearly 
and continuously visible for all but the brief intervals 
when HAPPY or ANGRY were flashed on the exposure field.
Twenty male psychiatric patients served as subjects.
When subjects' free descriptions of the face were classified.
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they were clearly more "pleasant" in HAPPY pairings than 
in ANGRY pairings. The main conclusion was that differences 
in meaning between words registered below the threshold 
of recognition can affect associated conscious thoughts, 
although these influences are modulated by response 
preferences and certain idiosyncratic reaction tendencies.
There are some weaknesses in this study. The result 
might be due to the contours of the words combining with 
the face to produce different facial expressions. There 
was no certainty that words were subliminal in all cases 
and no comparison was made with supraliminal presentation 
of the words. There are some indications that subliminal 
perception is not just a "watered down" version of normal 
perception (as claimed by Eriksen, 1962 pp. 13-15), but 
different in kind. Subliminal effects have been reported 
to be more marked when stimuli are well below threshold 
than when they are just below it (Bach, 1959; Eagle, 1959; 
and several others), and Silverman & Spiro (196?) have 
argued strongly that meaning is more potent than structure 
in determining responses to subliminal stimuli. Smith 
et al ’ s data doti|l| not permit elucidation of this point.
A further factor which must be taken into account in 
experiments of this type is the observation of Silverman
(1971) that effects of subliminal stimulation tend to be 
greater on a second test than on a first. This may be due 
to mobilization during the earlier part of the experiment 
of appropriate motivational associates.
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For these reasons the experiments to he reported, 
which use a similar method to that of Smith et al, 
included words of similar contour but different meaning 
from the critical words. Two sequences with the word to 
the masked eye suppressed (henceforth called subliminal 
sequences) then one supraliminal sequence with the word 
visible were presented, the first subliminal sequence 
being treated as practice. The experimenter was unaware 
on each trial what word was being presented.
It was predicted that responses when HAPPY and RAH 
were presented would differ significantly in both 
subliminal and supraliminal sessions and would differ 
from blank slide presentation. It was also predicted 
that responses to the words of similar contour would tend 
to be similar to those to either HAPPY or SAD, but less 
extreme, in the supraliminal session but unrelated in the 
subliminal session where response is assumed to be in 
terms of meaning rather than structure.
METHOD
The face used by Smith et al. (1959, Fig. 1) was shown 
to the target eye and a word or blank slide to the masked 
eye. Subjects were required to rate the face's expression 
using a forced-choice indicator (Miserable, Neutral or 
Cheerful). The words used were HAPPY, SAD, HURRY or CARRY 
and SAY or HAD. There were thus two critical words 
("happy" and "sad") and two words similar in contour to
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each of these (to separate the effects of word meaning 
from those of word form). These latter will be referred 
to as "contour happy" and "contour sad" words from here on.
A blank slide was presented on some trials to control for 
response bias. Each run consisted of twenty trials.
The target eye had a face presented to it on each trial 
and the masked eye had four presentations of HAPPY, four 
of SAD, four of "contour-happy" words (two of HURRY, two 
of CARRY), four of "contour-sad" words (two of SAY, two 
of HAD) and four blank slides. In session 1 and session 
2 the words were presented subliminally, as defined below, 
and in session 3 they were presented supraliminally.
Apparatus
The stereoscope (see Pig? 1.1^ was fitted with the eye- 
piece lenses from an Asher-Law stereoscope, the distance of 
the latter being adjustable via a knob with which S could 
make viewing comfortable. When viewing, S rested his fore­
head and the bridge of his nose against a fitted mould so 
that head position was relatively fixed. The projected 
images were 7 x 3 cm. , the distance between the images on 
the screen being adjustable, as each image could be moved 
by slight rotation of the appropriate perspex reflector.
The screen was shielded to a large extent from direct 
light from the projector on each side by cut-out black- 
painted cardboard. Each Leisegang magazine-loading 
projector (lamp: standard 300 watt) could be moved forward 

































































































image was required, with minimal alteration of the position 
or size of the image. The Prontor shutter on each side 
was fixed to the front of the projector and connected via 
a voltage stabilizer to a common Devices digitimer. The 
main masking filter consisted of a 5.0 Kodak Wratten 
neutral density filter. During the main experiment a 
0.1 filter was inserted on the target side to reduce after­
images.
Procedure
Experimental sessions (the three runs) lasted a total 
of about 40 mins. First S was accustomed to the apparatus 
and the idea that he would receive stimuli to both eyes.
To this end, S was asked which hand he used most often 
and was then told that his eye dominance would be examined. 
S was shown the word DOLLAR to both eyes and asked to 
report when fusion took place - if there was no fusion 
after one minute, small adjustments were made to the 
reflectors, to alter the relative positions of the images 
(in fact this was rarely necessary) and the lights were 
switched off. S was told "I am now going to show you 
different words to each eye, so that you will see them 
superimposed. Now, you will be able to report one word 
and then the other or perhaps just a mixture - tell me 
exactly what you see.” Four neutral pairs of words were 
presented, each for 1.0 sec. (PAINT/PLANT, REASON/REMAIN, 
SPACE/SHARE and WATCH/WORTH). Replies were noted.
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Having accustomed S to the apparatus, E inserted the 
filter on the probable side of the dominant eye (i.e. 
corresponding to handedness) and the timer was adjusted 
to 0.5 sec (in each case that a time is quoted, this 
refers to shutter interval for both eyes). In this part 
of the procedure E was checking that "masking” occurred 
in the manner desired; "This time, just tell me exactly 
what you see.” S was shown a cartoon of a face to the 
target eye and one of the four words previously shown, 
to the masked eye. After S had described the face, E 
asked "Did you see anything else at all?” (answer 
invariably, "No”) "Let me show you again.” (Answer 
again "No”) "Good. Now I am going to show you a faint 
word.” A blank card was inserted in the slide-holder on 
the target side. This was a visual threshold check on 
the masked word. If S couldn't report the word after two 
exposures, the exposure time was increased to 0.8 sec.
This procedure was satisfactory for 16 out of 20 8s.
(12 8s needed no adjustment at all). For two 8s it was 
assumed that the other eye must be dominant and everything 
was switched round, satisfactory performance being obtained 
at 0.5 sec. 8 was then shown a reversible staircase to 
the target eye and a neutral word to the masked eye. Two 
8s only reported a glimpse of "something” in addition to 
the staircase. Exposure for them was reduced to 0.3 sec 
with no subsequent report of awareness of the masked stimulus.
8 was then shown a complex cartoon to the target eye and 
a word to the masked eye. With this final trial slide no
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S reported seeing anything in addition to the target 
stimulus or was unable to report the masked stimulus 
when the target stimulus was occluded. The main 
experiment was then begun.
For each S, prior to the experiment, the 20 slides 
(which were numbered) were randomised in a different order 
with the aid of random number tables, so that E could not 
know which slide was being shown S on the masked side at 
any one time, hopefully eliminating any possibility of 
experimenter bias affecting responses in different 
conditions differentially. Slides had been made of 
Smith et al ' s Fig. 1, and were presented to the target 
side, three exposures of the slide alternating with three 
of its Right - Left reversal. This procedure had two 
functions, it enhanced the S's impression that different 
faces were being presented and it made explanations of 
changes in expression due to fusion of the hidden word 
with the face unlikely, because the face was asymmetrical. 
Before presentations began, the projector on the target 
side was moved forward to the mark, so that the image was 
blurred, but recognizable as a neutral face.
In pilot studies it was found that some 6s were unable 
to accept that the face (in focus) was not the same each 
time. Putting the face out of focus reduces the specificity 
of the perceptual constructs S makes and hence enables a 
greater effect of the subliminal stimulus. This finding 
is analogous that of Goldstein and Barthol (1960) and 
others, as will be elucidated further in the discussion.
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S was then told "Now that you are used to the 
apparatus, let's go on to the main experiment, which 
is about person perception. I am going to show you a 
series of faces. For each face I would like you to 
judge whether the impression it gives you is Miserable, 
Neutral or Cheerful. This is not an easy task, because 
the faces differ only in small details, one from another, 
so don't worry if you don't see much difference at first.
The important thing is just to give your impression of 
what you see, by giving one of the judgments. Miserable, 
Neutral or Cheerful. After you've judged the first slide, 
wait until any after-images have faded and then say 'Ready' 
and I'll show you the next. O.K.? Any questions?"
E then showed the first pair of slides at the same 
time exposure - 0.5 sec in most cases, going on to 
alternate the "face" slides every third presentation.
This served to maximize the impression that S was seeing 
a series of slides instead of the same one each time.
Any effects due to slight differences between the face and 
its mirror-image cancelled out over subjects as the same 
sequence was used for all subjects, whereas the sequence 
of words with which they were paired was different for 
each subject.
After the sequence of twenty judgments by S (which 
were recorded on a prepared sheet by E) a short interpolated 
task, easy and relaxing for S, was performed. With a blank 
slide on the masked side, S was merely required to report
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whether writing was present or absent on a slide and if 
present, roughly whereabouts. Six slides (in focus) 
were shown. E then continued, "Good. Now I'm going to 
repeat the previous experiment. Most people find that 
on the second run they see rather more differences in 
the faces. Just judge them exactly as before, as 
Miserable, Neutral or cheerful." At the end of the 
second session which was conducted exactly as the first,
S was shown the final masked word on its own by occluding 
the target face. This was a check that subliminal stimuli 
had been above recognition threshold and produced a 
positive result for all Ss.
For the third session of the experiment, the large 
filter was removed, a 0.5 Wratten filter was inserted, 
reducing intensity so that the words did not stand out 
from the face, but were nevertheless clearly visible.
S was told "In this last part of the experiment. I'll 
show you the series of faces again but this time you'll 
see a word superimposed on each one. Now, I don't want 
to know what the words are, I want you to judge the faces 
exactly as you did before, giving your impression of the 
face as 'miserable, neutral or cheerful'. As a check 
that you are seeing the words, occasionally no word will 
be shown and I want you to report this. So just judge the 
faces exactly as before, only telling me if nn word is 
present. O.K.?" The slides were then shown in the same 
sequence as the previous two "runs". Ss correctly reported 
the absence of a word in all cases.
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Introspective data» After completion of the experiment 
all Ss were asked what they thought the experiment was 
about and whether they had been conscious of being 
stimulated on the masked side. Only 4 out of 20 Ss 
reported anything at all, none of them being able to 
identify the stimuli ; they only reported having been 
conscious of "something" on at most 7 or 8 out of 40 
presentations. Most Ss (the other 16) expressed surprise 
when told of the actual experimental situation. The 
purpose of the experiment was also explained and Ss 
asked not to communicate details of it to their friends.
Subjects. 20 Ss, 10 male, 10 female; post-graduates, 
under-graduates, teaching and technical staff in the 
psychology department.
Results
Subjects' responses were scored as +1, 0 or -1 
corresponding to Cheerful, Neutral or Miserable. Thus 
for each condition in each session Ss could score from 
+4 to -4. Mean scores over 20 Ss in each condition of 
each session are shown in Table 1.1
Session 1 was treated as practice. A separate Analysis 
of Variance showed no significant effects of Conditions 
(i.e. words) in this session (F = 1.27, à . î » 4, 76).

















































































































































The hypothesis that subliminal stimuli have more effect 
on a second run was not tested in this experiment, as 
Sessions 1 and 2 differed in instructions and preceding 
task as well as order.
The results for sessions 2 and 3 were submitted to 
an analysis of variance followed by planned comparisons 
(see Appendix 1: tab A.I.3) effects being tested against 
their interaction with subjects. The raw data for the 
analysis is also given in appendix 1: tab A. 1.1. A 
summary table of the analysis is given in tab 1.2.
Tab. 1.2; Summary of analysis of variance
Source Sum of squares mean square u^Ug F p
Sessions 9.68 9.68 1,19 7.53 <0.025
Session x subjects 25*12 1.32
Subjects 77.12
Conditions 38.22 9.56 4,76 4.37 <0.005
Conditions x subjects 165.38 2.19
Sessions x conditions 4.12 1.03 4,76 < 1 n.s.
Sessions x conditions
, . . 180.08 2.37
X subjects
The conditions sum of squares yielded an F value of 4-37 
(df 4, 76: p < 0.005). However, planned comparisons of 
the conditions x sessions interaction (tab. 1.3) yielded 
no significant effects. To differentiate between the two 
sessions within the conditions sum of squares, conditions 
were tested in the two sessions independently with unplanned
comparisons.
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Tab. 1.3 î Planned comparisons of conditions x sessions 





Comparison 2 sessions) 1.25
Comparison 3 (3 vs. rest . p.
over sessions)
Comparison 4 (2+4 ^"06
1,76 < 1  n. s
4.12 1.03 4,76 < 1 n. s.
1 2 5 4 5
21 2 -6 10 -7





Conditions 1 and 5 differed significantly from each 
other in both the subliminal session 2 (P = 8.27, d.f. 1,76;
P < 0.01) and the supraliminal session 3 (P = 4.65, d.f.1,76;
P < 0.05) (two-tailed test in each case) but it will be seen 
from tab. 1.1 that only condition 1 showed marked difference 
from the blank slide (condition 3)- This difference was 
larger in session 2 than in session 3, which weighs against 
consideration of subliminal effects as watered down versions 
of supraliminal effects; the difference was not however 
significantly larger in session 2.
Results for words (Conditions 2 and 4) of similar contour 
to the affect words in conditions 1 and 5 did not differ 
significantly between sessions 2 and 3 (the relevant component 
of the interaction between conditions and sessions gave P < 1)
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Nor was the component of this interaction significant 
(comparison 2) which tested the difference between 
Sessions 2 and 3 in the differences between affect 
words and words of similar contour (P < 1, d.f. 1, 76).
Thus the prediction of a difference in handling of the 
contour similar words in the two sessions was not confirmed. 
There was a slight indication that the responses to these 
words were more similar to responses to the words they 
resembled in contour in the supraliminal than in the 
subliminal session.
The supraliminal session yielded responses which were 
significantly more positive over all conditions than those 
in the subliminal session (F = 7.55, d.f. 1,19; P < 0.025).
This is one indication that the sessions were handled 
differently, but may have been an effect of order of 
presentation or differences in task, since Ss had to 
report the absence of words as well as making ratings 
of the face in Session 3*
In conclusion, it has been established that words 
presented outside awareness had an effect on semantically 
related judgments, which was at least as great as that 
with the same words presented supraliminally. It has 
not been established that responses to subliminal and 
supraliminal stimuli differ qualitatively. Therefore 
it was decided to repeat the experiment using, in 
conditions 2 and 4, words which were more similar in 
contour to the critical words than those used in 
experiment 1.
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Experiment 2. Perception without awareness in a dichoptic 
viewing situation. A replication.
Abstract :-
In this experiment the findings of the previous 
experiment were confirmed. In addition it was found 
that increasing the similarity of contour between 
critical and control words of different meaning 
suggested differences between subliminal and supra­
liminal sessions. Responses tended to be meaning- 
related in the former and structure-related in the 
latter. The relevance of these experiments to current 
theories of selective attention is discussed.
METHOD:- 
Procedure
This was the same as in Experiment 1. The slides used 
were HAPPY, HARPY, blank slide, SAP and SAD, each presented 
four times in randomised order. In other words, the control 
slides (conditions 2 and 4) were made to resemble the 
critical affect words as nearly as possible while retaining 
different meaning.
Following the initial procedure to accustom Ss to the 
apparatus, 15 Ss had the "target" picture exposed at 0.5 sec 
to their Right eye, 2 Ss at 0.8 sec to their Right eye and 
5 Ss at 0.5 sec to their Left eye. The rest of the procedure 
was exactly as in Experiment 1.
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Introspective data. None of the 20 Ss reported being 
aware of any stimulation other than the "target" 
picture presented.
Subjects. 14 male and 6 female undergraduates and 
technical staff from several departments. About half 
were from non-psychology departments.
Results
From the mean scores for the 20 Ss, shown in Table 2.1 
it appears that there is a stronger bias towards "cheerful" 
judgments, perhaps related to the inclusion of the new 
"contour words". Results were treated as before. Again, 
no effects of words on responses occurred in Session 1 
(F = 0.9, d.f. 4,76). (Appendix 1, tab A 2.1)
The analysis of variance summary and sessions x 
conditions planned comparisons are shown in tab. 2.2 and 
tab. 2.5 respectively.
Conditions 1 and 5 differed significantly from each 
other in both subliminal and supraliminal sessions 
(unplanned comparisons) (F = 5*^0» d.f. 1,76 and F = 5*65, 
d.f. 1,76; P < 0.025 in each case, 2-tailed test) but in 
this experiment it was condition 5 which differed clearly 
from condition 5 (blank slide) in each case, whereas in 
Experiment 1, Condition 1 differed from Condition 5 while 



































































































































Tab. 2.2. Summary of analysis of variance
Source Sum of 
squares
Mean Square P p
Sessions 0.98 0.98 1,19 <1 n.s.
Subjects 188.8
Sessions x subjects 72.62 5.82
Conditions 29.35 7.54 4,76 5.58 0.01
Conditions X subjects 155.85 2.05





(Raw data for the analysis is shown in appendix 1: tab A 2.2)
Tab. 2.5. Planned comparisons of conditions x sessions
interaction: summary table and totals
Totals:- Conditions 1 2 5 4 5
Sessions: subliminal 21 17 21 52 2
supraliminal 29 22 55 14 9
Source Sum of 
squares
F p (1-tailed)
Comparison 1 (1 vs. 5) 0.01 1,76 < 1 n. s.
2 (2 vs. 4) 6.62 1,76 5.74 0.05
5 (5 vs.rest)2.54 1,76 1.49 n. s.
4 (1+5 vs. 2+%.90 1,76 2.77 0.05
14.17 4,76 2.00 0.1
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This was due to a difference in responses to the blank 
slide in the two experiments, Ss in Experiment 2 being 
biassed more toward "cheerful" responses in this 
condition than those in Experiment 1. The means for 
Conditions 1 and 5 (and hence the differences between 
them) were however very similar in the two Experiments.
Responses to words (Conditions 2 and 4) of similar 
contour to the affect words showed differences between 
Sessions 2 and 5. They were similar to those made to the 
affect words they resembled in the supraliminal session 
(Session 5) as predicted, but this was not true in Session 
2 in the case of the word SAP, of similar contour to SAD.
As in Experiment 1, the difference between Conditions 2 
and 4 was in the opposite direction in Session 2 and 
Session 3- However, the relevant component of the inter­
action between Sessions and Conditions was not significant 
in Experiment 1, but was in Experiment 2 (P = 5.74, 
d.f. 1,76; P = 0.05 on a one-tailed test). This result 
is expressed graphically in Pig. 2.1. Also the component 
of this interaction which tested the difference between 
Sessions 2 and 5 in the differences between the affect 
words and words of similar contour (comparison 4), which 
was not significant in Experiment 1, was just significant 
at the 5% level in the predicted direction in Experiment 2. 
Responses to aiffect words were more similar to their contour 
similar mates in Session 5 than in Session 2 (P = 2.77> 
d.f. 1,76; P = 0.05 on a one-tailed test).
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The supraliminal session again yielded responses 
which were more positive than those in the "subliminal" 
session, but the difference (represented by the sessions 
sum of squares) was not significant (? < 1). However, 
a further difference between subliminal and supraliminal 
sessions is apparent if the total number of positive and 
negative responses is examined. This difference can be 
tested by assigning +1 or -1 appropriately and calculating 
the variance in each session. Results, pooled from both 
experiments, are shown in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4 shows that Ss responded similarly in Sessions 
1 and 3 but produced far more negative and far less neutral 
responses in Session 2. This pattern of results was similar 
in both experiments.
All differences between Sessions 2 and 3 could be 
order effects or due to changes in instructions, task or 
experimenter's attitude, and further work is needed 
controlling for these factors before firm conclusions can 
be drawn. It would have made the present experiments very 
cumbersome to include such controls in a way which avoided 









































































































The results obtained are similar to those of Snith 
et al. (1959)1 in that they suggest that words perceived 
outside of awareness (i.e. when S is not aware of being 
stimulated) or subliminally have an effect on the response 
to a conscious percept processed simultaneously.
Hardy and Legge (1968), Lewis (1970) and Corteen and Wood
(1972) have obtained similar results with different 
experimental situations. The results presented here also 
suggest some differences related to awareness. When both 
the word and the other percept (a picture) were within 
awareness, Ss responses seem to have been more influenced 
by structure than meaning, in that less common words, of 
similar shape but different meaning were often responded 
to as if they were the expected words HAPPY and SAD.
This was borne out by introspective data from Experiment 2. 
Unless either of the words HAPPY or SAP happened to occur 
first in the supraliminal series, most subjects, when asked 
immediately afterwards to recall which words they were shown, 
were only able to report the two affect words or perhaps the 
latter plus one of the other words. Conversely, when words 
are perceived outside of awareness, we can infer tentatively 
that meaning may be analysed, as the control words were in 
some cases responded to quite differently from the affect 
words which they closely resembled in contour; this was 
shown by the significant components of the interaction 
between Sessions and Conditions in Experiment 2 and is 
shown most strikingly in Condition 4- of that Experiment.
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This tends to confirm Dixon's statement (19?1, p.302) 
"If the stimulus is above threshold, the subject who has 
been instructed to identify the stimulus does so by 
giving the appropriate structurally equivalent verbal 
response. If on the other hand it is below threshold he 
tends to give a semantically related response .... if he 
is partially conscious of the stimulus structure .... the 
subject again gives a structurally related response."
Even though Ss were not instructed to identify the stimuli 
in this experiment, it would seem that, owing to the over­
learned nature of the response to the common words, HAPPY 
and SAD, Ss respond in the way that Dixon suggests they 
would.
The finding has relevance to the controversy between 
Wiener and his associates (Guthrie and Wiener, 1966;
Wiener and Kleespies, 1968) and Silverman and his associates 
(Silverman and Spiro, 1967; Silverman, 1968). Wiener 
advocates a "partial-cue response characteristic model" 
to explain ostensibly subliminal effects found with sub­
threshold exposures of pictorial stimuli (particularly 
Eagle, 1959) and his suggestions have been consistently 
challenged by Silverman et al. The findings of the 
present experiment are not easily explained by a partial- 
cue explanation.
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Another reason for suggesting that the experimental 
situation described here is homologous with other 
subliminal experiments, is the observation, detailed in 
the Method, that the picture had to be blurred before Ss 
were able to respond appropriately, viz. willing to respond 
other than "Neutral" to a neutral face plus masked stimulus.
This mirrors the experience of Goldstein and Barthol (1960). 
Incidental stimuli (words) had no effect on Ss phantasy 
responses to TAT cards until the cards were projected out 
of focus. Both these examples provide support for Allison's 
(1963) finding that "a cognitive structure which allows for 
less logical, less differentiated elements, can better permit 
the incorporation of new stimuli."
Finally, the experiment has relevance to current theories 
of selective attention. Some recent theories of attention 
(Norman, 1969^ Deutsch and Beutsch, 1963) suggest that 
information may be analysed in much greater detail before 
selection takes place than is envisaged by the models of 
Broadbent (1958) and Treisman (1969). The present finding 
is in line with the former concept. One can take the argument 
further. In the experiments on dichotic listening which 
have formed the major basis of both the latter formulations, 
effects produced by un-attended-to material have only been 
assessed by methods which assumed that the material had been 
processed in the same way as the shadowed input. In other 
words, a basic criticism one may make is that "irrelevant" 
material has been consistently treated only as if it were 
within awareness and not as if it might be outside of awareness.
61
Once one has accepted the concept that stimuli may 
both be analysed and remain outside awareness and have 
some subsequent effect on behaviour (as workers such as 
Dixon, 1971 ; Spence, 1967; Silverman, 1971 and others 
have done) the picture changes. Unlike any of the 
theories of attention mentioned above, Dixon's concept 
of selective attention allows for the analysis of material 
which does not impinge on the phenomenal register.
Dixon sees the phenomena of selective attention and those 
of subliminal perception as representing end points on a 
single continuum of information handling. In experiments 
on selective attention such as the dichotic listening tasks, 
both kinds of information handling may occur simultaneously. 
Such parallel processing is indicated in the experiments of 
Lewis (1970) and Corteen and Wood (1972) mentioned above.
A re-examination of the data and re-design of experiments 
to take this possibility into account may prove fruitful.
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A sign-post to remaining sections
Two apparently divergent routes of investigation have
followed from Experiments 1 and 2. The experimental work
subsequent to these experiments is divided accordingly.
Firstly, Experiments 1 and 2 served as a trial for the
suitability of the apparatus for use in the investigation
of perception without awareness. As the attempt met with
some modest success this avenue was pursued further.
Secondly, among the implications of the findings was
that the relative roles of selective attention and
perception without awareness should be examined,
particularly in respect to situations where the two
systems may be operating simultaneously. In section B
therefore the handling of emotional and neutral stimuli
outside of awareness and within awareness is explored. 
tWi.
In section Dj^relation between theories of selective 
attention and perception without awareness is discussed 
and a tentative synthesis is suggested. A brief conclusion 
follows section p.
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Section B: EMOTIONAL STII-IüLI AND PERCEPTION
WITHOUT AWARENESS
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Experiment 3a: the effect of an emotive subliminal stimulus
on concurrent cognitive and associative tasks
Abstract
The effect of an emotive subliminal stimulus (nude 
figure) on concurrent cognitive and associative tasks was 
investigated using reaction time as the dependent variable.
As a secondary aim, an hypothesis put forward by %ence 
(1967) was tested in a modified form. Spence predicted 
that as well as being more difficult to discriminate, a 
taboo word would cause a delayed effect when associates 
to it were used in a subsequent learning task.
The results of Experiment 3a, which involved 12 subjects, 
although providing significant effects, were rejected because 
of methodological inadequacies, the chief being that the 
experimenter measured subjects' verbal reaction time. In 
Experiment 3b, 24 subjects took part and verbal reaction 
time was recorded by S pressing a key as he or she responded.
In the cognitive task a CVC was paired with either the 
subliminal nude picture or two subliminal control slides, 
a picture of a clothed girl or an outline (projected upside- 
down). The cognitive task involved various manipulations 
of the supraliminal CVC such as transposing letters. In 
the associative session subjects gave an associate to each 
of 20 pictures, being presented with the same series of 
subliminal stimuli as in the cognitive session. The 
perceptual defence effect was demonstrated by a) a differential 
response in terms of RT to the nude stimulus and b) change
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in ranking of the CVC paired with the nude stimulus when 
ranked immediately after the experiment and one day later 
(compared with base-line ranking before the experiment).
Subjects were divided equally into two groups, 
labelled D and S depending on whether their rating of 
the critical CVC fell or rose immediately after the 
experiment (a fall meaning that the CVC was ranked easier). 
Group D showed a presumptive defence effect in that they 
gave longer reaction times to the CVC in the main experiment, 
rated the CVC as easier immediately after the experiment 
but a day later rated the CVC as harder than before the 
experiment. The results for group 8 tended to be in the 
opposite direction but were less striking. When five of 
group D were subgrouped as ’Repressors' on the basis of 
their score on the Byrne R/S scale they showed an acentuation 
of the overall effect within group D. Only one of group S 
gave a score on the R/S scale corresponding to a ' sensitizer ',
In the associative session group D subjects gave a 
faster response to the nude stimulus than to control stimuli, 
whereas there was little difference in stimulus handling by 
group S. The handling of stimuli by both groups in the 
subliminal associative session differed from that in the 
supraliminal session.
The methodological weaknesses of the procedure are 
discussed and some hypotheses put forward to explain the 
findings in respect to both sections of the experiment.
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INTRODUCTION:
Bevan (1964) lists three major types of effect 
associated with subliminal stimulation:-
1. The evocation of responses that are essentially 
equivalent to those produced by supraliminal stimuli
2. The failure of appearance of responses which one 
otherwise might expect to appear (perceptual defence 
data fall into this category) and
3. The induction of a change or distortion in the 
perceptual responses to a (concurrent) supraliminal 
stimulus.
The preceding experiments (Experiments 1 and 2) can 
be said to demonstrate the first type of effect mentioned 
above, with the tentative provisos as to the qualitative 
difference between subliminal and supraliminal effects 
which have been stated. This experiment explores the 
third category, using emotive pictorial material which is 
presented outside of awareness. The principal dependent 
variable is reaction time and the effect of the subliminal 
stimuli on reaction time is measured in two different 
conditions, during a concurrent cognitive task and during 
a concurrent associative task. It was possible, moreover, 
to combine this investigation with an attempt to use 
subliminal stimuli to demonstrate a perceptual defence 
effect, following a suggestion by Donald Spence (196?).
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In his 1964 paper, Bevan comments that examination 
of the literature on perceptual defence revealed no major 
methodological breakthrough with the exception of the 
principle of convergent operations and he felt that this 
latter had not yet been translated into a particular set 
of empirical procedures in the service of this area of 
enquiry. A year later Natsoulas (1965) reviewed this 
problem in some detail. The term "converging operations" 
was first used in this context by Garner, Hake and Eriks en 
(1956) with reference to the need for making the crucial 
distinction between perceptual and response systems which 
had dogged experiments in this area. Natsoulas discusses 
the experiments which have attempted to estimate the effects 
of response bias by reference to a stimulus-absent condition 
(Mathews and Wertheimer, 1958; Go 1 diamond and Hawkins, 1958 
and Goldstein et al., 1962) |^ ob serve s that they fail to 
demonstrate that the distribution of response probabilities 
is similar for neutral and anxiety-arousing sets of 
alternative responses. Bootzin and Natsoulas (1965) 
attempted to deal with the problem by having subjects 
choose either between two emotional or between two neutral 
words when words were flashed for 0.05 sec. They claimed to 
demonstrate significantly less accuracy for anxiety-arousing 
than for neutral words.
Dixon (1971) concludes that experiments such as this 
fail to yield unambiguous results. He gives as an example 
two experiments, by Zajonc (1962) and Ruiz and Krauss (1968).
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Both experiments had as the essential procedure that 
suggested by Garner et al. , that recognition of a taboo 
word should be signalled by saying a neutral word and 
vice versa. The former experiment yielded results which 
suggested that the principal effect was due to a response 
bias against saying rude words, that is, recognition 
thresholds for neutral and taboo words did not differ but 
a longer exposure duration was required before saying a 
taboo word than before saying a neutral word. On the 
other hand Ruiz and Krauss's findings were in exactly 
the opposite direction, demonstrating no voluntary 
supression but results which suggested a change in the 
perceptual threshold. However, as Dixon points out, the 
first experiment did not disprove the possibility of 
perceptual effects, since habituation from the paired 
associate task which preceded the critical recognition 
thresholds (i.e. where subjects learnt the taboo response 
to a neutral word and vice versa) may have affected 
perceiving but not responding. Conversely, if a stimulus 
effect is demonstrated, we are still left with the stimulus 
effect hypothesis first outlined by Blum (1955)? that 
seeing a taboo word could well inhibit responding with a 
neutral word. Further, the second experiment may be 
explained in terms of there being some reluctance to say 
a neutral word since this might indicate an unhealthy 
predisposition towards seeing rude words. Though this 
latter seems rather a weak argument, Dixon's main premise 
seems valid, that these experiments demonstrate how
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difficult it is to provide a convergent operation which 
will distinguish between sensory and response effects, 
and the example he gives also illustrates another point, 
that each new methodological departure only serves to 
introduce a fresh crop of problems.
Dixon mentions two major weaknesses of most of the 
early experiments on perceptual defence, which even 
those experiments mentioned above suffer from; firstly 
that they involve tachistoscopic presentation and the 
determination of recognition thresholds and secondly, 
that they use the same paradigm for investigating as 
for demonstrating the phenomenon. The first weakness 
lies in the fact that S is aware of occurrence to the 
stimulus and so may receive varying partial cues, a 
factor difficult to control ; also, as %ence comments, 
recognition threshold procedures are almost laughably 
insensitive. The second complication is that the subject 
has to report the stimulus in a recognition situation, 
the stimulus being the agent which affects the threshold 
for phenomenal representation of itself. Dixon's 
solution is to concentrate on awareness threshold^ and 
to attempt to demonstrate a sensory effect by studying 
apparent sensitivity to a neutral stimulus (a spot of 
light) for one eye while presenting stimulus material 
at subliminal intensities to the other eye.
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Spence (1967) suggests an alternative procedure. He 
reviews some of the literature mentioned above, including 
Dixon and Lear (1965), which involved a similar technique 
to the mentioned above (i.e. determination of awareness 
thresholds, although not uniocularly). Alpha activity 
was measured simultaneously to demonstrate that high 
thresholds were associated with depressed activation of 
the cortex (increased alpha).*
%)ence sees, as did Bevan, that perceptual defence 
studies ended where the subliminal studies began; the 
former tried to produce non-recognition as a response 
measure, whereas the latter began with non-recognition 
and asked what if anything the unseen stimulus would affect. 
He argues the importance of combining both procedures; by 
using a subliminal stimulus to affect perceptual sensitivity 
many of the methodological pitfalls could be avoided.
Spence, while mentioning one of Dixon's experiments, does 
not credit him with having done exactly what he suggests.
Footnote
*
Spence appears to describe the relationship incorrectly in 
his paper, but this is because he confuses awareness with 
recognition thresholds. He states that subjects with a 
delayed threshold for "rude" words showed less alpha (more 
activation) before recognition of the word. Dixon and Lear 
actually showed that in the first 5-sec. epoch (i.e. that 
preceding awareness) alpha was reduced for the high threshold 
group, and peaked for the low threshold group, then fell to 
a low level before recognition in the latter group, while the 
former group showed a large rise in alpha between awareness 
and recognition. A phrase of j^ence's which is referred to 
below seems to confirm that he is confused or careless in his 
use of terms.
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As the Dixon and Lear experiment was concerned with the 
determination of awareness threshold only it is possible 
that at that time %)ence may not have read Dixon's 
earlier papers which used the technique described above 
(Dixon 1958, I960; Dixon and Lear, 1962)!
' 4
Spence suggests that^a series of rude words is 
briefly exposed in a something or nothing procedure in 
which the critical word is paired with a neutral word^ 
the subject would merely report whether a word was flashed 
in first or second (temporal) position. The stimulus word 
is not brought into awareness (presumably Spence means 
that intensity and duration are such that recognition is 
not possible but that words are at the awareness threshold 
(again a confusion of terms as indicated in the previous 
footnote)); all that is looked for to show that perceptual 
defence is occurring, is some evidence that discrimination 
is poorer for the rude word than for its matched control. 
Then evidence of a delayed effect of the word is looked for. 
This could be done by following the discrimination task 
with the subject having to learn a clearly visible list 
of words which are associated in meaning with the previously 
exposed rude words. Recall of the list would be used as 
a measure of delayed effect. If the same words which are 
not recognized in the discrimination task also seemed to 
bias recall of the clearly visible list, we would have two 
indications that a word not in conscious awareness was 
producing an effect.
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Briefly, Spence explains his thesis in terms of the 
model of short- and long-term storage proposed hy KLeinsmith 
and Kaplan (1963). These workers found that 1) syllables 
associated with high arousal during learning were remembered 
better one week after learning than immediately after
2) syllables associated with low arousal were remembered 
better immediately after learning than one week after, and
3) in general, there was a significant interaction between 
arousal and the course of learning. Spence argues that 
discrimination of rude words is worse than that for neutral 
words because the 'best guess' is more likely to be 
inaccessible, being held in "closed-loop reverberating- 
drcuit kind of storage" for long-term memory. It is of 
interest that Spence's suggestion is consonant with Brown's 
(1961) recommendations for future theory: that any new 
theory will be more valuable if it is couched in terms of 
wide applicability in several areas of psychological 
investigation and secondly, that it is profitable to regard 
perceptual defence effects as epiphenomena, discoverable
in the investigation of recognition thresholds, but 
originating in more realistic, if less controllable, 
situations. By interpreting perceptual defence in terms 
of memory mechanisms and suggesting the use of subliminal 
stimuli to investigate the phenomenon, Spence's idea seems 
to fulfil Brown's requirements.
Spence ' s idea was adopted in a slightly modified form. 
Subjects were asked to rate 6 CVC's in order of difficulty 
of handling. Subjects then did an experiment involving 
cognitive handling of the CVC's where three of the CVC's
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were consistently paired with subliminal stimuli, one 
emotive, the other two controls (the cognitive task).
After the experiment subjects were asked to re-order 
the CVC's in the actual order of difficulty experienced.
A day later subjects were asked to remember the CVC's 
in order of difficulty. Given that the emotive stimulus 
had a disruptive effect, producing longer RT's, which 
could be equated with perceptual defence, fence's theory 
would predict that immediately after the .experiment, the 
CVC paired with the subliminal emotive stimulus would be 
less available to memory because of being in closed loop 
storage and hence might be ordered as easier (i.e. lower 
in the list, mentioned later) than the control CVC's.
A day later, however, the CVC would be maintained in long 
term memory and would be among those first mentioned 
(rated harder - higher in the list). A converse effect 
would occur if subjects reacted to emotive stimuli with 
vigilance.
METHOD
Subjects were shown three groups of slides, constituting 
"cognitive", "associative" and "supraliminal" sessions.
The order of the first two sessions was alternated across 
subjects, so that three female and three male subjects 
had the cognitive session first and three from each group 
had the associative session first.
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In the cognitive session the principle of the 
experiment was that one particular nonsense syllable 
(CVC) for each subject was paired with subliminal 
presentation of a nude figure, one CVC paired with a 
clothed figure and one with a cartoon. The three 
stimuli were each presented six times in all, in all 
the possible orders of sequence. Each set of three 
CVC's was preceded by a trial CVC (paired with a 
blank slide) which was one of the three remaining CVC's.
That is, there were six CVC's to choose from:- 
ZIV, ZAN, QQR, Dm, YAD and VEM; for each subject three 
were chosen to be paired with nude, clothed and cartoon 
stimuli and one of the other three was used at random as 
trial stimulus within each block. Thus, over 12 subjects 
each CVC was paired with the nude stimulus for two subjects. 
Each block of four slides required a different type of 
response, thus: a) word association, b) transposing CVC
letters (read out the middle then first then last),
c) give next letter in the alphabet for each CVC letter,
d) identify (CVC up-side-down and back to front) e) word 
association (CVC blurred) and f) give letter before each 
CVC letter in the alphabet. The six tasks were always 
presented in the same order but the order of presentation 
of slides within each task and hence the position of the 
slide paired with the different subliminal stimuli was 
randomised. Block a) was used as a trial run and was paired 
with blank slides throughout. Thus only five of the six 
possible orders counted for each subject yielding five 
exposures of each stimulus (blocks b) to f)).
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For the associative session, twenty slides of scenes 
in Greece and Holland (slightly ont of focus) were shown 
subjects and subjects were asked to associate to them.
The twenty slides were always shown in the same order 
and were paired with the twenty slides presented 
subliminally as blocks b) to f) in the cognitive session.
The supraliminal session was a re-run of the 
associative session with the filter replaced by a O.5 
wratten filter, so that both stimuli (picture plus nude, 
clothed or cartoon stimuli or blank slide) were presented 
to different eyes at roughly the same intensity and seen 
as superimposed.
Each stimulus was presented for O.5 sec, closure of 
the shutter beginning a stop-clock. The experimenter 
pressed a key to stop the clock when the subject spoke 
thus giving response time. At the time of the experiment 
a working voice key was not available.
The measures used to determine whether or not slides 
were completely below the subject’s awareness threshold 
were less complex than those used in the previous experiment, 
The rationale for this was two-fold, firstly - if subjects 
did catch glimpses of masked stimuli, this would contribute 
to error variance given that H^j predicted that stimuli were 
treated in a qualitatively different manner when the subject 
was aware of them from when he was not and also that 
subliminal stimuli are postulated to have less effect when 
nearer the awareness threshold (e.g. see Dixon (197^ )^ p.240)
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Secondly, there had been criticism of the previous 
experiment that the elaborate technique used to confirm 
that the subject was not able to see masked stimuli 
would sensitize some subjects and defeat the purpose of 
the procedure. Therefore all subjects were shown masked 
subliminal stimuli to their right eye. At the beginning 
of the experiment the subject was shown three pairs of 
scenes to each eye and asked to say what they saw; for 
each pair, first both slides were shown together and 
then the masked scene only as a check that it was above 
threshold when presented alone. Immediately before the 
supraliminal session the subject was shown the last 
masked slide of the previous session on its own as a 
further check that masked slides had been above the 
visual threshold. Introspective data confirmed that the 
relatively simple initial procedure did not 'put subjects 
wise' to the technique.
Materials: Five 2 x 2" slides of naked girls showing
pubic hair were provided by Dr. J. Sandler and five slides 
of clothed models were prepared from pictures in a woman's 
magazine. The five cartoon slides had been used in an 
experiment by Dr. M. Lawlor and represented stick figures 
conversing or in crowd scenes. The apparatus was essentially 
as in the previous experiment with the addition of stop- 
clock and key (see Fig. $.1). The filter consisted of a 
combination of Kodak wratten filter to the value $.6.
The six CVC's were printed separately on white post-cards, 























Procedure: Each subject was given the six CVC's on cards
and told "this experiment involves cognitive tasks with 
nonsense syllables. To start with I want you to rank 
these six CVC's in order of difficulty i.e. putting 
first the one which you think would be hardest to handle 
in a task such as transposing letters. Don't worry too 
much - its just to get a base-line." After the order of 
CVC's was noted, the lights were switched off and the 
subject was shown the three initial slide pairs. "Now, 
to accustom you to the apparatus, I want you merely to 
tell me what you see." After the subject had described 
the first slide he was asked "did you see anything else?"
No subject answered in the affirmative. "Now, I am 
going to show you a much dimmer picturd' (subject then 
shown the masked stimulus only and describes it). The 
same procedure was used for the other two slide pairs.
The instructions for the associative session were as 
follows: "O.K. (if associative session first), to get
you used to the experiment ...." (or, if the cognitive 
session had been given first "As a control for the first 
part of the experiment ....) "in this part of the experiment 
you simply say the first word that comes into your head 
when you are shown each blurred picture." The instructions 
for the cognitive session were "In this part of the 
experiment I will show you the slides in groups of four, 
explaining what you must do before each group. The first 
slide of each group is a practice slide to ensure you 
understand the task."
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At the end of the second session, the subject was told 
"This time I am going to show you a dim picture, just tell 
me what you see" and was shown the last masked slide on 
its own. The subject was then told "in the final part 
of the experiment I am going to show you the pictures 
again, but sometimes you will find that there are two 
pictures superimposed. Just respond as before with the 
first word that comes into your head." At the end of 
this session the subject was given the six cards again 
and told "now that you have done the experiment, order 
the CVC's in the order of difficulty you actually 
experienced when you had to manipulate them. " Finally 
the subject was asked whether or not they had been 
aware at any time during the first two sessions of 
intruding stimuli. The purpose of the experiment was 
then explained and the subject was asked to keep it a 
secret.
Subjects: Twelve undergraduate and postgraduate psychology
students, six male and six female.
Introspective data: Six subjects were not aware of any
stimuli other than the target stimuli. Three subjects 
were aware of "something" on one and three subjects on 




Reaction time for each block of four slides was 
scored by ranks so that for all five presentations each 
stimulus was scored for each subject between 5 (stimulus 
fastest within each block) and 20 (slowest in each block).
A summary of totals for each subject is shown in Appendix 
1 (tab A 3.1). Tab. 3-1 gives a summary of mean ranks 
per exposure with reference to the analysis of variance.
Tab. 3.1. Rankings (mean) for male and female groups







A summary table for the analysis of variance is shown 
in tab. 3.2, the analysis being a split plot (M/E) with 
repeated measures on two variables within each half.
Each unit within the analysis represents the sum of ranks 
for five presentations of a particular stimulus in a given 
session, with subjects equally sub-divided by sex.
The only significant E ratios are for the sessions x 
stimuli and the sessions x stimuli x sex interaction 
(E = 14.11 and E = 2.69, df 6,60 respectively).
M E M E M E
2.60 2.60 2.97 2.73 2.16 2.40
2.33 2.10 2.36 2.81 2.53 2.70
2.26 2.33 2.43 2.46 2.81 3.00
2.77 2.50 2.16 1.97 2.50 1.90
8 1
Tab. 3.2. Analysis of variance : summary table (pilot experiment)
Source Sum of 
Squares
Mean
square "1^2 E p
Sex 0.25 - 1 - -
Subjects 3.41 - 10 - -
Stimuli 47.39 15.8O 5,50 < 1 n. s.
stimuli X sex 37.80 12.60 5,30 < 1 n. s.
stimuli X subjects 626.15 20.87
sessions 0.87 0.44 2,20 1.16 n. s.
sessions x sex 0.80 0.40 2,20 1.05 n. s.
sessions x subjects 7.67 0.38
sessions x stimuli 175.20 29.20 6,60 14.11 <0.001
sessions x stimuli x 
sex 55.55 5.56 6,60 2.69 0.025
sessions x stimuli x 
subjects 124.11 2.07
Table 3.5 is a summary table of sessions x stimuli 
planned comparisons. Details of the comparisons are given 
in Appendix 1 (tab A 3.2). Henceforth the cognitive session 
will be referred to as session 1, the associative session 
as session 2 and the supraliminal as session 3-
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Tab. 3-3- Analysis of variance: summary of stimulus X






Comparison 1 82.69 82.69 1,60 59.95 < 0.001
" 2 0.17 0.17 1,60 < 1 n. s.
" 3 8.<7 8.17 1,60 5.95 0.05
" 4 70.01 70.01 1,60 55.82 < 0.001
5 6.67 6.67 1,60 5.22 n. s.
6 7.52 7.52 1,60 5.63 n. s.
175.23 29.2 6,60 14.11 < 0.001
Comparison 1 is of sessions 1 + 2  (subliminal sessions) 
versus session 3 (supraliminal session) - excluding the 
blank or trial slides - and proves significant (E = 39-95 
df 1,60). By referring to tab. 3-1 it can be seen that 
the nude stimulus yields higher rankings i.e. longer 
reaction times, longer than either of the other two 
stimuli in both cognitive and associative sessions.
In session 3, the situation is reversed, with shorter 
reaction times to the nude stimulus than the other two 
stimuli. In both sessions 2 and 3 blank slide pairings 
yield the shortest reaction times, as might be expected. 
Comparison 2 (session 1 vs session 2, excluding blank slides), 
comparison 5 (differences in handling of clothed and cartoon 
stimuli between supraliminal and subliminal sessions) and 
comparison 6 (same interaction between sessions 1 and 2) 
all fail to achieve statistical significance. Comparisons 
4 and 3 are both significant, the former to a much greater 
extent (P = 33.82 and P = 3-95» df 1,60; respectively).
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Both these comparisons involve testing the trial or blank 
slides against the other three stimuli - in the former 
case session 1 versus session 2 and in the latter, 
supraliminal versus subliminal sessions. The large E 
value can be easily explained in terms of the difference 
in procedure. In session 1 the blank slide was paired 
with a CVC which was the first slide in each block of 
four, a trial slide - the long reaction time reflecting 
the subject’s uncertainty as to the correctness of his 
response. The large effect in comparison (4) of sessions 
1 and 2 is sufficient to explain the smaller effect
present in comparison 3-
Tab. 3-4 summarizes stimulus x sessions x sex 
planned comparisons', details of the comparison are 
given in Appendix 1 (tab. A 3-3).
The failure of comparisons 1 and 2 to reach statistical 
significance suggests that there is no sex difference in 
the handling^the nude stimulus in relation to the other
two stimuli, contrary to expectation. Comparison 3 is of
interest as it reflects the fact that there is a sex 
difference in the handling of the blank slide stimulus, 
comparing subliminal and supraliminal sessions - this being 
independent of the procedural difference in session 1 as 
comparison 4 fails to achieve statistical significance. 
Response to blank slide pairings in the supraliminal session 
appears to be slower in males than females - in comparison 
to handling of other slides, that is, they have lower mean 
rankings, as true time cannot be deduced from this analysis.
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Tab. 3-4. Analysis of variance : summary of triple






Comparison 1 2.84 2.84 1,60 1.37 n. s.
It 2 5.06 5.06 1,60 2.44 n. s.
3 8.96 8.96 1,60 4.33 < 0.05
" 4 0.50 0.50 1,60 < 1 n. s.
5 0.84 0.84 1,60 < 1 n. s.
6 15.19 15.19 1,60 7.34 < 0.01
33.39 5.56 6,60 2.69 0.02;
Finally, there is a significant sex difference in the 
handling of clothed and cartoon stimuli comparing sessions 
1 and 2. Females respond in clothed stimulus pairings 
faster than to the cartoon slide in session 1 while the 
reverse is true in the associative session. The rankings 
for the two stimuli are almost the same for males in both 
the sessions, although tending to be in the opposite order 
to those for females. A tentative explanation might be 
that for female subjects the clothed stimulus causes 
relatively more interference in the associative than the 
cognitive session because of their greater interest in a 
clothed female model than a cartoon, the stimulus causing 
less interference in the cognitive session because it is 
irrelevant to the task.
85
DISCUSSION
Although at first sight the experiment appears to 
demonstrate a significant difference in the relative 
handling of an emotive stimulus and control stimuli 
presented outside of awareness during two different 
types of tasks, in comparison with handling when 
stimuli are presented within awareness, there are several 
flaws in the methodology which, added together, must 
cause the results to he seriously questioned.
Firstly, the method of measuring reaction time is 
extremely suspect. The whole experiment can he discounted 
simply on the basis that the experimenter pressed the 
key when the subject responded and although stimuli were 
randomized and theoretically the experimenter was not 
aware which stimulus was being presented to the masked 
side on any exposure, the results could still be influenced 
by experimenter bias as e.g. the experimenter knew which 
CVC was paired with which stimulus. On top of this, this 
method of measuring reaction time is likely to be inaccurate, 
Secondly, the large effect of the emotive stimulus (nude 
girl) in both sessions is surprising in view of the fact 
that only 50% of subjects were totally unaware of receiving 
stimuli other than those presented to the target eye.
The introspective findings suggest that the filter was 
fixed at a level which resulted in masked stimuli (i.e. 
when paired with target stimuli) being slightly closer 
to the awareness threshold than that which would be expected 
to produce an optimum effect.
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There are several other minor defects which merit 
correction. Randomization of GVC's was not sufficient, 
so that although the nude stimulus was paired with each 
CVC twice, DIE for example was paired with the clothed 
stimulus five times and not at all with the cartoon 
stimulus. The findings related to the judgements of 
the CVC’s before and after the experiment have not been 
reported because in 6 out of 12 cases the key nonsense 
syllable i.e. that paired with the nude stimulus, did 
not change its relation to the other two CVC’s - those 
paired with the other (control) stimuli. Psychology 
students were used as subjects which raises the problem 
that some, particularly the postgraduates, could hardly 
be described as naive subjects. Finally, scoring by 
ranks is a relatively crude measure which may mask 
differences in reaction time e.g. between session 2 
and 3" It is probably more appropriate to use reciprocal 
reaction time as a means of correcting for ’skewness’ in 
reaction time raw data. This procedure was adopted in 
the subsequent experiments but re-analysis of the present 
data was not warranted because of the methodological flaws 
discussed above.
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Experiment 3b: A replication of Experiment 3a with
modifications
Experiment 3a was in essence repeated with the 
following improvements (in approx. order of relevance)
1. The experimenter noted the order of all 6 CVC’s after 
the subject had ordered them, not just the three critical 
ones, so that there was a greater chance of detection of 
change in order after the experiment even if the relative 
order of the three critical stimuli remained the same.
N.B. (as recapitulation) it was predicted that the CVC 
paired with the nude stimulus would be less accessible
to memory immediately after the experiment and so would 
be rated lower in the list (easier) while a day later 
the reverse would occur.
2. There was more thorough randomization of variables, 
partly by doubling the number of subjects, so that each 
CVC was paired with each stimulus four times overall, 
there being appropriate distribution of sexes, order of 
cognitive and associative sessions and order of possible 
sequences of the three critical stimuli (for a full list 
of the randomized procedures see Appendix 1: tab A 3.4).
3. The subject pressed the key as he or she responded to 
each stimulus, so that the subject contributed his or her 
own reaction time for each stimulus.
4. The majority of subjects were not psychology students.
3. The filter was increased in density by adding a 1.0 
value Kodak wratten filter (on one side).
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6. Reaction time was the dependent variable, rather than 
ranked time. Reciprocal times were used in analyses, to 
reduce the error arising out of the occasional long 
reaction time.
7- A separate "supraliminal only" group was run, as an 
order control, to answer the point raised in the discussion 
of Experiments 1 and 2. To recap, as subliminal sessions 
must always precede the supraliminal session, it could be 
argued that this order might give rise to between session 
differences which may be demonstrated, rather than the 
phenomenon of awareness. The order control is a "dummy 
run" where subjects respond to a session of slides with 
no masked stimuli other than blank slides and then do the 
supraliminal session in exactly the same way as subjects 
in the main experiment.
METHOD:
The method was the same as in the previous (pilot) 
experiment, apart from the additions mentioned above.
Apparatus: Slides used: although the nude and clothed
stimuli were as previous, a brightness control was included 
as the cartoon stimulus was considerably less bright# than 
the naked stimulus. Therefore a crude outline of the body 
was presented upside-down (as a second control stimulus), 
filled in with coloured film so that it was at least as 
bright as the nude stimulus.
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Procedure: The initial instructions included an admonition
in respect to pressing the key. "Remember, each time you
respond, press the key at the same time, to stop the clock.
Try to press the key as you speak rather than press the 
key and then speak, which is what you'll be tempted to do." 
The subject was then reminded after each of the six initial 
exposures (i.e. three slides to both eyes and masked eye 
only, alternately) so that by the time the first session 
started virtually all subjects were responding correctly. 
Subjects pressed the key with their left hand unless they 
specifically asked to be allowed to use their right, which 
happened about twice. The rest of the procedure was
identical with that of the preceding experiment. As
ordering of all 6 CVC's was recorded, the last stage of 
the experiment was implemented; wherever possible subjects 
were contacted the following day and asked to recall the 
CVC's.-
Order control: Subjects performed the same procedure as
the main experiment without receiving any subliminal stimuli, 
as described above.
Subjects : 36 subjects, 18 of each sex, were used. 24
performed the main experiment and 12 the order control.
The data from one additional subject were rejected (see 
below). Subjects were mostly undergraduates but not 
psychology students.
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Introspective data: Of the twenty-four experimental
subjects, 19 were not aware at any time of stimuli to 
the masked eye. One subject was aware of 'something' 
only once. Four subjects reported several glimpses 
of masked stimuli during the two sessions, ranging 
from 2 to 15 of the thirty critical stimuli. No subject 
seemed aware, following the experiment, of the true 
purpose of the procedure.
RESULTS:
Early on in the course of the experiment (after data 
from eight subjects had been collected) it was observed 
that there seemed to be a direct relation between a 
"defence" - type response, i.e. the key CVC rated as 
easier to handle after the experiment than before it 
(relative to the other CVC's) and relative reaction time 
for the nude stimulus pair in the cognitive session, the 
difference being in the expected direction (nude stimulus 
pair gives longer RT than controls). However, it was 
further noted that two subjects (both female) showed a 
"sensitizing" - type response in that the critical CVC 
was rated as harder after the experiment than before it, 
relative to the other CVC's. As analysis of the results 
by sex in Experiment 3a had proved of limited interest, 
subjects were accordingly divided into group D ("defenders") 
or group S ("sensitizers") according to whether the key 
CVC was rated harder or easier after the experiment than 
before. Eight of the D group which resulted were male 
and eight of the S group were female. As it happened.
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by the twenty-third subject there were twelve in group S 
and eleven in group D. Subject 24 proved to be a 
"sensitizer" and his data was- rejected as it was felt 
that, though methodologically to be frowned upon, the 
rejection of one subject was preferable to having 
unequal groups for analysis. Fortunately, the next 
subject tested was eligible for group D on the basis 
of his choice of CVC's after the experiment.
Perceptual defence. Rankings of CVC difficulty:- 
The mean ranks by group D and group 8 of the three critical 
stimuli are shown in table 3*5 under three conditions, 
before the experiment, after the experiment and one day 
later. The CVC rated as hardest is given rank 1, that 
rated easiest, rank 6. Any CVC which was forgotten a 
day later was given the average rank of 3« 5*
Analysis of variance summary tables are given in 
tables 3.6 and 3.7: (raw data for these analyses is shown 
in Appendix 1: tab A 3*5 and A 3*6).
(Note: although the distribution of ranks 1 to 6 is likely 
to approximate only crudely to normality it was considered 
that analysis of variance was a sufficiently robust test 
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Tab. 3.6. Group D: analysis of variance siimma-ry: 
PD effect
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Source SS MS "l"2 F P
Sessions 0.78 0.39 2,14 < 1 n. s.
Subjects 10.54
Sessions x subjects 22.67 1.62
Stimuli 0.78 0.39 2,14 < 1 n. s.
Stimuli X  subjects 42.67 3.06
Stimuli X  sessions 9.00 2.25 4,28 < 1 n. s.
Triple 66.88 2.39
Tab. 3.7. Group S: analysis of variance summary:
PD effect
Source SS MS UiUg F P
Sessions 4.68 2.34 2,22 1.34 n. s.
Subjects 56.47
Sessions x subjects 38.38 1.74
Stimuli 5.29 2.65 2,22 1.18 n. s.
Stimuli X  subjects 49.44 2.25 < 0.02
Stimuli X  sessions 32.16 8.04 4,44 3.44
Triple 103.61 2.34
The planned comparisons and the means of the totals 
on which they were used are shown in tab. 3-8 aiid the 
combined planned comparison tables (groups S and D) for the 
stimuli X sessions interaction are given in tab. 3«9*
The interactions are graphed in Fig. 3.2.
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summary: group s D and S: PD effect
Group D 1-tailed Group S 1—tailed
Comparison SS "1^2 F p Comparison SS p p
1 7.67 1,28 5.21 <0.05 1 27.25 1,44 11.5 <0.001
2 0.09 1,28 < 1 n. s. 2 2.92 1,44 1.25 U . S .
3 1.26 1,18 < 1 n. s. 3 1.51 1,44 < 1  n. s.
4- 0.01 1,28 < 1 n. s. 4 0.58 1,44 < 1  n. s.
Total: 9.05 4,28 < 1 n. s. 52.06 4,44 3.44 <0.01
It can be seen that comparison 1, which compares the 
relative position of the critical stimulus between after 
the experiment and before and later, is just significant 
for group D (1-tailed p < 0.05) and very significant for 
group S (1-tailed p < 0.001).
Finally, an alternative method of analysis was used, 
simply comparing before, after and late ranks for the nude 
stimulus pair across subjects by using the Hann-Whitney U 
test.
For group D the results were: Before vs. After p = 0.10 (U = 19) 
Before vs. Later p = 0.14 (U = 21) and After vs. Later p < 0.02 
(U = 12).
For group S the results were: Before vs. After p < 0.005 (U = 21) 
Before vs. Later p > 0.05 (U = 54-) and After vs. Later p < 0.01 
(U = 25): all p values 1-tailed.
. -I*, .
The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test  ^
should strictly be tried here* However results obtained with 
the Wilcoxon are substantially th# same
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In summary, for the smaller group D the results are 
in the predicted direction, the emotive stimulus being 
handled quite differently from the control stimuli.
The crucial finding is that the nude-pair stimulus is 
judged as harder on the day after the experiment than 
immediately afterwards and it is unfortunate that numbers 
are so small, so that the effect is only of marginal 
statistical significance. While results of much higher 
significance are obtained with the S group it must be 
noted that the results on the day after compared with 
before the experiment show a small rise in ranking 
(rated harder) for all three stimuli, i.e. no differential 
forgetting. There is a major weakness in the arguments 
used here in that differential forgetting or remembering 
is inferred from relative ranking. Actual forgetting of 
CVC ' s on the day following the experiment can be ascertained 
from tabs. A 3-5 and A $.6, i.e. those scores given 5-5» 
the average rank. In terms of actual forgetting there is 
less forgetting by group D subjects across all stimuli 
(16.7%) compared with group S subjects (25%). However, 
in terms of forgetting in relation to specific stimuli 
there is, if anything, slightly more forgetting associated 
with the nude stimulus, in group D and slightly less with 
the same stimulus in group S although these differences are 
a matter of the responses of one or two subjects. The 
experiment needs repetition with at least double the number 
of subjects if clear findings are to be hoped for. The 
ordering of the CVC's took place on average approx. twenty 
minutes or so after presentation of the stimuli. At the
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corresponding time in the Kleinsmith and Kaplan (1965) 
experiment recall for high arousal words was still rising 
and that for low arousal words still falling.
To conclude, the results tend in the right direction 
to support fence's hypothesis provided that the emotive 
stimuli are shown to have a significant effect in the 
cognitive session in the main experiment. Although the 
big change in rank of stimuli after the experiment is a 
function of selection i.e. group D and S were differentiated 
on that basis, the change a day later makes the rating 
immediately after the experiment worthy of explanation.
»
Main experiment. Table 3*10 gives the harmonic means for 
each condition in the main experiment: that is each score 
represents the reciprocal of the mean of 60 reciprocal 
reaction times: five presentations of each stimulus over 
12 subjects.
In the cognitive session the blank slide results can 
be discounted as in this session these represent trial 
presentations which are bound to be longer because of the 
procedure adopted.
For group D the nude stimulus yields longer reaction 
times than the two control stimuli, an average difference 
of 77 msec in session 1 and yields shorter times, an 
average of 88 msec in session 2. Differences for group S 
are much smaller and in the opposite direction: in session 
1 the reaction time to the nude stimulus is on average 4-5 
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The table of total reaction times from which tab. 3.10 
is derived is shown in Appendix 1 (tab A. 3.7). The 
summary table for the analysis of variance with repeated 
measures on sessions and stimuli within the two groups 
is shown in tab. 3-'11«
The significant stimulus sum of squares can be 
ignored as it stems from the procedural effect of the 
blank slide in session 1. Again, the sessions sum of 
squares is significant merely because the procedure in 
session 1 is different from that in the other two sessions. 
This difference accounts for five sixths of the variance.
A comparison of subliminal vs. supraliminal associative 
sessions yields F = 2.48 (df 1,44: p > 0.1).
Tab. 3"1^. Analysis of variance summary table:
groups X  sessions x stimuli : main experiment
Source Sum of 
Squares
Mean
square "l"2 F ' P
Groups 0.329
Subjects 803.779
Stimuli 7.238 2.419 5,66 5.72 < 0.01
Stimuli X group 0.471 0.137 5,66 < 1 n. s.
Stimuli X subjects 27.957 0.423
Sessions 56.135 18.076 2,44 6.80 < 0.01
Sessions x group 10.309 5.154 2,44 1.94 n. s.
Sessions x subjects 166.895 2.637
Stimuli X sessions 22.318 5.755 6,152 8.63 < 0.001
Stimuli X sessions x 
group 3.428 0.903 6,132 2.09 0.03
Stimuli X sessions x
subjects 57.238 0.454
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Tab. 3.12. Sunmiary of sessions x stimuli planned 
comparisons: main experiment
Sum of u^Up 
squares
Comparison 1 0.604
^ (II vs III) ^"662 
^ ^11 vs III] 0*^30
^ ffvsli°tni)2-ooo
5 I^ vs^II^+III)°'°55













22.320 6,132 8.63 <0.001
H. Means: (secs.)
1 2 3  
1.068 0.994 0.955 
1.072 1.034 0.900 
1.036 1.026 1.000 
1.407 1.008 0.955
A summary of sessions by stimuli planned comparisons 
is given in table 3.12. - the actual comparisons used are 
shown in tab. A 3.8. As differences between groups are 
appropriate to the cognitive session mainly, the comparisons 
chosen enabled examination of the two associative sessions 
alone, i.e. subliminal (session 2) versus supraliminal 
(session 3)- Comparison 2, that of handling of the nude 
and clothed control between sessions 2 and 3 is of border­
line significance, the nude stimulus eliciting faster RT's
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in the subliminal session. Any effects in comparisons 
4, 3 and 6 can be ascribed to procedural differences 
as they compare session 1 with sessions 2 and 3, i.e. 
in session 1 subjects were essentially doing a different 
task. Nevertheless, scrutiny of the means for clothed 
and outline stimuli reveals that handling of the two 
stimuli is similar in the two subliminal sessions but 
different in the supraliminal session. An unplanned 
comparison gives F = 8.60 (df 1,132: p < 0.003), a 
significant difference between subliminal and supraliminal 
sessions relatively independent of procedural biassing
i.e. the large effect of the blank slide in session 1 
being used as a trial slide in each block. However, the 
comparison fails to reach significance when the conservative 
Scheffe test is used (F would have to be F (0.(]3) 11,132 x 11 
= 21. 2).
A summary table of the planned comparisons on the 
stimuli X  sessions x group interaction is shown in tab. 3-13* 
The comparisons used have been described previously (tab A 3«5) 
It is of interest to compare these findings with those of 
the previous (pilot) experiment because, as noted above, 
two thirds of group D were male and two thirds of group S 
female.
Unlike previously comparison 2 just reaches statistical 
significance, indicating that handling of the nude stimulus 
in relation to control stimuli is different in sessions 1 
and 2; this difference is in the opposite direction for 
groups D and S. That is, the nude stimulus is reacted to
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Tab. 3.15. Stimuli x sessions x group interaction:
planned comparisons and totals: main experiment
Sum of u^Up 
Squares F p (2-tailed)
Comparison 1 0.27 1,132 < 1 n. s.
2 1.90 1,132 4.39 < 0.03
5 2.36 1,132 5.90 < 0.03
4 0.00 1,132 < 1 n. s.
5 0.00 1,132 < 1 n. s.
6 0.69 1,132 1.60 n. s.
Total 3.42 6,132 2.09 0.03
Totals/:- Group D: Group S:
Session: 1 2 3 Session 1 2 3
Nude 32.34 60.61 68.78 Nude 39.72 60.12 57.19
Clothed 33.93 36.02 70.31 Clothed 38.03 60.09 63.48
Outline 39.15 55.70 64.78 Outline 36.64 61.30 55.18
Blank 42.68 59.72 63.00 Blank 42.39 59.30 63.42
more slowly in session 1 by group D and more quickly in 
session 2 with the reverse pattern of responses occurring 
in group 8. In fact reaction times in session 2 differ 
very little in this latter group. (Comparison 3 is 
significant, as it was in the pilot experiment.) Reaction 
times to the blank slide are virtually identical for the 
two groups in the subliminal sessions and very similar in 
the supraliminal session (see also tab. 3-10).
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The significant difference results from the three 
critical stimuli being reacted to faster by group S than 
group D in both subliminal sessions but slower in the 
supraliminal session, which is consistent with the labels 
"defender" and "sensitizer" i.e. one could explain the 
results for group S by suggesting that they show less 
evidence of disturbance in the subliminal sessions but 
that when the stimuli are within awareness, greater 
interest in the stimuli is shown, manifested by longer 
reaction times for the group as a whole.
Main experiment: further analysis
a) Perceptual defence hypothesis. So far, the hypothesis 
for which evidence was presented has gained some further 
support by the just significant planned comparison of the 
cognitive and associative sessions interaction for the two 
subject groups. It was decided that it would be useful if 
these sessions could also be looked at separately, as this 
was impossible'within the context of the analysis of 
variance used.
Performance of the nude stimulus pair was again compared 
with that for the other three control stimuli using ranks, 
totals being obtained for each subject over the five exposures, 
ranging from 0 = nude stimulus gives the longest reaction 
times of the four stimuli on each of five exposures, to 15 = 
nude stimulus gives shortest reaction times over all five 
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For the cognitive session, comparison of groups h and 
S using the Mann-Whitney U test and determining Z (which 
enables a correction for ties) yields Z = 2.28 (one tailed 
p = 0.011), with group D subjects ranked higher, i.e. 
having significantly longer reaction times. For the 
associative session Z = 2.16 (2-tailed p = 0.031), the 
direction of the difference between the two groups being 
opposite to the originally predicted i.e. group D subjects 
actually respond faster in nude stimulus pairings. - This 
procedure enables comparison of group D and group S within 
sessions and yields significant results.
An attempt was made to compare responses to different 
stimuli within sessions for each group separately, using 
the Friedman two-way analysis of variance by ranks. For 
group D this test yielded, in session 1, = 3-5 (df 2),
p > 0.1 and in session 2, X^ = 7-2, p < 0.03* Group S 
results did not approach significance for either session.
b) Partial awareness. With relation to this problem, which 
needs controlling for as long as there fails to be a consensus 
among psychologists as to the verifiable nature of perception 
without awareness, the findings were as follows: firstly,
supraliminal and subliminal sessions differed significantly 
in the relative handling of the two control stimuli 
(excluding blank slide). Secondly, although there were 
significant differences in the relative handling of the nude 
stimulus in both subliminal sessions, groups D and S did not 
differ in the handling of this stimulus in the supraliminal 
session (using Mann-Whitney U test on the data in tab. 3*14;
Z = 1.67, 2-tailed p = 0.1). Also, neither group differed 
significantly
io|7
from the order control group e.g. group S, which differed 
more than group D from the order control group yielded 
on comparison U = 57 (p > 0.2) Z not being calculated 
because the result is clearly not significant. Although 
mean reaction times for the nude and clothed stimulus 
in the order control fell in between those for group 
D and S in their supraliminal session (see again tab. 3.10), 
those for the other control stimuli, the blank and outline 
slides were slightly different for the order control group. 
It is probable that this is not a perfect control technique 
as the possibility cannot be discounted that learning takes 
place during the dummy experiment such that supraliminal 
handling of stimuli is subsequently bis^ed. Clearly 
this could not be a large effect but is, after all, what 
is postulated to occur to produce differential rating of 
CVC's after the main experiment. What is maintained here 
is that handling of the critical stimuli is qualitatively 
different in subliminal and supraliminal conditions.
To add further support to this postulate, there is evidence, 
as in previous experiments (Experiments 1 and 2) that 
partial awareness, when reported subsequently by subjects, 
can be shown to have contributed to random variance during 
the experiment, rather than produced so-called subliminal 
effects. This point will be discussed in more detail in 
a later section.
c) Nature of groups D and S. One problem remaining is to 
explain the apparent cross-over effect i.e. that group D 
performs as predicted in the cognitive session but produces 
significantly faster reaction times to the nude stimulus
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pair in the associative session, the reverse (more or less) 
holding for group S. The division of subjects into these 
two groups, rather than on the basis of sex, as in the 
pilot experiment, has been explained as arising on an 
ad hoc basis early in the experiment. An attempt was 
made to investigate the nature of group D and group S 
by giving subjects, one year later, the revised form of 
the Byrne sensitizer/repressor scale (Byrne et al. 196$).
Byrne (1964) reviews the literature on approach vs. 
avoidance responses to threatening stimuli. Many early 
experiments on perceptual defence showed individual 
differences in defensive reactions, which were consistent 
with the formulations of both Eriksen and Gordon, that is, 
in response to threat some subjects showed defence 
(characterized by raised recognition thresholds) ased 
labelled "repressors" and some subjects showed vigilance 
(lowered recognition thresholds), being labelled "sensitizers", 
these responses corresponding to avoidance and approach 
responses respectively. Since 1961 Byrne has developed 
a refinement of a scale developed by other workers, to 
measure defensive behaviour, derived initially from six 
MMPI scales.
Ten subjects from group D and the 12 subjects from 
group S were successfully contacted and returned the form.
The scores for these twenty-two subjects were compared 
with those of 2$ subjects who acted as sampling controls, 
in tab. %$.15. A t  test on the difference of the means of 
the experimental and sampling control groups yielded t = 0.10$ 
(n.s.).
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Tab. ^3.15. Scores on Byrne R/S scale: expert mental 
subjects and controls
Mean Range mean range SB 
Group D 43.40 22-67 Combined
Group S 05.75 22-85 oSi” ». . 22)
41.91 ( 6-90) 20.36 Controls (N = 23)
It is of some interest that these figures are 
considerably lower than those quoted in a paper by 
Byrne (1961): Males (N = 394) X = 63-08, SD = 17-71;
Females (N = 230) X = 61.80, SB = 16.20.
It was decided to look at the results for those subjects
who were classified as "repressors" and "sensitizers" by both
methods: five males from group B had "repressor" scores of
< 34 and three females and two males from group S had
"sensitizer" scores of > 33- By this definition repressors 
/]
are more than 1-^  SB below the mean given by Byrne, but all
1the sensitizers bar one are within SB of Byrne's mean
(only one subject out of 24 scored more than 67)- Tab. 3-16
gives the harmonic mean reaction times for the three groups 
1 1(group R , group S and residual) and should be compared 
with tab. 3-10.
The most striking finding is that those subjects now 
excluded from the analysis (N = 14, residual group) give 
overall longer reaction times and have two particular 
features; firstly, in the two subliminal sessions mean 
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of only 26 msec, the mean differences between nude and 
control slides being 22 and 3 msec respectively.
Secondly, mean reaction time to the blank slide in the 
supraliminal session is long, compared with that to the 
other stimuli, which is puzzling.
/I
If the pattern of responses in group R and S is 
examined it seems that those patterns present in group D 
(see tab. 3*10) are present in accentuated form in group 
R : the nude stimulus causes longer reaction times in 
session 1 by on average 130 msec and is responded to 
faster in session 2, the average difference between nude 
and two other control stimuli being 126 msec. On the 
other hand, the pattern of responses for group S is 
more or less the same as in the main experiment (there 
is a slight difference in session 2) and the order of 
differences between stimuli is much the same. Accordingly, 
a full analysis of variance for both groups yields little 
of note. The table of totals corresponding to tab. 3-16 
is shown in Appendix I (tab A 3-9)* Inspection of tab.
3.16 will reveal that group 8^  contributes very little 
more than error variance to any comparison. It was 
therefore decided to repeat the analysis of variance on 
group R^ - this was appropriate in that it was consistent 
with the observation made previously, that group R 
corresponds in score to "repressors" as defined by Byrne's 
mean values whereas group 8^  scores do not truly correspond 
to "sensitizers" by any definition.
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The summary table of group e'' analysis of variance 
is shown in Appendix I (tab. A 3.10). The two significant 
F values are for the sessions sum of squares (F = 17.644, 
df 2,8: p < 0.002) and the stimulus x sessions interaction 
(F = 2.44, df 6,24: p 0.03). Planned comparisons of the 
sessions sum of squares are both significant: session 1 
vs. sessions 2 and 3 yields F = 4.71 (df 1,8) p < 0.02), 
but more importantly 2 vs. 3 yields F = 24.38 (df 1,8) 
p < 0.002. A summary of the planned comparisons on the 
stimulus X sessions interaction is shown in Appendix I 
(tab. A 3.11). Of importance is the comparison of 
handling of the nude stimulus between sessions 1 and 2 
(comparison 2, see tab. A. 3-2) which yields F = 4.28 
(df 1,24) 1-tailed p < 0.023. (However Fridman analysis 
of variance by ranks on session 1 yields only (df 2)
= 2.1 (n.s.)).
d) Combined groups: associative sessions. The relation of 
the above findings to the investigation of a perceptual 
defence effect will be discussed later. The findings with 
respect to the cognitive session are mainly of interest in 
the context of perceptual defence. However, from the 
point of view of further investigation of the effects of 
subliminal stimuli the associative sessions are of importance 
because they provide additional material which can be studied 
in relation to subjects' reaction times viz. their verbal 
responses to the target pictures.
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Thirty-four control subjects were shown each of the 
twenty slides for O.5 sec in a class-room setting and 
gave their associations. There was thus a pool of fifty- 
eight responses to each slide (24 experimental + 34 control). 
For each slide, the number of novel responses was 
calculated, i.e. the number of responses occurring only 
once in forty-eight. Taking the control group first, the 
percentage of novel responses to the five slides paired 
with a blank slide during the main experiment was 46.5%, 
that from the fifteen slides paired with critical stimuli 
in the main experiment was 46.3%. suggesting that there 
was no difference in the potential of blank-slide pair 
or critical slide pair pictures to elicit novel responses. 
For the twenty-four subjects in the main experiment the 
percentage of novel responses to blank slide pairings 
was 32.5% and to critical slide pairings 40.6%. This 
suggests that the experimental situation had an overall 
constricting effect on novel responses but that the 
presence of subliminal stimuli increased their number.
The difference is, however, not significant (Mann-Whitney 
U = 28; p > 0.1).
The 186 novel responses for the experimental group were 
rated by five judges for similarity to the common responses 
in the following manner: for each slide a list of the non­
novel responses from the pool of fifty-eight subjects was 
given to each judge. He was then given each novel response 
that had been elicited by that slide in turn and asked to 
rate it as 0, 1 or 2; corresponding to very similar or
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equivalent in meaning, partly related and totally 
dissimilax as compared to all or any of the common 
responses to the particular slide. Three or more 
judges were in agreement on 164 responses (88%).
Tab. 3.17 shows the number of novel responses to 
each stimulus pair as rated by three or more judges 
(the twenty-two slides on which there was no total 
agreement were scored as intermediate).
It can be seen that the nude stimulus elicits more
novel responses but that a higher percentage of these
are equivalent responses compared to those from the
other stimuli. There are however no significant 
differences between stimuli. About 10% of the novel 
responses to the nude stimulus and 3% to the outline 
stimulus were elicited by partial awareness of the masked 
stimulus. This would produce more dissimilar responses, 
so that it might be postulated that the true proportion 
of equivalent responses (i.e. if there were no intrusions) 
might be slightly higher for the nude stimulus. When mean 
reaction times are inspected it can be seen that the 
shortest mean reaction time was elicited by the nude 
stimulus, that with the greatest proportion of equivalent 
responses and that the longest mean RT, to the outline 
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Finally, the two associative sessions, with the 
groups combined have been analysed already within the 
context of the overall analysis of variance summarized 
in tabs. and 3.12 (comparisons 1-3).
Summary : — as the perceptual defence results presented 
above are rather complex they are summarized here as 
briefly as possible.
1. Handling (reaction time in a cognitive task) of a CVC 
paired with a nude picture was' compared with handling of 
CVC's paired with two control pictures. In group D the 
emotive picture presentations averaged 77 msec longer
than control presentations. In group S emotive presentations 
averaged 43 msec faster than control presentations.
Comparing latency to the nude stimulus in groups D and S 
via the liann-Whitney Ü test gave Z = 2.28 (1-tail p = 0.011). 
Comparing responses within sessions for the two groups 
separately using Freidman's two-way analysis of variance 
by ranks yielded, for group D, = 3*5 (df 2) p > 0.1. 
Results for group S did not even approach statistical 
significance.
2. The CVC's paired with nude and control stimuli were rated 
for difficulty of handling immediately after the experiment 
and were recalled one day later. The CVC's had been rated 
before the experiment to provide a base-line. Only eight
of twelve subjects from group D were included as four 
failed to make contact on the day after the experiment.
For group D the nude stimulus - CVC was rated on average 
0.62 of a rank easier than before the experiment and a day
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later 0.63 of a rank harder (higher in the list) than 
before the experiment. The difference in ranking after 
the experiment and one day later produced U = 12 (p < 0.02). 
In group S the nude stimulus—pair CVC was ranked on average
1.3 ranks harder immediately after the experiment than 
before and a day latter was ranked on average 1.25 ranks 
easier than after the experiment (U = 23 : p < 0.01) but 
still on average 0.23 of a rank harder than before the 
experiment (U = 34 : n.s.).
3- A possible method of convergence to elucidate the 
nature of groups D and S was investigated by giving subjects 
the Byrne repressor - sensitizer scale. Five subjects in 
group D gave scores corresponding to ’repressors' (range 
22-34) but only one or two in group S corresponded to 
'sensitizers' so that analysis for the latter group was 
of little value. In the repressor group (five male members 
of group D) emotive picture presentations averaged 13O msec 
longer than control presentations. Unfortunately the small 
number of subjects in the group made significance testing 
of comparative handling within the session impracticable 
(Fridman (df 2) = 2.1: n.s.).
DISCUSSION:
The secondary eim of this experiment was to follow a 
suggestion made by Donald ^ence that perceptual defence 
could be demonstrated by a) poorer discrimination for 
rude words than controls b) poorer recall in a subsequent 
learning task of associates to the rude words used previously
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and c) subsequent improvement in long term memory of 
such associates compared to control words. The results 
of the modified version of this experiment are summarized 
above and it can be concluded that considerable support 
for Spence ' s suggestion is obtained but that the support 
is not overwhelming.
One of the main criticisms of the experiment that 
could be put forward is that no attempt was made to 
demonstrate the emotive nature of the nude stimulus for 
individual subjects. The original premise was that the 
picture could be assumed to be fairly emotive for most 
people, but as the picture was not overtly pornographic 
or obscene, this assumption must be questioned. %ence 
specifies the two conditions necessary for a subliminal 
stimulus to have an effect. The first is that it must be 
relevant to the subject, in this case emotive, as has 
been stressed by Brown (1961) and many before him. The 
second is that it must be maintained over time i.e. caught 
up by some ongoing tension state. %>ence suggests for 
fulfilment of the second criterion that the subject should 
be prepared by measuring his attitudes on the sale and 
distribution of pornography, his feelings about censorship 
in literature and related questions. It is possible that 
%)ence is completely mistaken in making the suggestion 
that sexual arousal is analogous with hunger or thirst. 
Sexual arousal in man is not a phenomenon governed by a 
primarily homeostatic system but is one more than usually 
tied to consummatory responses.
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Gofer and Appley (1968) point out that there are 
major differences between the circumstances and factors 
involved in sexual behaviour and those responsible for 
hunger and thirst e.g. sex behaviour is catabolic 
whereas eating and drinking are anabolic. Similarly 
Epstein (1962) classifies sex as a conflict producing 
drive compared with hunger and sleep and describes a 
study, (Epstein and Smith (1957)) which failed to show 
any relationship between deprivation from sex and 
thematic sexual responses, a relationship only developing 
if a measure of guilt was added. Given that the relation­
ship between arousal and sexual or emotive stimuli is a 
non-simple one, it seems reasonable to postulate that an 
emotive stimulus by itself might be arousing and preparation 
of the subject may be more likely to habituate the effect 
of the stimulus. Returning to the initial and more 
important point, given that the emotivity of the stimulus 
must be questioned, the use of the R/S scale constitutes 
a possible method by which one may tentatively infer that 
the stimulus was emotive for particular subjects without 
measuring emotivity directly (the latter procedure being 
extremely problematic, as will be discussed later).
Wagstaff (1974) has investigated the relationship 
between perceptual sensitivity (brightness scaling) and 
stimulus emotionality using Byrne's Repression - Sensitization 
scale as a possible personality correlate. The importance 
of Wagstaff's work here is that he has investigated the
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behaviour of subjects defined as repressors or sensitizers 
in response to words presented well below recognition 
threshold. Byrne, himself, in his 1964 paper dismisses 
unconscious perception as 'a colorful notion' which goes 
some way to explain the rarity of studies of the R/S 
scale and its relation to responses to subliminal stimuli. 
Wagstaff concludes that the overall form of the functions 
relating perceptual sensitivity and emotivity as postulated 
in studies of perceptual defence may be the resultant effect 
of a number of different components. The differential effects 
of these components could account for many of the inconsist­
encies occurring in the literature, where a range of stimulus 
emotionality and individual difference have not been 
systematically considered. The present study is deficient 
in respect both to the former condition and in part to the 
latter in only considering individual difference in a semi­
post hoc fashion. It is therefore possible to conclude that 
the small support that was obtained for the hypothesis that 
some subjects were defending against an emotive stimulus was 
the best that could be expected in the circumstances^
A second major weakness of the experiment rests in the 
appropriateness of the task which was used to demonstrate 
a perceptual defence effect. The problem is that the task 
does not involve the investigation of thresholds. There are 
however grounds to question the thesis
that the perceptual defence effect is 
related entirely to gating of sensory inflow.
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Spence's explanation of perceptual defence relates the 
effect to response selection rather than input control.
The various theories about the mechanism of perceptual 
defence will be reviewed later. Perhaps what should be 
questioned here is whether the principle of perceptual 
defence, that an emotional stimulus has an effect when 
presented subliminally which could be categorized as 
either approach or avoidance, needs to involve description 
of sensory processes only. If the emotive stimulus is 
presented subliminally, there seems no logical reason 
and certainly no physiological basis for limiting 
investigation to sensory rather than to both sensory and 
response processes, given that whatever effects there are 
would be outside of awareness.
The main experiment, which investigated the effect 
of emotive stimuli on supraliminal processes had results 
of limited applicability. Again, the failure to demonstrate 
the emotionality of the subliminal stimuli reduces the 
extent to which results might be generalized. Briefly, 
there was a significant 'cross-over' effect in the 
cognitive session, i.e. while the defender group showed 
longer reaction times associated with a subliminal emotive 
stimulus, the S group yielded faster times in the same 
context. However, in the associative session only the 
defender group showed an effect and again, the nude 
stimulus yielded significantly faster responses. The 
factor that might be the critical one that discriminates 
between the two sessions is that in the cognitive session
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the subliminal stimuli are not relevant to the task but 
in the associative task they are. The unusual feature, 
that defenders respond faster in the 'relevance task' 
as it were, has a parallel in the findings of Dorfmann 
(1967). Using signal detection theory he demonstrated 
that his sixty girl subjects appeared to discriminate 
taboo words better than neutral words. The important 
fact is that the girls were well aware that they would 
be shown taboo words and make such a discrimination.
Bottlos (1963) found that when presented with incomplete 
supraliminal words such as sh-t which had two or more 
completions, one of which was taboo, subjects tended to 
give the taboo completion - or think it and then show 
clear evidence of discomfort and response withholding.
The two references cited seem to confirm that when the 
emotive stimulus might be relevant its discrimination is 
facilitated (independent of expected biases).
Analysis of the responses given in the associative 
session shows that although the emotive stimulus elicits 
rather more novel responses, slightly more of these are 
equivalent in meaning to the non-novel responses. This 
is perhaps typical of the kind of complex response that 
emotive stimuli evoke, the situation being complicated by 
the fact that the stimuli in question are subliminal.
When emotive material is used it clearly becomes necessary 
to investigate and control for subject and stimulus 
variables to a much greater extent and this experiment 
illustrates the kind of difficulties which may arise.
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Experiment 4 : the effect of subliminal words on verbal
associations and associative reaction time
Abstract:- Following the previous experiment, the effects 
on verbal association of subliminal verbal material rather 
than pictorial material were investigated. Twenty-six 
subjects responded to fifty words, presented individually 
in the same apparatus as had been used previously. The 
fifty words constituted twenty neutral and twenty-four 
emotive words (chosen on an a priori basis) buffered by 
six CVC's. For individual subjects, three emotive words 
were selected using Brown's (1965) suggestion that co­
occurrence of complex indicators was a better criterion 
for selecting emotive words than long reaction time alone.
A week after responding to the original list subjects were 
shown a shortened list of twenty-five words. In the central 
block of ten slides they responded to the following pairs 
(in random order): EN, NN, NE, E-, N- and five N- controls
(the first of each pair being the slide which was presented 
to the target eye). Control words were matched for frequency 
and associative difficulty with the pair with which they 
corresponded as were words within each pair. Associative 
difficulty had previously been estimated for the fifty words 
by obtaining paper and pencil responses from 108 subjects. 
Twenty-four control subjects performed the first part of 
the experiment only, acting as a sampling check for the 
twenty-six experimental subjects.
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Responses to EN, E- and NE pairings were significantly 
longer than to neutral slides. While responses to these 
three categories did not differ from each other, responses 
to the NN pair were longer than to N- pairings. Analysis 
of the actual responses given under the different conditions 
confirmed that both emotionality and whether or not a 
subliminal stimulus was present affects responses. Long 
reaction times appeared to be associated with more unusual 
responses but the evidence was not sufficient to elucidate 
the exact nature of the interaction between the independent 
variables emotionality and subliminal competition and the 
dependent variables RT and uniqueness of responses. 
Suggestions are made as to how such evidence might be 
obtained.
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INTRODUCTION: The previous experiment concluded that when
emotive material is used in subliminal and or reaction time 
experiments, subject and stimulus variables need careful 
investigation and control. In an attempt to do so, several 
studies were first considered.^" Silverman (1971) has 
conducted a series of experiments involving the subliminal 
presentation of material with aggressive content and has 
demonstrated drive-related effects in both normal subjects 
and schizophrenics. More recently he and his associates 
have been using verbal instead of pictorial stimuli 
(Silverman (1973)) and have found these to work just as 
well. Verbal stimuli have the advantage of making it 
much easier to equate experimental and control stimuli 
for structural characteristics to help rule out the 
possibility that the results are due to partial structural 
cues rather than aggressive content. Handler and Parnes 
(1937), studying frequency and idiosyncracy of associative 
responses to differing kinds of material i.e. both verbal 
and pictorial stimuli, found that there were significant 
differences in response patterns between stimulus classes 
and that the variability between stimulus classes was 
significantly greater than within stimulus classes. 
Furthermore individual differences in frequency and 
idiosyncracy showed a wide range of values, and differences 
in respect of the former variable contributed the most 
significant source of variation over the whole experiment.
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Jimg (1973) wrote in 1905 emotional processes
are of the greatest significance in the origin or formation 
of abnormally long reaction times. As we know from every­
day experience, it is in the sphere of the emotions that 
the greatest individual differences exist." Both the 
results of Silverman's subliminal work and Handler and 
Parnes' supraliminal study provide a rationale for using 
subliminal verbal stimuli as opposed to the pictorial 
material used in the previous experiment. Similarly 
Handler and Parnes add extra weight, if it were needed, 
to Jung's premise. Logically, the most practical way to 
investigate and utilize the emotivity of stimuli is to 
ensure that the stimuli are emotive for the individual 
subject, as has been observed by many workers in the past.
Brown (1965) suggests an appropriate method to control for 
both stimulus and individual variation. Brown found that, 
with word length, frequency and associative difficulty 
controlled for, the "complex indicators" identified by 
Jung and in earlier studies tended to co-occur more often 
when subjects were responding to words independently 
classified as emotive than when words classified as neutral 
were presented. Hull and Lugoff (1921) in their study of 
10,000 associative responses observed, with reference to 
the diagnostic potency of complex indicators, that two 
given indicators, when they co-occur, are 64.8% more likely 
to attract a given third indicator than either one of them 
is likely to attract it separately.
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Brown's study provides partial confirmation for this 
view, four of the nine pairs of emotional indicators 
studied showing significant tendencies to co-occur among 
responses to emotive words. Of interest in respect to 
single indicators is that subsequent forgetting of the 
given associate, and response-repetition correlated with 
mean stimulus emotionality ratings at a significance level 
below 1% but that there was virtually a zero correlation 
between mean stimulus emotionality and frequency of LRT 
(long reaction time) to particular words. Brown concludes 
that the common practice of selecting words with LRT's 
for experiments on perceptual defence, repression etc. 
has little to recommend it except its ready availability.
Other single indicators, such as forgetting, would be more 
satisfactory criteria and specified pairs of indicators 
might prove even more acceptable. Brown notes further the 
practical problems raised by replacing LRT by one of these 
alternatives. Even when a subject displays very quick 
reactions, the experimenter can still pick out those 
responses which have relatively LRT's for that subject.
Use of forgetting means that the subject with perfect recall 
on re-test must be dismissed from the experiment. Also, 
apart from LRT, all the emotional indicators are dichotomous 
variables and most of them are of fairly infrequent occurrence 
On consideration of these points it was decided that, with 
a list of 50 stimulus words, it was probably possible to - 
select for the individual subject a minimum of three words 
which could be considered emotional for that subject by 
virtue of co-occurrence of two of the traditional indicators
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viz. LRT (for definition: see discussion in Method section), 
forgetting (combining Brown's categories of forgetting and 
misremembering), stimulus-repetition and response-repetition.; 
using LRT + another indicator as the first choice. The 
effect of neutral and emotional words presented outside of 
awareness on concurrent association to visible words, could 
then be investigated, with such factors as word frequency 
and associative difficulty controlled for.
Virtually the only studies of the effect of subliminal 
words on reaction time or response latency are those of 
Dixon (1938) Sind Banreti-Fuchs (1967). In both these 
studies however, the task was that the subject would make 
verbal guesses (the response latencies of which were 
measured) as to the identity of neutral and emotional 
words presented at intensities too low for the subject to 
be able to report awareness of any of the stimuli. Both 
studies found that response latencies were not significantly 
related to the subliminal stimuli. The apparent lack of 
the investigators' alternative hypotheses must be questioned 
however. For example, Dixon reports that five (71%) out 
of the seven subjects who took part in the experiment showed 
shorter average latencies for the neutral items than they 
did for the emotive items. Not surprisingly, this difference 
is not significant by the sign test but Dixon reports no 
further attempt at analysis of this data and even the mean 
values’ mentioned are omitted from the paper. It can therefore 
be concluded that the effects of emotive words on word 
association and associative reaction time have not previously 




Subjects were presented tachistoscopically (i.e. at 
0.5 sec to the target eye, with blank slides on the masked 
side) with fifty words (for list, see Appendix 2, form 
4.1), constituting 20 neutral words, 24 emotional words 
and 6 CVG's. Words were categorized as emotional or 
neutral on an a priori basis but after the experiment 
this procedure was checked by having $1 subjects rate the 
words for emotionality on a seven point scale ranging from 
not emotional (0) to very emotional (7) (see Appendix 2, 
form 4.2). Mean values for emotionality ratings of the 
44 words are shown in appendix 1, tab. A 4.1. If a mean 
value of 2.74 is taken as the cut-off point, 35 (79.6%) 
of the 44 words correspond in rating to their a priori 
grouping. The biserial r between mean ratings and the 
original classification was +O.78 (Brown obtained a value 
of +0.89). The mean ratings for the a priori E group as 
a whole and the a priori N group were 4.07 and 2.43 
respectively which yields t = 3.24 (df 42: p < O.OOI).
Subjects produced an association and an associative 
RT to each word, giving the latter by pressing a key to 
stop the time-clock as they spoke each response. On 
completion of the set of fifty slides (which were only 
balanced for order by sutternating the first and second 
blocks of twenty-five) subjects were shown the slides again 
in the same order and for each one asked to remember the 
associate they had given previously.
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Half the subjects were asked to come back the following 
week. The protocol for each of these subjects was inspected 
and three emotional words were selected from the list using 
the criteria explained below. For each subject the slides 
to be presented in the session were prepared as follows 
ten slides formed the experimental block on the target side. 
These constituted ten slide pairs which can be described 
as E-, EN, m ,  HE, N-, N^-, N^-, and N^- (the
first of each pair being the slide which was presented 
to the target eye), that is, five critical pairs and a 
neutral/blank pair corresponding to each of them. Each 
critical slide pair and its neutral equivalent (control) 
was matched for associative difficulty (see below) and 
word frequency. Thus, the first critical pair was made 
up of an emotive slide on the target side and a blank slide 
on the masked side ; , the neutral control word to the
target side was chosen from the twenty neutral words and 
was matched for frequency and difficulty as closely as 
possible with the emotive word in the first pair. Taking 
the second critical pair (EN), the neutral word on the 
masked side and N2 its neutral control, were both matched 
as closely as possible with the second emotive word for 
both frequency and difficulty and so on. Over the block 
of ten experimental slides, seven pairs had blank slides 
presented to the masked side and one emotive and two neutral 
words were involved in the remaining three pairs.
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The order of the ten experimental pairs was randomized 
for each subject. The experimental block was buffered by 
picking at random 13 emotional and neutral words from the 
remaining 31 (44 - (10 + 3)), ten preceding the block 
and five following it. The last word of the ten preceding 
the experimental block was paired with a word of similar 
frequency and difficulty on the masked side. The rationale 
for this was that with so few presentations within the 
experimental block, order would not be sufficiently 
balanced across the subjects within ten simuli to allow 
for the possibility of a startle response on first 
presentation of a subliminal word. Although there was no 
evidence for this, it was considered worthwhile to 'cue in' 
subliminal stimuli in this way provided that it did not 
have a disastrous effect in terms of awareness of masked 
stimuli, which is justified by the subsequent introspective 
data. Although introspective data provide evidence of 
reported awareness, no check was made at the beginning of 
the experiment that masked stimuli were above visual 
threshold for all subjects. To check for this, after the .
23 slides had been presented and associates and RT's recorded, 
the subject was asked to identify the word BEAT shown to 
the masked side alone. No subject failed to identify the 
word correctly.
Apparatus: the apparatus was the same as in the previous
experiment. The filter used was made of Kodak wratten 
neutral density filters with the following values:
2 X  1.0, 3 X  0.3 and 2 x 0.3 = 4.1 units. The twenty-four
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(a priori) emotional words were: BALLS, WINTER, SAL,
LIVER, SCREW, WET, WATER, BRUSH, RAM, HARPY, MOUTH,
GUILTY, SHADOW, WORTH, CANCER, HORROR, MOTHER, HOT,
HATRED, TIT, FATHER, VAI^ ITY, AFRAID and BREAST, and 
the twenty neutral words, similarly selected were:
PAllTT, COD, SAP, HURRY, REASON, SPACE, DOLLAR, SAY,
SHARE, BEDTCH, HARPY, REMAIN, HAD, WATCH, CARRY, PLANT,
CUP, RED, RUN and CARPET.
Characteristics of the stimuli:- Frequency of words was 
determined using the Thorndike and Lorge handbook (1944). 
63% of E words and 75% words were A or AA (X^  (df I)
< 2, n.s.), only two E words and 1 N word have a frequency 
less than 10 per million. 79% of E words and 65% of N 
words had 5 or 6 letters, the rest being three-letter words. 
Associative difficulty norms were determined by collecting 
written responses from a control group. I'h?. H. Fisher 
kindly provided this data by collecting completed forms 
from 108 of his students at the North-Eastern Polytechnic. 
Unique responses were used as the measure, for the sake of 
simplicity. Brown (1965) found a correlation between the 
total number of different responses to a given word (hence­
forth referred to as D) and the number of unique responses 
to that word (henceforth referred to as d) for each of 
sixty words to be +0.97 for 100 subjects. Therefore d^^g 
was used as the measure of associative difficulty for 
pairing words in the main experiment. Later d^^g (i.e. 
unique responses for the pooled group of 108 controls 
plus 50 subjects initial protocols in the main experiment)
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and were correlated for each of the forty-four words,
yielding r = +0.96. As in Brown's experiment, the associative 
difficulty of the neutral and emotional word groups was 
similar: mean d^Qg for E and N was 24.7 and 26.0 respectively 
(t < 1 ; compared with Brown's mean d^^^ of 21.7 and 17.8 
respectively).
Criteria for selection of emotive words for the individual:- 
Following the argument presented in the introduction, where- 
ever possible E words were chosen for a particular subject 
from the 24 a priori E group on the basis of LRT and some 
other indicator. A total of 78 E words was chosen (i.e.
26 subjects x 3 words) - of these, 63 (80.8%) had yielded 
RT > 2.0 sec.
The question of absolute versus relative duration is 
one which needs further elucidation. Jung is categorical 
in that he quotes As chaff enburg as saying in 1896 that 
"little value can be attributed to the absolute duration" 
and in his studies he defines as LRT any value of RT above 
what approximates to the median value for each subject.
Thus LRT occurs in 40%+ of responses in Jung's studies.
Brown (1963) and Laffal (1955) on the other hand, both 
take the absolute value of 2.6 sec used by Hull and Lugoff 
(1921). Brown justifies this by the fact that his subjects 
yielded a similar proportion of LRT's (15-3%) to those of 
Laffal (12.9%). Laffal refers to the fact that Hull and 
Lugoff found that using 2.6 secs as a cutting point for 
faults (indicators) yielded results very similar to those 
using individual distributions. This procedure is examined
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in more detail in Experiment 5- Hull and Lugoff's curve 
actually shows that 1.8 sec is the value at which complex 
signs are elicited at an above chance level. It is of 
interest that 1.8 sec is the value for average reaction 
time reported in Jung's 1905 paper "Uber das Verhalten 
der Reaktionszeit bein Assoziationsexperimente". It was 
decided to use an absolute cut-off point of 2.0 secs as 
a compromise, which fits in with Brown's suggestion that 
departures from current word association practices might 
be experimented with. Such a procedure yields a mean 
incidence of 24.0% LRT's, which is surprisingly close to 
that reported by Hull and Lugoff (20.4%). Other criteria 
are shown in tab. 4.1. With regard to stimulus repetition, 
the same rules as in Brown's study apply viz. because 
closely connected words such as wet - water, red - hot 
and happy - sad occurred in the -list no response given by 
more than one other subject (i.e. 5%) was accepted as 
response or stimulus repetition.
Tab. 4.1. Criteria for selecting 78 £ words
Long RT + reproduction failure
" RT + S - repetition!
> perseveration
" RT + R - repetition )
Combination of the above indicators 








Three quarters of the 12 reaction times not paired with 
other indicators were over 5.0 secs.
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Selection of subjects: to control for gross bias in the
selection of the subjects used in the experiment, initial 
protocols of the 26 subjects used were compared with those 
from 24 control subjects. The two groups included 14 
(53*8%) and 15 females (54.2%) respectively. Reaction 
times for the experimental group were longer than those 
for the control group overall (harmonic means for individual 
responses being 1.59 and 1.15 secs respectively). However, 
overall duration was considered less important than relative 
word duration within subjects. The product moment correlation 
of totals for the two groups over 50 stimuli yields +0.712 
(Z = 6.10 p < 0.001). Tab. 4.2 shows a comparison of the 
groups in respect to the frequency of emotional indicators.
Tab. 4.2. Frequency of indicators: E and N words across 





E words(N=24) N words(N=20) 
per subject per subject
Mean no. of
LRT (> 2.6 sec) 5.08 
per subject
Converted to





E words N words
2.04 1.79














The differences between experimental and control 
groups help confirm the absence of bias. Although the 
mean number of LRT's differs between the two groups, 
reflecting the overall difference in RT, the proportion 
of reproduction failures, which is not dependent on 
absolute RT per se does not differ (14.14 versus 13-47 
per 100 responses for the two groups). The combined 
figures for the experimental group for LRT (> 2.5) i.e. 
12.4 per 100 responses compare with Laffal's figure of 
12.9/100 R's and for reproduction failure 14.1 compared 
with Laffal's 13-3/100 R's. Of importance, however, is 
the failure to replicate Brown's finding that groups 
matched for associative difficulty showed differences in 
the frequency of complex indicators which could be 
ascribed to the effect of emotionality. With groups of 
E and N words of very similar associative difficulty, 
the frequency of indicators within the experimental group 
barely differs and with respect to reproduction failure 
differs in the opposite direction to that expected, this 
pattern being maintained in the control group despite 
the difference in absolute RT's between the two groups.
Emotivity of selected stimuli: a check: given that the
ratings of emotivity by an independent group have more
or less confirmed the a priori selection, the overall lack
of E/N differences with respect-to indicators does not
affect the premises with regard to emotivity for the
individual, rather the contrary. The vindication of the
selection by indicators shown in tab. 4.1 can be seen in
IW, 4.3)
the comparison of RT's to E- and The harmonic mean
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per individual response for 50 subjects across 20 neutral 
words was 1.211 sec and that for 50 subjects across 24 
emotive words was 1.264 i.e. a difference of 50 msec. 
Given that words are matched for associative difficulty 
and frequency, that the means of E and N words differ 
by only 0.05 sec and that overall differences in the 
incidence of emotional indicators are not significant; 
then there is a strong case for suggesting that a 
difference in RT in the second part of the experiment 
between E and of 0.1 sec or more, is due to the 
differing emotional valence of the two words when 
selected individually.
Procedure : At the beginning of the first session*
subjects were seated^the position of the key was indicated 
and the lights put out; subjects were then told "I am 
going to show you a series of words in the box and for 
each one I want you simply to say the first word that 
comes into your head. As you speak please press the key; 
this will stop the clock and tell us your reaction time.
The only difficulty is remembering to press the key at 
the same time as you speak, as its very tempting to press 
the key and then speak. Occasionally, instead of a word 
you'll be shown a nonsense syllable, but don't let it 
worry you. Just respond in exactly the same way by saying 
the first word that comes into your head. Remember, press 
the key as you speak. O.K?" Subjects were then reminded 
after each presentation of the correct procedure. Virtually 
all subjects were using the key correctly by the second or 
third presentation. After the two blocks of 25 slides had
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been shown the subject was told "I'm now going to run 
through the slides again quickly, but there's no need 
to use the key any more. For each slide I just want 
you to tell me the word you gave as a response last 
time you saw the slide." At the end of the session 
the subject was thanked and asked to come back the 
following week, when the experiment would be explained- 
The protocol was scrutinized in the interviewing period 
and stimuli selected for the main experimental run.
At the beginning of the second session the subject was 
told "I'm going to show you just some of the words that 
you saw last week. The procedure is exactly the same as 
before. Just give whatever word comes into your head - 
it doesn't matter whether its the same as on the previous 
presentation or not." After presentation of the twenty- 
five slides the subject was shown the word BEAT to the 
masked side and asked to identify it. He or she was then 
asked what hypotheses they had about the nature of the 
experiment and whether or not they had been at all aware 
of the stimuli on the masked side. The nature of the 
experiment was then explained.
Subjects: 26 student subjects in the main experiment and
24 acting as controls, taking part in the first session 
only. Of these fifty students the majority were non­
psychology undergraduates. The allocation of subjects to 
experimental or control group was relatively random although 
it was necessary to allocate a few subjects to the control 
group simply because their protocols provided fewer than 
three emotive words (using the criteria already described).
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Introspective data: Only one subject produced a
reasonably accurate hypothesis as to the nature of the 
experiment. Of 26 subjects, 17 (65%) were totally 
unaware of any subliminal stimulation and a further six 
were awai’e only of ’something' on one or two presentations, 
but not that more than one word was being presented.
Of the remaining three subjects (11.5%), one saw an 
unclear word superimposed on the target stimulus on one 
occasion and two subjects saw several.
RESULTS
Confirmation of the emotionality of chosen stimuli
Three sets of stimuli have been compared i.e. for 
each subject the responses in the second part of the 
experiment for E-, EN and N- with those to the appropriate 
neutral controls (N^-, N^- and N^-). It is predicted 
that E or EN will give longer RT than the corresponding 
N control whereas N- and N^- will not differ significantly. 
The RT for E- was longer than that to N^- in 22 of 26 
subjects (84.6%), sign test yielding Z > 5-5 (2-tail 
p < 0.001) and individual scores are shown in tab: 4.5.
50% of responses to E- were >2.0 secs compared with 13% 
to N^- stimuli. Means were 2.28 and 1.61 secs respectively 
(t = 1.705, p < 0.05, 1-tail test). For EN, RT was 
greater than to Ng- in 19 of 26 subjects (75-1%)- Sign 
test here yielded Z = 2.15 (2-tail p < 0.02). RT to N- 
stimuli was greater than to N^- in 14 subjects (55-8%) 
with one tie (sign test yielded Z = 0.4, n.s.).
140
Tab. 4.3. Reaction times (sees) to stimuli in the main 
experiment
Emotive stimuli to blatched neutral control
































Main experiment findings:- Harmonic means for the ten 
conditions are shown in tab. 4.4 with means for associative 
difficulty of the stimuli used. The values are d^^g i.e. 
no. of unique responses from the 108 criterion group + 50 
experimental subjects. As subjects' stimuli were matched 
using d^Qg, mean values of d^^g confirm that by and large 
the measure derived from paper and pencil responses did 
not differ greatly from that obtained by inclusion of 
experimental responses (product-moment r for the 44 stimuli 
(<3-158 vs. d^Qg) + 0.87).
Tab. 4.4. Harmonic means (secs) for conditions in the 
main experiment (mean associative difficulty 
in brackets)















1.720 (34.6) 1.374 (30.2)
1.545 (31.5) •
1.464 (31.0)
1.752 (39.7) 1.345 (40.8)
1.740 (37.8) 1.334 (35.6)
1.360 (27.4) 1.250 (26.5)
The average difference between the three E conditions 
(including NE) and neutral controls is 0.59 secs (range 
0.55 - 0.41), while for the two neutral conditions (NN and N-) 
the difference is 0.10 sec and between the six N- conditions 
the maximum difference is only 0.21 sec.
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As neutral control conditions are not expected to 
differ from each other (and do not appear to do so), to 
do an analysis of variance on the ten conditions would 
involve comparing the critical stimuli against a large 
background of error variance. Therefore on an a priori 
basis it was decided to compare six totals, those for 
the five experimental conditions and N^-, that which is 
known in advance to have the highest associative difficulty, 
on the assumption that if LRT were connected with 
associative difficulty, would provide a tougher control 
to test against (n.fe. mean associative difficulty vs. 
mean RT for the six N- conditions yields r = +0.19).
As it happens, represents the median mean value for 
the five matched controls.
The analysis of variance summary table is shown in 
tab. 4.5) including a summary of the five planned comparisons 
on the stimulus (conditions) totals. Raw data (reciprocal 
RT's)oLfe shown in tab. A 4.2 and the comparisons used are 
shown in tab. A 4.$.
Tab. 4.5 shows that the three conditions involving 
emotive words give significantly longer RT's than the three 
conditions involving neutral words (comparison 1: F = 16.9 
df 1,125 : p < 0.001). The condition (NE) where the emotive 
word is subliminal does not differ significantly from the 
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The neutral condition (KN) where two words compete, 
one of them subliminal, might be expected to produce 
longer RT's than N words on their own (cf 2: F = 5.62 
df 1,125 p < 0.05, 1-tail test) and the appropriate 
comparison yields an F value of borderline significance.
It has been established that emotive words yield 
longer reaction times than neutral control words and 
that competing neutral words produce a small effect 
(n.k. E and EN do not differ significantly: comparison 5, 
suggesting that response competition is a smaller factor 
than E/N effects on RT when E words are selected for the 
individual subject). It is possible to investigate the 
nature of the process by analysing associative responses 
given in the second (experimental) session and comparing 
these with the responses given in the initial session. 
Associates were analyzed for the ten stimuli in the 
experimental block plus the last of the twenty-five 
stimuli (82 )^) to provide a further check on the control 
stimuli. It was predicted that responses to -this stimulus, 
which for each subject would be an E or N word randomly 
chosen from the remaining 51 stimuli, would not differ from 
those to the other control stimuli. Tab. 4.6 shows the 
number of responses over the 26 subjects using two parameters 
a) the number of responses where the response to the target 
word was different from that given to it on the previous 
exposure to the subject and b) the number of new unique 
responses (i.e. unlike any of the I58 responses previously 
obtained to a particular word) given in this session.
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Tab. 4.6. Different and unique responses: 
main experiment (N = 26)








Ng 11 1 4




^25 12 J 4
The six control stimuli (i.e. including S^^) yield 
a mean value which is virtually identical to that associated 
with N, the other neutral stimulus, which is reassuring.
The feature of most interest is the relation of scores for 
the three stimuli where subliminal stimuli were presented, 
compared to the rest and similarly, of the three stimuli 
involving emotive stimuli, compared to the rest. With 
respect to the first variable, the results are clear viz. 
that EN, E and NE provide higher scores than neutral stimuli, 
NN providing a comparable value to the latter stimuli.
The difference between E and N stimuli, using the Mann- 
Whitney U test is U = 0 (p = 0.006: 1-tail test). It would 
seem, in relation to this variable, that stimulus emotivity, 
whether the stimulus is in or outside of awareness, is 
relevant whereas co-occurrence of stimuli is not.
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With respect to the second parameter, the results are 
slightly different. Again, the emotive stimuli yield 
more unique responses than the control stimuli hut the 
NN combination gives an intermediate value (6/26) which 
is closer to the mean for the three E stimuli (7-7/26) 
than to that for the seven neutral stimuli (3-7/16).
If one excludes the E- condition, the three stimuli 
associated with subliminal presentation give significantly 
more unique responses than the seven neutral stimuli 
(U = 0, p = 0.008, 1-tail test).
To explore the matter further and attempt to 
discriminate the effects of emotivity and co-occurrence 
of subliminal stimuli, a more complicated analysis was 
performed. The response hierarchies for the 44- stimuli 
were drawn up and for each subject the response to the 
11 categories of target words listed in tab. 4.6 was 
given a 'uniqueness' score calculated according to its 
place in the response hierarchy of the given word.
Tab. 4.7 shows the scoring method used.
Tab. 4-7- Scoring of response frequency
Score: 1 Most common response
2 response more frequent than mean frequency 
but not most common 
5 below mean frequency but not unique
4 unique response: previously given once in 
158 responses
5 new unique response (not given previously)
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Tab. 4.8 shows the mean 'uniqueness' score over 26 subjects 
for the eleven categories:
Tab. 4.8. Uniqueness mean score and % of response frequencies 
in eleven stimulus categories
Mean 'uniqueness' %  commonest % inter- % unique
score (26 subjects) responses mediate responses
frequencies
Stimulus
EN 2.8 19 54 27
NN 2.7 15 62 23
E 3.1 27 38 35
NE 2.7 51 42 27







mean of \ 
/means '





The relation of mean scores corresponds very closely 
to that of new unique responses shown in tab. 4.6 or the 
%  of unique responses shown in this table (4.8), confirming 
that both co-occurrence and emotionality of stimuli affect 
uniqueness of responses. Also included in the table is 
the number of responses (expressed as a %) over the three 
main groups of response frequency with respect to the 
response hierarchy of each word which happen to fall into 
a particular stimulus category, i.e. the proportion of
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responses scored 5, 4 ^ 2  and 1 within each stimulus 
category. This procedure provides the first indication 
of differences in responding when E and N words are 
presented outside of awareness.
It will he seen that the main difference between E 
and N stimuli is that E words give rise to more unique 
responses at the expense of responses of intermediate 
frequency. The HE category is intermediate between 
E and N categories. However, the two categories where 
N words occurred subliminally show a different pattern, 
with the percentage of common responses falling. The 
results could be expressed in a different way. Using 
responses to the seven categories of neutral word as 
a baseline, addition of a subliminal neutral word increases 
unique responses at the expense of the commonest responses 
while addition of a subliminal emotive word increases 
unq'g.ue responses at the expense of intermediate responses. 
Addition of a subliminal neutral word to an emotive word 
decreases both common and unique responses.
What is needed to make the situation clearer is 
a) a larger total number of responses, so that the pattern 
can be both replicated and be suitable for significance 
testing and b) the addition of the EE category. Both 
these requirements make the same demand, viz. a larger 
scale experiment with more subjects each making more 
responses (so that a minimum of five emotive words for 
each individual is obtained).
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DISCUSSION
When two words are presented, one to each eye, the 
subject being only aware of one and being required to 
give an associate to that word, there seem to be two 
principal factors which may interact and which ought to 
be differentiated. Emotive words were expected to yield 
longer reaction times than neutral words with appropriate 
stimulus variables controlled. This relationship is 
explored further in the next section, which re-analyses 
some of the data used here. The second factor is the 
actual presence of words simultaneously presented outside 
of awareness which was expected to cause a change in 
reaction time. In Experiment 5, this change was in the 
opposite direction to that found in this experiment, 
i.e. pictorial material presented subliminally caused 
faster reaction times.
Reaction times to emotive words, whether presented 
in or out of awareness differed significantly from those 
to neutral words by an average 555 msec, while E- and EN 
did not differ significantly nor did NE differ from E and 
EN considered together. On the other hand, the NN pair 
did give a longer reaction time than the six N- pairs, 
on average 190 msec longer. It therefore seems that both 
factors did cause longer reaction times.
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Analysis of the kind of responses given in the 
different conditions suggests that increased reaction times 
are associated with more uncommon responses being given, 
whether LRT is due to emotivity or co-occurrence.* Detailed 
analysis with respect to response hierarchy for each target 
word to which responses were given suggests that there might 
be a difference between E and N words. While both word 
emotionality and co-occurrence cause an increase in the 
number of unique, very uncommon, responses, these occur in 
a different way for a neutral target word depending on 
whether the subliminal word is emotive or neutral. A neutral 
co-occurrent word causes a fall in the proportion of very 
common responses whereas an emotive one does not. It might 
be that the subliminal emotive word, instead of producing 
a simple shift towards more unusual responses, has an effect 
depending on whether or not it constitutes a threat for the 
particular individual. Thus, over a group of subjects the 
tendency to give a unique response (implying assimilation, 
or approach to the hidden stimulus) is balanced by a tendency 
to give a more common, dominant response (implying defence, 
or avoidance of the hidden stimulus), in line with the 
findings of Calloway, Broen, Hockey and others on responding 
under stress conditions, which will be discussed later.
The differences are not big enough to allow more than 
very tentative suggestions as to their cause and a larger 
experiment is clearly needed. Nevertheless it appears that 
there is some evidence that the emotive content of a
*NOTE: here co-occurrence refers to the simultaneous presence 
of subliminal words, as opposed to the co-occurrence 
of complex indicators.
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subliminal word biases associative responses given to a 
visible word with which it co-occurs, although the inter­
relation between the two factors, co-occurrence and 
emotionality, and the two dependent variables, reaction 
time and uniqueness of response needs further elucidation. 
The stimulus variables, such as frequency, associative 
difficult and word length were controlled or partially 
controlled during the experiment. Although the biserial 
r between mean rating of emotionality by control subjects 
and a priori classification was only +0.78 compared to 
Brown's value of +0.89, this is much less important when 
words are defined as emotional for individual subjects 
in the main experiment by using the co-occurrence of 
complex indicators as suggested by Brown. This procedure 
seems to have had at least limited success in that words 
chosen as emotive mostly on the basis of long reaction 
time plus some other indicator gave a longer reaction 
time than a matched control word when shown a week later 
in 22 out of 26 subjects.
The relation between such stimulus variables as 
response hierarchy (or response entropy), associative 
difficulty (unique responses), frequency and word 
emotionality has been explored by Hull and Lugoff,
Laffal and Brown. If the initial protocols of experimental 
and control groups are combined, these represent ^0 subjects 
responses to 44 words, a total of 2200 responses. It was 
decided to attempt to replicate some of the findings of the 
writers mentioned above using this data in order to define
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more precisely a) the parameters which might he used 
in the selection of words which are emotive for individual 
subjects and b) the relationship between the emotive 
nature of stimuli, uniqueness of responses and associative 
reaction time. If positive findings were obtained from 
such a procedure it would add to the likely fruitfulness 
of any replication of this experiment.
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PARTIAL AWAHEIIESS
Experiments 1, 2, 3 and 4 are suitable material 
to illustrate the effects of partial awareness within 
experiments attempting to demonstrate the effects of 
perception without awareness. Granted that subjects 
work on the principle of "when in doubt say nowt"
(Dixon, 197^ 1; P- 234) any conclusions one might draw 
from the data of subjects who ^  admit to partial 
awareness would presumably generalize to subjects who 
do not report partial awareness (as opposed to subjects 
who actually are unaware of the experimental stimuli).
Apart from constituting another phenomenon of 
perceptual processing whose investigation may give a 
clearer idea of the relation between the physical and the 
phenomenal properties of the stimulus, partial awareness 
is of interest because it provides the basis of one of the 
alternative hypotheses to subliminal perception. Dixon 
(chap. 8) examines opposition to the concept of subliminal 
perception. Some experiments in this area are merely 
unsuccessful replications of studies which have success­
fully provided evidence of subliminal effects; these 
experiments have as a shortcoming that they fail to 
demonstrate, explicitly, any alternative explanation for 
the subliminal effects found by others. There are two 
main alternative hypotheses which have been pursued. The 
demand characteristics hypothesis suggests that experimenter 
effects (Rosenthal, 1966) are responsible for positive 
findings. There is little support for this hypothesis.
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Barber and Rnshton (1973) bave conducted a large experiment 
which involved a replication of one of Spence's experiments 
but they failed to show any experimenter effects. 
Incidentally, no subliminal effect (large enough to attain 
significance at the 5% level) was found either, but like 
other replications mentioned above "such studies provide 
some support for the hypothesis that, under certain 
circumstances, it is quite possible to prevent weak 
stimuli from having an effect on behaviour (Dixon, p.232)".
The partial cue hypothesis remains the only alternative 
hypothesis which merits consideration. Wiener and his co­
workers have been the main proponents of this suggestion 
that cues from partial awareness are sufficient to explain 
differences supposedly due to subliminal perception.
For example, the results of Eagle (1959) where a neutral 
picture and a threatening one flashed subliminally have 
differing effects on the rating of a neutral figure, are 
explained in terms of there being greater angularity and 
less curvedness in the outlines of the threatening picture 
(Guthrie and Wiener, 1966). In other words, implicit in 
the partial cue hypothesis is the assumption that structure- 
related cues produce the observed effects rather than a 
' semantic ' analysis of the percept. Interestingly this 
explanation is probably true of partial awareness, its
weakness is that there is considerable evidence, some of
\
it discussed above, that such a system does not operate 
when there is no awareness of the stimulus. Rather, a
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semantically related response is more likely and a 
structurally related response less likely in these 
circumstances.
A recent experiment by Eleespies and Wiener (1972) 
illustrates a new phase in Wiener's campaign against 
subliminal effects. One of Wiener's Ph.D. students had 
"measured" input by studying saccadic eye movements 
following stimulus presentation, arguing that such 
movement represented the orientation reflex and that 
if there was any input from a briefly exposed stimulus, 
a saccadic eye movement towards the display would be 
expected. Eleespies and Wiener used modifications of 
the Guthrie and Wiener stimuli again, controlling for 
angularity and curvedness. They exposed the stimuli at 
3 msec, 10 msec and 1 sec durations, the first condition 
being designed to produce a subliminal and the second a 
partial awareness situation. Among other variables mean 
number of first eye movements towards the stimuli during 
the first second following exposure was measured and was 
positively related to exposure duration but did not differ 
between threatening and non-threatening stimuli for a given 
duration. Nor did angularity and curvedness produce differing 
responses for a given duration. Eleespies and Wiener claim 
that their findings in toto indicate that measures of first 
eye movements are effective measures of visual input 
differences but also comment that reports of a change in 
visual experience are highly consistent with the eye movement 
data. In other words their results seem to be correlated
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with experimental procedure. They have demonstrated a 
positive relationship between strength of the orienting 
reflex and reported awareness but their evidence for the 
relationship between saccadic eye movements and visual 
input is incomplete. Secondly, they state that there 
were significantly more reports of a change in visual 
experience with the 10 msec exposure compared to the 
3 msec exposure. Since the implication is that some 
reports of such a change occurred with the 3 msec 
exposure this suggests that the 3 msec exposure did 
not in fact qualify as a without awareness condition.
Finally, they argue that there was no support for the 
PD effect because of the lack of difference across 
conditions of either "orienting reflex" or differential 
report of awareness between threat and non-threat 
sessions. The authors recognize that this constitutes 
a null hypothesis proof and fijirther admit that there was 
likewise no evidence obtained for the partial cue 
hypothesis, as no reliable difference was found as a 
function of structure (angular vs. curved). This 
suggests that their experiment was as incapable of 
allowing a demonstration of the effects of subliminal 
perception as it was of allowing a discrimination between 
different amounts of visual input and amounts of awareness.
The partial cue hypothesis, nevertheless, has an 
extremely important function in relation to subliminal 
perception. Popper (1959) believes that a system can be 
admitted as empirical or scientific only if it is capable
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of being tested by experience. These considerations 
suggest to Popper that not the verifiability but the 
falsifiability of a system is to be taken as a criterion 
of demarcation. "A theory is to be called 'empirical' 
or 'falsifiable’ if it divides the class of all possible 
basic statements unambiguously into the following non­
empty subclasses. First, the class of all those basic 
statements with which it is inconsistent (or which it 
rules out or prohibits): we call this the class of the 
potential falsifiers of the theory; and secondly, the 
class of those basic statements which it does not 
contradict (or which it 'permits'). We can put this 
more briefly by saying: a theory is falsifiable if the 
class of its potential falsifiers is not empty.
It may be added that a theory makes assertions only 
about its potential falsifiers (it asserts their falsity). 
About the 'permitted ' basic statements it says nothing.
In particular, it does not say that they are true (p. 86)."
In the series of experiments so far described, two 
closely related alternative hypotheses have been used when 
testing the validity of the effects of perception without 
awareness. The partial cue hypothesis was used in 
Experiments 1 and 2 and the hypothesis that subliminal 
perception is a 'watered-down version' of supraliminal 
perception was used in Experiments 1, 2 and 3- Experiment 
4 has the wealcness that there was no firm alternative 
hypothesis to test. The partial cue hypothesis, therefore, 
is of value to the investigator of the effects of subliminal 
perception simply because it is a solid alternative
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hypothesis which can he falsified. The experimenter 
bias hypothesis however is inadequate because it is 
difficult to falsify and it makes few positive 
predictions, so that Barber and Rushton ended up 
proving the null hypothesis.
The data from Experiment 1 is shown in tab. 4.9.
Tab. 4.9. Data from Experiment 1: partial awareness subjects 
(mean scores)
Condition: 1 2 3 4 5
H CE B1 CS S
Subliminal
session













awareness)0.25 -0.75 -0,25 —1.00 -0.50
Supraliminal Whole group 1.4 0.55 0.45 0.45 0.37
session Without X, c 
awareness ' * 0.45 0.31 0.44 0.38
With awareness 1.0 0.75 1.00 0. 50 0.25
Four subjects admitted partial awareness. (No subjects
reported awareness in Experiment 2).
The mean scores for the subjects with partial awareness 
differ markedly (^ 1.0) from the rest of the subjects in 
three of the five conditions in the subliminal session 
(one would not expect a difference in the blank slide 
condition). In the supraliminal session differences 
(between the two groups) are much smaller, the only 
difference greater than 0.5 being in the blank slide condition.
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The overall pattern is that results for the reduced 
without awareness group are little different in the 
supraliminal session from the whole group hut are 
'sharpened' in the subliminal session in the expected 
direction (H v S difference increases from 1.40 to,1.81,
GH V  OS difference from 0.40 to 0.56).
The data from Experiment 5 is shown in tab. 4.10.
Two subjects reported awareness in group D and three in 
group S. As the numbers are small and the table complex 
only harmonic means for total group and the without 
awareness sub-group are shown, to emphasize the differences.
The differences in cognitive and supraliminal sessions 
between the whole group and the without awareness sub-group 
are minimal for both group D and S.
In the associative session the difference between the 
nude stimulus time and that for the others increases by 
approximately 20 msec so that it is handled slightly faster 
in group D and slightly slower in group S. Although the 
same proportion of subjects (20/Q reported awareness, the 
effects of removing these subjects appears to be much 
smaller than in Experiment 1. In the latter experiment 
the words were relevant to the concomitant task, so that 
the associative task was more like Experiment 1 than the 
cognitive task was (i.e. partial awareness where the 
' subliminal ’ stimulus is irrelevant to the task probably 
differs from when the stimulus is task-relevant).
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Perhaps more important is that the scores given above are 
means for single trials from each subject and do not 
represent the summed time for four or five presentations 
as in Experiment 1.
Tab- 4.11 gives the data from Experiment 4. Nine 
subjects altogether reported partial awareness. Harmonic 
NT's for with and without awareness are compared with 
those from the whole group.
Firstly, the relatively large number of subjects who 
report awareness casts doubt on the validity of the results 
in the crucial EN, NN and NE conditions. The same 
methodological error (filter not thick enough) as in 
Experiment 3a appears to have been perpetrated. Secondly, 
the lack of an alternative hypothesis further limits the 
usefulness of the .data as has been pointed out above.







m 1.718 1.689 1.776
0 1.374 1.521 1.485
NN 1.546 1.531 1.573
C 1.464 1.565 1.305
E 1.751 1.855 I.7O6
C 1.344 1.433 1.204
NE 1.739 1.672 1.881
C 1.335 1.335 1.335
N 1.361 1.376 1.333
C 1.250 1.274 1.207
1 62.
The differences between E and N and their respective 
controls, according to expectation, are very similar for 
aware and unaware groups. Where intrusions due to partial 
awareness are lilcely it could be predicted that means 
for the aware group would be higher. This is the case 
in EN and NIT conditions although the differences are 
small (< 0.1 sec), probably because the neutral words 
would cause only a small increase in RT even when they 
did intrude. The difference for the IJE condition is 
greater, >0.2 sec. Nevertheless, the relative relation­
ship of the five conditions remains similar for the 
unaware group as compared to the group as a whole although 
the differences between conditions are reduced in the 
former.
In conclusion, data from Experiment 1 and to a lesser 
extent Experiment 3 support the hypothesis that partial 
awareness occurring on some trials contributes to error 
variance. There is no support from these experiments for 
the alternative hypothesis that the experimental effect 
resides in data from those subjects who report partial 
awareness. It could be argued that the 'subliminal effect' 
is caused by subjects who fail to report partial awareness. 
Apart from the low probability that their results would 
differ greatly from those with partial awareness who did 
report it, this argument is rendered unlikely by the 
qualitative differences in handling of stimuli between 
subliminal and supraliminal sessions.
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The data from Experiment 4, apart from the weaknesses 
mentioned above, suffers from the drawback that the 
stimuli under conditions of partial awareness were not 
predicted to have different effects from stimuli outside 
of awareness. Examination of the data reveals that some 
of the effect ascribed to the subliminal stimuli was 
due to partial awareness though it must be added that 
a substantial effect in the ITE condition remains and 
cannot be explained in this way.
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A further signpost
Experiment 4 and the discussion of partial awareness 
represent the follow-up of one aspect of the handling of 
emotive stimuli raised in Experiment 5- It is unfortunate 
that there is no way of structuring this account in order 
for one section to simply follow another. Thus, the 
second aspect of the handling of emotive stimuli, 
perceptual defence, is now reviewed in order to complete 
section B. In section C some of the points raised by 
Experiment 4 are dealt with in more detail and some 




The aims of this brief review are to examine the 
psychoanalytic concept of defence and its relation to 
perceptual defence, to discuss some of the models 
suggested to explain the'mechanism of the latter and 
to consider the relationship between it and perception 
without awareness. Finally, a tentative synthesis is 
proposed which unites the best features of the models 
with work on personality differences in perception and 
the effects of arousal.
The literature on this subject has been ably reviewed 
by first Brown (1961), covering the period to I960 and then 
Dixon (197 )^, covering I960 - 1970. The curious situation 
that now exists is that the wheel has turned full circle - 
the methodological problems which made the early 60's a 
low point for the concept of subliminal perception have 
been circumvented, by and large. The student of the field 
in the early 70's is able to view in a quite different light 
some of the papers that heralded and re-consider some of 
the questions that ushered in the 'New Look' in perception 
in the post-war era. To attempt to use the same paradigm, 
recognition threshold, for investigating as for demonstrating 
the phenomenon was an almost hopeless task, as has been 
discussed previously. It must be stressed, though, that 
this does not necessarily invalidate either the rationale 
and conceptual framework of the experiments of that time 
nor even some of their findings.
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With this orientation it is of value to think again 
about the possibility of "demonstrating Freud in the 
laboratory" which is what many early workers seemed to 
feel that they would be able to do. One of the problems, 
as Brown makes clear, was the status of the term perceptual 
defence. There seemed to be little agreement among workers 
in the 50’s as to either the exact meaning of the term 
or to the defence mechanisms with which it was analogous.
To give an example, Blum (1954) argued that psychoanalytic 
theory predicts that repressed psychosexual impulses, of 
which the individual is not consciously aware^ are always 
pushing and seeking for an outlet in conscious behaviour. 
Everyone should, at the unconscious level, be sensitive 
and responsive to cues relevant to these potentially 
threatening impulses - this represents "selective sensiti­
zation" (Lazarus et al. 1954)- This process, however, 
is expected to operate only at a level below conscious 
awareness, for when the impulses do begin to approach 
the surface a second process, ego defence, acts to ward 
off that which the organism basically desires, because 
of its threatening quality. At this point, rathbr than 
being vigilant for psychosexual cues, the individual seeks 
devious ways of not perceiving them - the mechanism then 
labelled as "perceptual defence".
On the other hand, Eriksen (1954) saw defences as 
learned ways of avoiding or dealing with anxiety that 
arises from certain specific causes i.e. "threats to the 
individual's self esteem." The basis of the concept is
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the ability of the organism to detect the presence of 
anxiety-arousing stimuli at an unconscious level of 
awareness. This is necessary if defensive responses 
are to serve their purpose of preventing the spread of 
anxiety to more conscious levels. Sriksen saw sensiti­
zation and defence as differing avoidance techniques 
learned by individuals to deal with anxiety. Thus 
patients who 'ruminate' on anxiety-producing stimuli 
and show intellactualizing defences would be expected to 
show lowered thresholds while patients who clinically, 
used repression as a defence (e.g. as indicated by 
Rorschach responses) would have a raised threshold to 
anxiety-producing stimuli. Lazarus et al. (1954) divided 
patients into groups accordingly and using both sexual 
and aggressive stimuli shown independently to be emotional 
for the patients found highly significant differences 
between the handling of emotional and neutral stimuli.
Although a lengthy example this illustrates that there 
were some points of agreement. Both writers used "perceptual 
defence" as a largely descriptive term (the difference 
lying in what they chose to use it to describe.'), which 
led W.P. Brown to adopt the definition "a descriptive term 
for any systematic relationship found to hold between 
stimulus emotionality and the ease of recognition of stimuli. " 
Secondly, as befits a laboratory demonstration of "the 
unconscious" both writers assumed that perceptual defence 
(PL) must imply the discrimination outside of conscious 
awareness of emotional, anxiety-producing or threatening stimuli
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Thirdly, both writers accepted that defence or vigilance 
can occur although Blum felt that, as response modes, 
they can be manipulated within the same subjects while 
Eriksen saw them as habitual modes to different 
pathological groups.
The concept of defence One possible cause for disagreement 
over terminology may well have been historical in origin, 
namely, that Freud had been in his grave a mere ten to 
fifteen years and there was still considerable confusion 
over the appropriate conceptualization of defence mechanisms. 
This is mirrored in the approach of Bollard and 1‘liller (1950). 
Brown ends his monograph by suggesting, among other things, 
that their analysis of repression must necessarily form 
the basis of any competent theory of PD. This view must 
be questioned, if only because Bollard and Miller appear 
to pay little more than lip service to actual psychoanalytic 
theory, despite their professed and rather grandiose 
(ultimate) aim "to combine the vitality of psychoanalysis, 
the vigour of the natural science laboratory and the facts 
of culture" to create a psychological base for a general 
science of human behaviour.
Bollard and Miller interpret repression as the inhibition 
of the cue-producing responses (especially verbal ones) which 
mediate thinking and reasoning. They develop their idea from 
a quotation of Freud's which refers to repression denying the 
translation of a rejected idea into words. Repression, then, 
is the symptom of avoiding certain thoughts. As cue-producing
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responses play a crucial role in higher mental processes, 
the absence of these responses (or the over-riding of the 
responses they mediate by stronger direct responses) makes 
an important difference in behavio^ or. The possibility of 
planned action is limited because of inadequate labelling 
of goals etc causing behaviour to be more susceptible to 
direct, unreasoned responses to drives and cues. As 
repression originates in the "primitive and child-like" 
unconscious the therapeutic effect of removing repression 
is therefore dependent on the far greater adaptiveness of 
conscious behaviour.
Bollard and Miller's concept is open to criticism on 
several counts. The Freudian ideas they choose to adopt 
come from Freud's "Middle Period" (1900-1923) when Freud 
was developing his interest in the nature of internal 
psychic reality and the relation between psychic energy 
and the "topographical model" (consciousness-unconsciousness), 
It is in Freud's later period, when the "structural model": 
ego, id and superego had been formulated, that the idea of 
defence mechanism, a general term for all of the techniques 
which the ego puts into action against conflicts, was 
reinstated. For this reason, the terms "defence mechanism" 
and "ego" do not appear in Bollard and Miller's account.
As a result of this narrow viewpoint. Bollard and Miller 
actually avoid that area of Freudian theory which deals with 
the interaction between internal and external realities.
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Freud's very early (pre-1900) notion of defence as 
withdrawal from painful reality was superseded in his 
middle period by the concept of repression as a means 
of suppressing internal conflict - it was not until the 
formulation of the ego, as a complicated structure 
organized around the System Perception - Conscious 
i.e. around the means of contact with (external) reality 
(Rapaport, I960), that a theory which might be applied 
to perceptual defence phenomena came into being. The 
ramifications of defence against reality in the context 
of the structural model were fully developed by Anna 
Freud (1936). Her special contribution was to make clear 
that unconscious processes could only be made conscious 
by analysis of the defence, i.e. all the psychic formations 
which aim at barring the perception of the unconscious 
(Van der Leeuw, 1974)-
Finally, Bollard and Miller's classification of 
repression as a pathological response conditioned by fear 
seems a curious basis for a theory of perceptual defence. 
Allport (1961) is in agreement with them in seeing defences 
in this light and feels that defences do not constitute 
the person's entire repertoire of adjustive actions, 
stressing coping as an alternative. The neurotic, then, 
shows much defence and less coping; in the healthy 
personality, coping ordinarily predominates. Again, this 
view of defence is at variance with modern psychoanal^ic 
thought. Lampl-de-Groot (1957) has attempted to show that 
"defence" can be a pathological phenomenon but that it is
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not inconsistent to speak of "normal" defence mechanisms 
and defensive processes. She suggests that neunotic 
defence mechanisms can he viewed as pathologically 
exaggerated or distorted regulation and adaptation 
mechanisms which in themselves belong to normal development.
She does, however, find it difficult to define specifically 
the normal role of these mechanisms apart from the fact 
that they can be clinically differentiated from neurosis 
in children. Van der Leeuw (197^), in a valuable historical 
review of the concept of defence, attempts to go one stage 
further by specifying the ways in which individual defence 
mechanisms can indicate the presence of nemroses on the ' 
one hand and be indispensable for normal psychic functioning 
in the same person on the other. Thus identification is a 
necessary condition for learning, it enables compassion 
but if too intense, disturbs reality-testing. Reaction 
formation stabilizes the ego but can lead to rigidity of 
personality structure. Denial hinders perception but 
regression, as regression in the service of the ego, is 
necessary to creative work, etc. etc. Van der Leeuw stresses, 
as does Lampl-de-Groot, that both the positive and negative 
influences of defence must be considered in personal 
assessment particularly in relation to adaptation.
Psychoanalysis and experimental psychology The above 
attack on Lollard and Miller’s theory of repression has 
enabled coverage of sbme of the salient points regarding 
the psychoanalytic concept of defence, but the question
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remains as to how exactly such notions can he reconciled 
with laboratory experiments.
Rapaport (1960) details the obstacles in the way of 
psychoanalytic theory. The lack of systematic literature 
is a major handicap to advancement. "The general theory, 
far from being well - ingrained dogma, is a waif unknown 
to many, noticed by some and closely familiar to few.
Not the alleged rigidity of the theory but rather 
unfamiliarity with it is the obstacle to theoretical 
progress." Klein (1970), on the other hand, feels that 
systematization of clinical observation slowly beginning 
e.g. Luborsky (1967) and Sandler et al. (1962). Secondly, 
Rapaport suggests that neither the training of psycho­
analysts nor the nature of psychoanalytic practice are 
conducive to theory-making. Klein mentions one area where 
needed revision has not occurred. The formulation of two 
modes of thinking, primary and secondary process, happened 
a long time before the structural model but no reconciliation 
of these concepts has yet been made. Rapaport invokes a 
much larger problem, the ego as a structure has proved so 
complex that its eirploration is still only in the early 
stages. Thirdly, he attacks the "scientific method" and 
the "measuring rage" as ways in which theoretical advance 
is hindered by a clutter of research findings, experimental 
designs and schools of psychology. This argument originates 
in the fact that psychoanalytic concepts are based primarily 
on observation and that Freud envisioned the psycho anal j~tic
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situation as a unique opportunity for the systematic 
study of the lawfulness of behaviour. * This explains 
why Rapaport vigorously attacks present fashions in 
psychology because "they crowd out the interest in 
methods of excperimenting and observing. "
Gardner liurplxy (1965) gives some guidelines for 
integrating psychoanalysis into a unified scientific 
system. He warns of the danger of encapsulating Freud 
within a period i.e. the need for interpretation and re­
interpretation in terms of present socio-cultural realities. 
He affirms the point about observation in a different way. 
Murphy suggests that it is not yet appropriate to apply 
the tenets of excperimental psychology to psychoanalysis 
as the sciences of geology and astronomy are closer counter­
parts for psychoanalysis as a system. These sciences have 
sought and achieved a rigorous and systematic use of terms 
and modes of observation and cross-checking of widely 
different kinds of observation with one another, the 
application of which would benefit psychoanalytic theory. 
Murphy makes the case for, eclecticism on a large scale and 
details five "more orderly systems" with which psychoanalysis 
might be united in order to establish a (or another) unified 
theory of human behaviour viz. the phénoménologie existential
Klein (1970) comments "this investigative orientation may 
be one reason why Freud steadfastly insisted on keeping the 
psychoansilytic method free from domination by the medical— 
therapist community, a matter in which he was overruled - 
to the melancholy detriment of both psychology and psycho­
analysis. "
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systems, gestalt or organ!smic psychology, the Pavlovian 
system (including physiology and behaviourism), the 
biochemical system and the sociocultural. These systems 
should not be seen as in competition but, via inter­
disciplinary thinking, as offering overlapping means of 
interpreting phenomenon in a way conducive to further 
advance in understanding.
Shallice (1972), discussing the role of consciousness 
in psychology, notes that it occupies an analogous position 
for cognitive psychology to that of language behaviour for 
behaviourism, namely, an unsolved anomaly within the domain 
of the approach. His suggestion can be applied to psycho­
analytic theory and cognitive psychology. One technique 
in science for relating two fields is by constructing 
isomorphic correspondences between the concepts and 
operations of one field and those of another. Numerous 
examples of such constructions exist in the history of 
science, the most famous recent one being that of molecular 
biology, linking biology and chemistry. As Beckner (1959) 
showed, using this example, it is not necessary to construct 
isomorphisms between all the concepts and operations of 
one paradigm and those of another (i.e. reduction of the 
first to the second) for the linking to be successful.
There is a good case for arguing that circumstances 
are not yet right for such a rapprochement. George Klein 
(197^  observes that for the non-psychoanalyst to get 
observational mileage out of psychoanalytic concepts does 
not require a .formally pure theory. Rigour of this kind
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is n e c e s s a r y  mainly when the central objective is to assess 
the predictive power of concepts and their generality; it 
is not a requirement for other productive, if less 
systematic, uses of the theory. The usefulness of a 
theory in expanding discovery and in illuminating phenomena 
deserves precedence over considerations of improving the 
formal rigour of the theory itself. Theoretical rigour 
can distract from a fundamental aim of science, the 
discovery of phenomena and expansion of the range of the 
observable in order to help determine the contingent and 
sufficient conditions of phenomena.
To conclude this section, one possible approach will 
be considered which attempts to reconcile findings in 
cognitive psychology with individual differences in a 
v;ay amenable to the utilization of psychoanalytic concepts 
according to Klein’s suggestion. This is sufficient for 
the purpose of the discussion which has attempted to 
establish that there are grounds for not rejecting psycho­
analytic theory outright when considering a perceptual/ 
cognitive phenomenon such as PD. Rejecting it, either 
totally (denial) or by misinterpretation and isolation 
of elements out of context (rationalization), involves 
the loss of a potentially valuable system both for 
increasing the number of observable phenomena and for 
providing a wider conceptual framework with which to 
generate la;}^ otheses.
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Gardner et al. (1959) observe that the research on
cognitive control or cognitive style is closely linked
to a fundamental premise of psychoanalytic theory: the
organism must not only bring needs, imp^ olses and wishes
into continual harmony; it must also resolve the many
independent claims of reality, the possible conflicts
between adaptive behaviour and internal needs or
motivated goals. They see cognitive control as an
organizational tendency that relates the functions of
remembering, perceiving and thinking to each other
within the person. It is an intervening structural
condition accounting in part for the particular impact
of a need on cognition. Thus, with relation to defences,
Gardner et al. consider that it is doubtful that two sets
of controls are involved, each invoking different mediating
structures - it is more likely that defences and cognitive
controls involve the same signal and action apparatus.
However, defences were originally conceived as modes of
resolving conflict, control principles were conceived of
solely as modes of coping with certain insistent
configurations and events in external reality. The
relationship between the two modes has been explored
experimentally to some extent i.e. repression has been
*
shown by Gardner et al. to be linked to levelling while 
isolation (intellectualizing) is related to broad scanning.
The former result was replicated by Holtzman and Gardner (1959)-
*
the terms levelling and scanning are discussed in detail 
in the section on selective attention.
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Tû allow a more definite statement as to the 
relationship between the various controls and defences, 
developmental studies of the emergence of both controls 
and defences need to be completed.
Some models of Perceptual Defence In order to apply
this orientation to defence it is necessary to consider
first some of the models of the mechanism of PD. Brown
(1961) opts for a mediating response model developed from
Dollard and Miller's ideas. The principal element in
this model is that the avoidance response or negative
(fear-arousing) connotation -r^ associated with, a
particular stimulus will generalize to the recognition
response r^ . The existence of -r^ will cause "perceptual
disruption" when the stimulus next occurs. Brown argues
further that a situation can be imagined where the stimulus
evokes both r^ and -r^, thus producing conflict. Increasing
stimulus emotionality could be equated with increasing
conflict. A suitable consideration of absolute and relative
strengths of the competing response tendencies would then
suffice to explain the inverted - U shape curve of recognition
threshold with increasing emotionality. Brown states that
this model is designed to show that a behaviour theory
explanation is possible, rather than to be a substantive
i t .
explanation of the phenomenon. He feels that^is essential 
to recognize that when an emotional stimulus is being 
exposed, the tachistoscopie situation is endowed with an 
element of approach-avoidance conflict.
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ïïochberg (1970) analyses the tachistoscopic word- 
recognition experiment from the subject's point of view:
(i) the word is flashed on a screen and withdrawn long 
before he can respond
(ii) after the exposure is over, the subject must consult 
his memory of that brief flash (eked out by his 
after-images of it, unless they are masked by a 
post-exposure field) and prepare the appropriate 
verbal response
(iii) finally, he must make the appropriate overt verbal 
response.
Such experiments are by their nature experiments in 
retrospection, experiments in which the subject is unable 
to check his memory of the stimulus because the stimulus 
is no longer available for consultation. Short term 
memory is notoriously fragile and stimuli that have been 
associated with trauma in the past (such as those associated 
with electric shock) are equally notorious as producers of 
disruptive emotional responses. Perhaps, therefore a
weak and labile memory trace, newly laid down by the 
brief tachistoscopic exposure, might be eradicated by an 
almost simultaneous startle response (which may be aroused 
by fractional recognition of the stimulus) which 'automatically' 
interferes with recognition and recall of the briefly 
presented material (Hochberg et al, 1955)" This hypothesis 
was tested and positive results obtained.
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Dixon criticises this model because it lacks the 
necessary distinction between sensory processes and 
those underlying and essential for conscious perceptual 
experience- Dixon's model is based on his experiments 
which attempt to demonstrate the sensory process nature 
of PD effects by providing evidence of changes in 
awareness threshold to a neutral stimulus presented to 
one eye accompanying simultaneous presentation of 
emotional stimuli below the awareness threshold to the 
other eye (see Dixon, 1971 PP- 191-222). Dixon's model 
is of PD as a three stage process. In the first, 
subliminal inputs are discriminated by the cortex. In 
the second, the results of this discrimination bring 
about an increase or decrease in reticular activation, 
with consequent enhancement or depression of cortical 
sensitivity. Finally, these reticular-activating-system 
induced changes in cortical sensitivity would determine 
the ultimate threshold for phenomenal representation of 
the stimulus. In Dixon's model, which he supports with 
both neurophysiological and behavioural evidence, the 
results of preawareness discrimination act "forwards"
(in time) upon the processes underlying phenomenal 
representation of the stimulus.
Dixon's model does however allow of the possibility 
of sensory discriminations below awareness having a direct 
effect upon response processes and he cites the stimulus- 
effect hypothesis of Blum (see below). Tliis view of the 
perceptual process is open to modification. The approach
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favoured here derives from Hochberg's theory of focal 
consciousness in which the phenomena of attention and 
the phenomena of perceptual organization result from 
the normal exercise of well-practised skills that are 
fundamental to the perceptual process, rather than 
from the intervention of special faculties. This concept 
will be discussed further in relation to selective 
attention (in Section 5), it is mentioned here because 
this approach entails an orientation to the notion of 
response and sensory processes which possibly differs 
from that of Dixon.
Hochberg*s general perceptual model is here interpreted 
in relation to PD effects, although it was not specifically 
designed for this purpose, and is compared with Dixon's 
model. Both models allow that such effects are not 
peripheral,acting at either receptor or effector. Both 
models involve a monitoring or pre-attentive analysis 
system which is situated prior to awareness. In Dixon's 
model, if the stimulus is above the awareness threshold 
it is processed via the phenomenal register which is in 
parallel with input-output processes. In Hochberg*s model 
the equivalent stage, "focal conscious experience" consists 
of testing anticipated sensory events. Perceptual organi­
zation is postulated to be a function of the structuring 
of the sets of anticipations or anticipating schemata and 
selective attention involves the selection of a particular 
set of schemata for testing within awareness against the 
data from the analysis system. Hochberg's model implies
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the possibility of a feed-forward type of control (e.g. 
McKay, 196?) where correction only need take place when 
the material presented requires a high degree of 
discrimination or is of low probability - generally 
fine discrimination is traded off against speed of 
processing. This model provides the opportunity of 
explaining more clearly the basic difference between the 
effects of perception outside of awareness and partial 
awareness. If there is no partial awareness this suggests 
that the signal is too weak to activate anticipatory 
encoding and the pre-attentive analysis is likely to 
have a more widespread, non-specific effect which is a 
function of its meaning, such as the general rise in 
awareness threshold demonstrated by Dixon which would 
affect simultaneous neutral stimuli also. If anticipatory 
encoding is activated, recognition may still be interfered 
with in a separate although related way, that is, via the 
mechanism suggested by %)ence (1967).
Within such a model, the distinction between sensory 
and response processes shifts in emphasis. If a stimulus 
is above awareness threshold, so-called response processes 
which involve the necessity to verbalize the conflict area 
(represented by the stimulus) are the most likely source 
of disruption or "defensive" behaviour (Blum, 1955). 
Therefore the stimulus-effect hypothesis (the term is 
incorrectly ascribed to Blum by Dixon, although Katsoulas, 
1965 coins it to label Blum's suggestion) appropriate 
where conscious processing of the stimulus could occur.
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On the other hand, with the stimulus below awareness, 
because response selection does not occur, gating must 
take place prior to this. Dixon bases his suggestion 
that negative feedback from the analysis of emotive 
material acts on the input prior to the monitoring or 
analysis system signal detection eicperiments which 
have shown that a higher awareness threshold is due to 
a change in d' and not in beta. There is in fact no 
evidence to link changes in d ' with mechanisms operating 
in any specific site prior to overt response selection.
In conclusion, it is tentatively suggested that a 
perceptual model that involves anticipatory encoding is 
a useful adjunct to Dixons' model of the perceptual 
process and the role within it of discrimination without 
awareness. This discussion helps make clear the relation­
ship between PD and perception without awareness as, 
whether changes in awareness threshold or recognition 
threshold are involved (i.e. provided the stimulus is 
above physiological threshold), discrimination without 
awareness is considered to be a necessary condition for 
either to take place and the results of Experiments 1 
and 2 suggest that fairly detailed discrimination occurs.
A model for changes in recognition threshold Spence's 
(1967) suggestion that raised recognition thresholds to 
emotive stimuli were a function of storage under conditions 
of high arousal stems from an experiment by Eleinsmith and 
Kaplan (1963) of University of Michigan, as discussed in 
Experiment p. The evidence to support the latter idea is 
two-fold in nature.
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Firstly, the concept of trace consolidation was 
reviewed by Walker (1958) at Ilichigan, although the 
original idea comes from Iliiller and Pilzecker in 1900 
(Gliclman, ^961). The phenomena of retrograde amnesia - 
caused by trauma, electro-convulsive shock, anoxia, 
anaesthesia, rise in temperature and stimulation from 
chronically implanted electrodes (liahut, 1958; Thompson,
195s) all suggest that storage can be interfered with by 
external influences- More specifically Glickman (1958) 
showed that cortical arousal affects the trace. He 
suspected the hippocampus and amygdala as the sites 
affected.
Douglas (1967) reviewed the literature on the 
behavioural effects of hippocampal lesions. Changes in 
behaviour after the removal of the hippocampus are 
almost invariably of a perseverative nature (inability to 
withold a response) when a prepotent response is involved, 
implying that the basic function of the hippocampus is 
inhibitory. Douglas presents a case for refinement of 
this concept and suggests that the hippocampus may be 
responsible for both non-specific and specific gating of 
sensory input corresponding to Pavlov's external and internal 
inhibition, lion-specific gating results in the widespread 
exclusion of irrelevant stimuli during the process of 
concentration of attention and is postulated to have the 
function of protecting memory traces from interference 
during consolidation.
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Routtenberg (1968) provides evidence for the 
existence of a dual arousal system; arousal system I 
mediated by the reticular activating system and 
system II by the limbic system. These are organized 
so that they are mutually inhibitory. One of the 
weaknesses of Routtenberg's theory is that he is unable 
to specify the exact anatomical correlates of the two 
systems. Nevertheless, the hippocampus is postulated 
to have an important role in the control of arousal.
The appearance of hippocampal theta it is suggested ' 
means that arousal system II is dominant and desyn­
chronization that system I is. Grastyan (1959) showed 
that hippocampal theta appears when the environmental 
stimulus is of uncertain importance to the animal.
One might assert that when an uncertain stimulus is 
presenting organized response systems stop and the 
animal attends to the properties of that stimulus as 
well as its consequences. Douglas seems to agree with 
this notion. Further, John and Killam (i960) have shown 
that hippocampal theta predominates in the initial stages 
of learning but that once learning is established this 
type of activity disappears. Routtenberg therefore 
postulates that the two-arousal scheme plays a role in 
enhancing the probability of transition from short-term 
memory to intermediate term memory: activation of arousal 
system II would reduce the activity in arousal system I 
which would be disruptive of the consolidation process.
185
Finally, Kimble (1969) also makes a case for the 
function of the hippocampus being equivalent to Pavlov's 
internal inhibition (i.e. that repeated presentations of 
a conditioned stimulus, whether or not accompanied by 
UCS initiate in the brain the development of inhibition 
in the cortical cells responsive to that conditioned 
stimulus). Kimble sees Walker's (1958) concept of 
"action decrement" - the lowered capacity for rearousal 
of the same event which follows any psychological action, 
as showing the influence of Pavlov's idea. Kimble 
discusses the role of action decrement in perseverative 
consolidation, which is necessary for retention and 
subsequent performance. It is consistent with the 
inability of human patients to store permanent memories 
following bilateral lesions invading the hippocampus. 
Anatomical connections suggest that such an inhibitory 
control exerted by the hippocampus and disrupted by 
hippocampal lesions may be primarily effected by virtue 
of neural connections mediating pre-synaptic inhibition 
onto neurons in the mesencephalic and diencephalic 
arousal systems.
The second source of evidence derives from several 
replications of Kleinsmith and Kaplan's original experiment 
on human subjects. Maclean (1969) mentions nine such 
experiments where arousal was manipulated using different 
techniques. Although the degree to which long-term memory 
was enhanced by these experiments varied from differential
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forgetting to strong reminiscence the striking feature 
is that the interaction between arousal and time of 
recall is common to them all. Hamilton et al. (1972) 
start from the position that level of arousal is known 
to cause changes in the information selection strategies 
used, as evidenced by changes in attention (see discussion: 
Experiment 5)« If such changes occur as the result of 
experimental manipulation in the memory experiment, 
there will be a problem in deciding whether differences 
in memory output under two conditions are due to 
differences in selection of input information or to the 
action of decay, interference or consolidation processes 
during the storage period. They obtained data that agreed 
with previous findings in that high arousal at the time 
of storage seemed to aid the preservation of input material 
in the long term. However, the crucial finding, that 
immediate recall under high arousal was poorer, was not 
obtained. Hamilton et al. found that a fixed order list 
actually produced better recall.in noise although with 
order randomized for recall, 'noise' recall was slightly, 
though not significantly worse than quiet. They suggest 
that more order information is stored in noise and that 
the findings of the previous experiments were an artifact 
of the standard experimental technique of randomizing 
list order for each anticipation trial. There are two 
reasons for rejecting this suggestion. Some of the previous 
experiments e.g. King (196$) and those that followed it, 
used extended connected verbal material (a story), with
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delayed auditory feedback to cause arousal, rather than 
PA learning, so that order effects would have been 
maximized. King found that immediate recall was 
severely affected. Furthermore, even if this were not 
so, the conclusion of Hamilton et al, as they point out, 
does not necessarily apply where arousal items are 
events occurring within a list (emotive words).
Apart from there being strong evidence from two 
areas to support the mechanism underlying Spence's 
suggestions (as well as the tentative evidence from 
Experiment $.') the theory has the utility of being 
reasonably consistent with previous models. It is 
similar to that of Hochberg et al. with the necessary 
addition of the subliminal perception element. It is 
not dis-similar from a model developed independently by 
Adcock and Mangan (1970) based on consideration of 
experiments involving conditioning of perceptual responses 
and the effects of arousal on attention, fence's model 
is complementary to the models of the perceptual process 
discussed above and represents a more testable alternative 
to response mediation theory. Furthermore it allows a 
tentative explanation of the mechanism of perceptual 
vigilance as well as defence. Routtenberg (1968) 
conceptualizes the reticular activating and the limbic 
systems as being mutually inhibitory. Activity in arousal 
system II "protects" the memory trace by damping activity 
in arousal system I and presumably acts to increase difficulty 
of recall as a function of the initial arousal occurring on
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presentation of the stimulus. If the individual were in 
a high state of arousal before presentation of the stimulus 
it is possible that an additional increase in arousal 
would cause an 'over-ride' effect, i.e. arousal system II 
would fail to cause inhibition of system I activity so 
that the trace would actually be more accessible to recall 
than if the stimulus had been neutral and no change in 
arousal had occurred. This mechanism entails the finding 
that so-called "repressors" would differ in arousal level, 
would be less aroused, than "sensitizers". There is some 
evidence that this is the case.
Personality differences and perceptual defence
This account of the perceptual defence phenomenon has 
adopted the concept of arousal as an intervening variable 
as it is hoped that this might be more fruitful than the 
earlier use of mediated response. There are several 
immediate advantages of this strategy, the link between 
arousal and activity in the reticular activating system, 
the historical appropriateness of the concept (Hebb, 1955) 
and the relationship between arousal and performance that 
has been frequently suggested. The concept of activation 
is open to criticism, the basic one being that there is no 
reliable physiological index that correlates consistently 
with behavioural arousal. The criticism is reviewed by 
Hinde (1970, pp. 214-227). Some of the criticism can be 
answered. For example, it is difficult to see the relevance 
of the much cited studies of Winkler (1952) and Feldman
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and Waller (1962) to the normal animal or person. Both 
supposedly show dissociation of behavioural and physio­
logical indices of arousal but in the one case, the 
effects of atropine were in fact rather complex and in 
the other, the animals had quite gross mid-brain lesions - 
this data in fact provides favourable support for 
Routtenberg's two-arousal system hypothesis instead of 
casting doubt on the concept of arousal.
Hinde himself details a fair amount of evidence for 
the existence of an optimum level of arousal, performance 
deteriorating if arousal increases or decreases from this 
level, so that an inverted - U shaped function could be 
described. Of particular interest here, is an experiment 
by Corcoran (1965). He used sleep deprivation as a method 
of manipulating arousal. Introverts and extraverts were 
taken as groups which are predicted both on theoretical 
grounds and from previous experimental findings to be 
individuals with predominantly high and low arousal 
respectively. Using a "five-choice serial-reaction task" 
he found that the predicted relationship held viz. the 
performance of extraverts (low arousal) decreased with 
increasing sleep deprivation while the overall performance 
of the introvert (high arousal)*group increased. Corcoran 
adds, though, that the results demonstrate the validity 
of the argument only to the extent that the groups used 
as external criteria were valid ones, i.e. that introverts 
are in general more highly aroused, etc.
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The relationship between these findings and those 
of Brown (1961) is difficult to overlook. Brown predicted 
that extraverts would show their highest recognition 
thresholds at stimulus emotionality levels higher than 
those of introverts. He based this prediction on the 
early work that had linked "sensitizers" with high 
scorers on the Pt (psychosthenia: obsessive-compulsive) 
scale of the MMPI and repressors with high scoring on 
the Hy (hysteria) scale. Eriksen (1954) had already 
suggested that the Pt and Hy scale could reasonably be 
interpreted as measuring an introversion-extraversion 
factor very similar to that of Eysenck. The Byrne 
repression-sensitization scale was based partly on the 
work of Eriksen (Byrne, 1964) and includes the Pt scale 
as a likely measure of sensitization and Hy denial as a 
likely measure of repression. The substantial relation­
ship between the R-S scale and various measures of 
introversion-extraversion derived in studies reviewed 
by Byrne suggests to him the possibility of inter­
connections between his work and that of Eysenck (Byrne,
1964 p. 207). Perhaps Byrne had overlooked Eriksen's 
observation. Byrne also finds some evidence for a linear 
relationship between sensitizing defences and maladjustment, 
e.g. a correlation of +0.75 with the I#]PI neuroticism scale 
and -0.56 with ego strength.
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Brown found that the predicted relationship held for 
female extraverts and introverts that were low on neuroticism. 
Male subjects as a whole showed only the upward trend of 
the curve, which was consistent with the stimuli (emotional 
words) being of less emotionality (assessed on the basis 
of associative RT) for them and the experimenter being male. 
Male and female subjects high on neuroticism might not 
have shown the expected effect because of the interaction 
between extraversion and neuroticism on thresholds 
suggested by the findings that Byrne reports.
If, following Corcoran, extraverts are generally less 
aroused than introverts these findings lend some support 
to the theory proposed above, that arousing words will 
cause PD ("repression") in individuals with a moderate 
level of arousal but vigilance ("sensitizing") in high 
arousal individuals and that it is possible that an 
inverted U-shaped curve would be shown by both sets of 
individuals given a wide enough range of stimulus 
emotionality.
Coles (1965) observes that Brown's inverted-U curve 
contradicts the findings of Duffy and others (e.g. Duffy,
1962, pp. 112, 125-4) that there is a U-shaped relation 
between thresholds and stimulus emotionality. He feels 
that there are three possible explanations; 1) change in 
threshold is not in keeping with the concept of arousal 
2) the direction of threshold change may be dependent upon 
the threshold as well as upon the degree of stimulus
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emotionality (Blum, 195^) and 3) the indicators for 
stimulus emotionality used by Brown were not valid.
The above discussion seems to answer the first point 
adequately. Recent work that has used a range of 
stimulus emotionality (Wagstaff, 1974) a^.s also tended 
to confirm Brown's findings and predictions. The second 
point is a weak one - Blum's earlier experiment was rather 
idiosyncratic, so that e.g. manipulated vigilance was 
demonstrated with stimulus exposures of 0.03 sec and the 
same subjects were manipulated to produce defence effects 
with stimulus exposures at 0.2 sec. Cole's third point 
is dealt with in detail in Experiments 4 and 5-
Is perceptual defence defensive? Dixon comments that 
from one angle, the fuss over PD is rather odd since few 
would deny, even nowadays, that the ease or difficulty 
with which one recognizes somebody or something depends 
upon their meaning or personal significance. Further, 
he argues that the concept of defence in connection with 
this phenomenon is unnecessary. Even if visual sensitivity 
does vary as a function of unconsciously discriminated 
meaning, there is no need to invoke the notion of defence.
All that is required is to suppose that the physiological
consequences of emotional arousal exercise a gating effect
on sensory inflow. Dixon later concludes that his
experiments do not shed any light on the origin (purpose
if there is one) of such a mechanism, so that PD effects
may well be due to physiological accidents, be mere epiphenomena.
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There are two possible approaches which argue for 
the purposive element in PD. One of them is discussed 
by Dixon himself, the work of Shevrin and his colleagues 
(Shevrin et al. 1970, 1971). They have developed a 
reliable measure of peak amplitude average evoked 
responses (AER's), interjudge reliability for this 
measure being above +0.93. Over several experiments 
they have shown that subjects rated as repressive on 
the Rorschach (with good inter-judge reliability) 
responded with lower amplitude to a meaningful subliminal 
stimulus than did non-repressives (in the most recent 
experiment, twin siblings). Non-repressives recalled 
more "penny" associates to the stimulus, a pen-knee rebus, 
than did répressives. When the stimulus was supraliminal 
AER's from répressives were higher than from non-repressives. 
Shevrin et al. hypothesize that the same meaningful stimulus 
may link up with different levels of thought organization, 
depending on whether it is subliminal or supraliminal.
Klein (1970, PP- 199-203) makes the point already 
implied when the work of Gardner et al. (1959), which 
represents the second type of approach, was first mentioned 
above. Much of the confusion in the discussion of so-called 
PD comes from the operational failure of demonstration of 
the antefcedents necessary to allow the process to be 
specified as defensive. A heightened recognition threshold 
does not inevitably have a defensive intention, it can also 
reflect the type of habitual adaptive cognitive control 
discussed by Gardner et al. Gardner et al. used the
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Schematizing test, which requires the estimation of size 
difference of adjacent members of a long series of squares 
shown in ascending order of size,to study the levelling- 
sharpening continuum and confirmed the prediction that 
subjects who showed repressive tendencies on the Rorschach 
would be more likely to be levellers. This result was 
replicated by Holtzman and Gardner (1959). It is no 
coincidence that Gardner et al, Klein and Shevrin et al, 
are all working or have worked for the Menninger foundation.
Their work represents different aspects of a continuing 
programme which attempts to relate psychoanalytic thought 
to psychological reality in a meaningful way.
In conclusion it is suggested that the amplification 
of Spence's and Dixon's models to explain the effects of 
emotional stimuli on word recognition is consistent with 
the concept of perceptual style or cognitive controls, 
although the evidence linking the two concepts is sketchy. 
Nevertheless, by providing a framework connecting 
individual differences with perceptual behaviour, this 
approach adds the missing element to a formulation of PD 
which would "explain away" the effect of emotional stimuli 
or reduce it to the status of an epiphenomenon. Within 
this framework it is not strictly rational to equate PD 
with repression or other defences. As Holtzman and Gardner 
(1959) showed, knowing that a subject relies chiefly on 
repression for defensive purposes allows the inference that 
levelling is a prominent mode of cognitive functioning.
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The converse, however, does not appear to he true. 
Similarly, in terms of the arousal-type model, where 
pathological defences could be postulated (e.g. on 
clinical grounds), the situation is actually more 
complex than would be predicted from a simple inverted- 
U shaped function, as evidenced by the interaction between 
neuroticism and the extraversion-introversion continuum.
It would seem that individual differences in the effects 
of emotional stimuli on perception may represent a 
fruitful avenue for research, as was argued originally 
by the proponents of the "New Look".
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Section G : THE SELECTION CE EMOTIONAL STIMULI
197
Introduction
Further to Experiment 4 the non-emotive characteristics 
of words used as emotional stimuli are now examined in 
greater detail. Although in the nature of a digression 
from the main theme of the thesis this particular area 
is of considerable methodological importance. A similar 
approach could he applied to the use of non-verbal stimuli 
with emotive connotations.
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Experiment 5- Words as emotional stimuli
Abstract: The theoretical implications of words acting
as affective stimuli are discussed and Osgood's 
mediational model of word meaning adopted as a first step 
in considering the effects of emotivity. Experiments by 
Laffal (1955), Hull and Lugoff (1921), Brown (1965) and 
Levinger and Clark (1961) are examined in turn as a 
means of assessing the data which is derived from the 
analysis of fifty sets of associates obtained from 
Experiment 4. Thus four experiments are used 
respectively to look at the effects of associative 
difficulty, absolute versus relative reaction time as 
a complex indicator, a priori versus rating assessment 
of emotionality and the factor analytic approach.
The overall pattern of findings for the present data 
is similar to that of the work mentioned above, but the 
crucial differences between E and 11 words found in the 
Brown and Levinger and Clark studies are not replicated.
A methodological analysis of some of the principal 
studies on the effects of stimulus affectivity (using 
Cramer, 1968 as a source) suggests that virtually without 
exception, previous studies have contained sufficient 
procedural errors to preclude any clear demonstration of 
the effect of the factors under investigation.
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Recent studies (Smith and Harleston, 1966; Brown, 
1971) are then discussed because they introduce two 
further variables, concrete-abstractness and pleasantness- 
unpleasantness, which also need controlling in the 
investigation of stimulus affectivity.
Finally, the findings associated with stimulus 
affectivity are re-examined in the light of work on 
selective attention and arousal in an attempt partly 
to replace the mediational response (avoidance) - type 
explanation with one which allows the generation of more 
readily testable hypotheses. Some further comments are 
included, as an addendum, on the selection of words 
which are emotive for the individual subject.
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This study is organised in a slightly different way 
from the previous experiments- To help the reader 
understand the orientation of the material, the first 
section considers the implications of words as emotional 
stimuli from a theoretical point of view. This is 
followed hy a section devoted to experimental data 
which compares the analysis of data collected during 
Experiment 4 with results from four well-known studies 
in the field.
The discussion is in three parts, first, a summary 
of Cramer's (1968) review and a methodological analysis 
of the work she covers. Secondly, several recent studies 
are discussed in the light of the present study and 
methodological analysis. Einally, an attempt is made to 
reconcile the theoretical position which has been adopted 
with the experimental findings from the present study 
and the other work discussed.
Stimulus affestivity as a theoretical construct
"The area of emotional experience and behaviour is 
»
one of the most confused and ill-defined in psychology 
(Izard, 1969)."
Bindra (1970) categorizes four different lines of 
experimental work developed under the vague rubric "emotion" 
These include the study of a) emotional experience (or 
emotional recognition) as subjectively reported by man 
and inferred by him in other human beings and animals,
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b) emotional arousal, changes in internal bodily 
processes produced by emotional stimuli, c) emotional 
action, the overt environmentally directed response 
patterns and d) emotional stimulation, the particular 
stimulus features of the physical or social environment 
that usually provoke one or more of the above three.
Words can function as signs for emotional experience, 
enabling communication of such experience to others 
and as signs of emotional arousal for communicating the 
existance for the word user of affective elements in the 
situation. These aspects have been investigated by 
hcVitz (1969) who has attempted a systematic description 
of the language used to describe emotional states in 
order to define the structure of emotional meaning as a 
way of developing his own theory of emotion.
Words which themselves function as emotive stimuli 
have been very inadequately investigated, despite their 
widespread, usage in this capacity in psychological 
experiments. Using the word association paradigm, words 
were initially considered by Jung and others as signs 
which were linked to underlying symptom complexes and 
which would therefore produce evidence of emotional 
disturbance when the individual v/as required to use the 
sign to make an associative linkage. Emotional disturbance 
was defined in terms of response characteristics which 
were called complex indicators', such as LRT, failure to 
reproduce the association and certain characteristics of 
the response word. Jung observed that certain words in
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bis standard list were more likely to evoke complex 
indicators than others. liore recently the differences 
between words which are consistent across subjects 
have been the principal source of interest. Bindra 
points out that the definition of emotional stimuli 
is to some extent dependant on the definition of 
emotional responses and vice versa. Circularity is 
an obvious problem in the context of word association 
where words can be classified as emotional on the basis 
of their power to evoke complex indicators which in 
turn are defined as responses more often evoked by 
emotional words than by neutral words. However, a 
possible way out of this situation is to look at word 
meaning.
An important consideration that arises from a study 
of the literature on emotion is the role of context in 
the labelling of emotion. Schachter (197^) observes 
that whether emotional behaviour is produced by direction 
stimulation of the brain or by experimental production 
of the peripheral correlates of emotion (administration 
of adrenaline), a necessary condition is the presence of 
appropriate external stimulation. Any physiologically 
based formulation of emotion must specify the fashion in 
which physiological processes interact with stimulus, 
cognitive and situational factors. Essentially the same 
point is made by Arnold (1970) who, looking at emotion as 
a neurophysiologist, stresses the role of the person’s 
appraisal of the situation as a determinant of emotion.
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Another interpretation of these findings is that context 
provides the necessary semantic structure for the labelling 
of emotive states (whether or not this means labelling 
in the literal sense).
A theoretical approach which seems to provide a 
useful way of beginning to integrate data on word 
emotionality is Osgood's mediation process model of 
word meaning. Osgood's model has three advantages 
1) it allows both for individual differences and for 
similarities across subjects 2) it includes affectivity 
as a part of word meaning and as such allows for the 
influence of contextual cues, both external (e.g. 
syntactic) and internal (memory) and 3) it involves 
consideration of sensory and response integration.
T o explain the third point, Osgood's static model of 
language behaviour (Osgood, 1957) involves the following 
processes:
stimulus — > sensory re-coding (integration) — > de-coding
— > central processes (r^--- > S^) — > encoding
— > motor recoding — > response
which makes the model amenable to incorporation or 
explanation of data from the areas of both psychophysiology 
and experimental psychology. Briefly, a significate is 
defined as any pattern of stimulation which regularly and 
reliably elicits a predictable pattern of behaviour (in 
other words - something that can be labelled).
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Whenever a neutral stimulus (sign-to-be) is paired with 
a significate and this pairing occurs sufficiently close 
in time to a reinforcing state of affairs, the neutral 
stimulus will acquire an increment of association (r^) 
with some distinctive part of the total behaviour 
elicited by the significate (E^). Such fractional 
behaviour Osgood calls a representational mediation 
process. Representational because, although called 
forth by another stimulus (the sign) it is part of the 
very behaviour produced by the significate; mediational, 
because the self-stimulation produced by this representing 
reaction can become associated through ordinary instru­
mental learning, with various overt responses appropriate 
to the object signified. The association of various 
signs as stimuli with representational mediators as 
reactions constitutes one set of habits which Osgood 
calls decoding habits, the association of representational 
mediators as self-produced stimuli with various overt 
acts constitutes another set of habits he calls encoding 
habits. The justification for calling this model a two- 
stage model (to distinguish it from the crude Skinnerian 
model, where there is a one to one relation between the 
meaning of a sign and the total response to the significate) 
is that the learning of decoding habits may proceed 
independently of encoding habits.
Osgood (1966) admits that the (r^--- > s^ ) linicage .
is a hypothetical construct and recognizes the danger that 
by proliferating unobservables, mediation theory may be 
able to "explain" too much and hence become untestable.
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Following on his work on the Semantic Differential Osgood 
sees r^ not as a single reaction but rather as a multi- 
componential affair. In a fashion analogous to the 
notion of a phoneme as a simultaneous bundle of 
distinctive phonetic features, the meaning of a sign 
is conceived to be a simultaneous bundle of distinctive 
semantic features, of which, incidentally, the affective 
connotation could represent one or several. Osgood sees 
representational mediation processes as having response 
functions in decoding ( "understanding") and stimulus 
functions in encoding ("creating") language. Perhaps 
they themselves could be crudely categorized in a like 
manner as the "knowing" component, which both establishes 
the link between sign and the object originally labelled 
and provides the cognitive, context-bound element which 
allows observer and the individual to label its effect 
"affective" rather than simply "arousing". This argument 
should apply whether the word functions as an emotive 
stimulus in itself (e.g. for some idiosyncratic reason, 
say, 'lamprey' for King John's wife) or if the word is 
used to communicate feeling in an accepted way 
("the professor said 'I'm appalled at this experiment'").
Criticism of Osgood's theory Osgood's theory has been 
attacked by Podor (1965) who criticises mediation theory 
as a whole as applied to linguistic reference, Podor's 
criticisms are essentially two-fdd. Firstly', he criticises 
the simplistic application of S-R theory to language 
behaviour, which Osgood himself disagrees with, hence his
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mediational approach. Secondly, Podor argues that 
mediation theory only differs from single-stage theory 
in that the responses (i.e. r^) are not observable 
(cf R^) and that two-stage theory reduces to a single- 
stage theory because of the one-to-one relationship 
between r^ and R^, given that r^ is a proper part of R .^ 
Osgood (1966), in reply to the article, points out that 
the essential difference between single - and two-stage 
theories is the functional separation of decoding (S-r) 
and encoding (s-R) phases. In other words, R^ the 
verbal response, does not bear a one-to-one relationship 
to r^ (e.g. use of a second language), as the groups of 
S-r and s-R connections for a particular word are as 
varied as the multi-component concept of r^ implies and 
are postulated to be formed independently of each other. 
Podor (1966), in his reply, does not answer this point 
but continues to maintain that the relations between the 
mediating events and the input-output states they connect 
are, by hypothesis, one-to-one. Consideration of the 
affective element of meaning underlines the necessity for 
a cognitive element ; if this is accepted much of the 





Jung introduced his method of word association as 
a technique for studying the psychopathology of the 
individual case. Utilizing a similar rationale, in 
the previous experiment words were selected as emotive 
on the basis of features characteristic of the 
particular individual with whom they would be 
subsequently re-used. In the field of perception 
without awareness words are not infrequently used as 
emotive stimuli. It is therefore relevant to study 
those'stimulus characteristics of emotive words which 
have generalized effects across subjects. Such effects 
may need to be controlled for or at least considered 
when words emotive for the individual subject are sought.
To illustrate this point, in the previous experiment 
the word LIVER was rated as emotive on an a priori basis 
while the word PAIITT was rated as neutral. Thirty-one 
undergraduates subsequently rated the words as part of a 
list on an emotional-unemotional seven point scale.
The two words had a mean rating of 1.90 which suggests 
that subjects considered both to be neutral. Examination 
of associative difficulty (D) values and mean reciprocal
reaction times for fifty subjects suggests that differences 
in^reaction time between the two words are in almost 
exact proportion to the tO^ i^ verse) ratio of their D values.
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It would seem that such differences were entirely due to 
difficulty of a non-emotive kind. On the other hand, if 
the emotional ratings of the thirty-one subjects are 
examined it appears that all thirty-one scored PAINT between 
1 (non-emotional) and 4 (mid-point of the scale). Three 
subjects however had rated LIVER as 5 or more. It might 
be argued that a minority of subjects (including the 
experimenter.’) find LIVER an emotive word. Given that in 
some gross respects LIVER has the stimulus characteristics 
of a neutral word, are there other stimulus characteristics 
which distinguish LIVER from a word like PAIITT, which hardly 
any subject finds emotive?
In order to consider questions such as this the data 
from the twenty-six experimental and twenty-four sampling 
control subjects in the previous experiment were pooled.
This provided responses from fifty subjects (twenty-seven 
females and twenty-three males) to a forty-four word list, 
a total of 2200 responses. Each word had been presented 
tachistoscopically for 0.5 sec and the subject had pressed 
a key as he or she responded, thus providing an associative 
reaction time for each response. A response reproduction 
test had been performed immediately after initial presentation 
of the set of stimuli. The data was thus comparable to that 
used by several studies to investigate stimulus affectivity.
It appears that the role of affective factors has been 
examined in three kinds of ways a) empirically, on a 
'lowest common denominator' basis, using stimuli which are 
judged to be sufficiently powerful for few subjects to be
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able to deny some degree of emotional content. This is 
the basis of the use of so-called 'taboo' words in 
early experiments in the perceptual defence field, 
b) by establishing an 'emotivity' dimension so that 
words can be said to be relatively neutral or emotional 
with respect to each other. The principal method has 
been either to use a non-specific scale, as was done 
above, or to employ scales that have had some degree of 
testing for reliability etc such as specific scales from 
the Semantic Differential, c) by elimination i.e. by 
demonstrating in a situation where appropriate variables 
are manipulated that a significant portion of the variance 
remains when non-emotive factors are partialled out.
Brown (1965) has attempted to use a combination of 
methods b) and c) to investigate the validity of the complex 
indicators first described by Jung in 1905- Selecting two 
lists of thirty words of similar mean associative difficulty 
(as measured by the frequency of unique responses) he 
examined the differences between the associative responses 
of 100 subjects to the thirty emotive and thirty-neutral 
words (rating by a separate group of subjects yielded a 
biserial r between his original classification and mean 
rating of +0.89 over the 60 words). Six indicators: unique 
response, LRT (> 2.6 sec), response repetition, stimulus 
repetition, forgetting and misremembering, were investigated. 
Certain pairs of emotional indicators tended to co-occur 
when the stimulus was emotional to an extent which was not 
found with neutral stimuli.
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Levinger and Clark (1961) did not examine intra- 
stimulus association but used three measures of emotivity: 
a priori classification, mean rating on a seven point 
scale and mean GSR. The 60 words were responded to by 
34 subjects although only 20 subjects provided GSR’s.
The response variables studied were recall, reaction 
time and two measures of associative difficulty. There 
were three main findings; subjects showed significantly 
higher GSR's while giving associations which were later 
forgotten than while giving those which were later 
remembered ; stimulus words rated as emotional were far 
more likely to elicit associations which were later 
forgotten than were stimuli rated low on emotionality 
and finally, associative difficulty was found to be 
linked to forgetting. In a principal components factor 
analysis of interstimulus correlations with the different 
variables two main components appeared. Forgetting, GSR 
and mean reaction time loaded on both factors, one of 
which was heavily loaded for emotional rating and the 
other for associative difficulty measures. It was - 
concluded that forgetting is a function of both emotional 
and non-emotional determinants.
Laffal (1955) had previously shown that response 
faults (LRT and reproduction failure) were highly correlated 
with two measures related to associative difficulty (which 
were also intercorrelated, r = +0.925)- The response of 
80 subjects on a 100 - word list were analysed.-
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Laffal did not attempt to distinguish emotionality 
although scrutiny of his list suggests that 8 0 %  of the 
words would probably be rated as emotional. V/hile 
Laffal’s conclusion that response faults are a function 
of the associational response hierarchy of the stimulus 
word is valid in a limited sense, his failure to attempt 
to discriminate the effect of emotionality per se 
limits the value of his finding. Thus, referring to the 
list again, all but one of the twenty words which would 
probably be considered neutral yield a frequency of 
faulted responses for the 80 subjects which is below 
the median value (22) for the list as a whole.
Finally, the large study (100 subjects each providing 
100 responses) of Hull and Lugoff. (1921) is, apart from 
its liistorical interest, of importance because of the 
detailed analysis on the 10,000 pooled responses which 
was performed. Here again, no attempts was made to 
consider effects due to affective attributes of the 
stimuli but the interrelation of complex indicators - 
in particular reaction time with the others, was considered. 
In section Y  of their paper: "diagnostic potency as a 
function of the length of reaction-time". Hull and 
Lugoff plotted the average number of other complex signs 
(indicators) per 100 reactions against each length of 
absolute time from the longest to the shortest. Each 
point represented between 500 and 1000 reactions. Using 
a horizontal line to represent a critical level at which 
the %  of complex signs ceases to be chance an upward
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sloping curve was obtained which cut the criterion line 
at a point corresponding to 1.8 sec. It is to be noted 
that the x axis (RT) was not of equal intervals 
although not logarithmic either. It is not quite clear 
why this was so. To establish that use of absolute RT 
as a criterion measune was valid, relative reaction 
times were plotted on the same axes except that whereas 
the y axis was the same the x axis became a series of 
equally spaced intervals representing blocks of 500 
reactions i.e. the fastest five RT's for each subject, 
over 100 subjects, followed by the next fastest five etc. 
The curves appeared "astonishingly similar. This 
detailed similarity can only mean that on the long run 
at least, one method is diagnostically as potent as the 
other. " Hull and Lugoff thus came to the curious 
conclusion that because both curves had an upward slope 
that "they must follow the same law. " In Laffal ' s paper 
this becomes "... using 2.6 secs as a cutting point for 
faults yielded results very similar to those using 
individual distributions. " HuJLl and Lugoff in fact 
established no more than that the slowest 15% of responses 
for each of 100 subjects provided the same % of faults 
as pooled reactions for 100 subjects which are over 2.6 
sec in duration. This finding is at least equivocal 
because of a) the dubious nature of the response- 
repdition indicator in tliis study (see later) which 
contributed over 40% of the non reaction-time faults and 
b) the lack of evidence that the faults obtained with the
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relatively longest reaction times were the same as those 
obtained with the longest absolute reaction times. Thus 
it could be that forgetting (for example) was linked
re
almost eilirely to ^ faction times over 2.6 sec while stimulus- 
repetition occurred only in the slowest 15% of responses 
given by those subjects with mean RT's below the median 
for the group. Although such a situation would produce 
identical results to those of Hull and Lugoff it would 
hardly justify the assumption implicit in Laffal's 
statement. Brown accepts the procedure without querying 
it, merely observing that he obtained the same proportion 
of faulty responses as Laffal by so doing.
This brief survey illustrates the kind of problem 
that arises in this field. The major difficulty is 
analogous with that of using the same indicator for 
investigation of perceptual defence as for demonstrating 
the phenomenon. As Brown points out, it seems perverse 
to call for a response-specific criterion of emotionality 
since it was the lack of such a measure which the word - 
association indicators were designed to meet. Brown 
attempts what he admits is a relatively crude procedure, 
namely, demonstrating differences of handling of complex 
indicators (frequency of occurrence, co-occurrence etc) 
across conditions of differing emotionality and then 
making the inference that differences are due to the 
emotionality difference itself. Although at face value 
this seems a reasonable suggestion it relies on the 
assumption that emotionality can have an effect relatively
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independent of other situational variables, which has 
not yet been satisfactorily demonstrated. To pursue 
the analogy a little further, the methodological 
advances of the late 50's and early 60's and the 
introduction of SDT caused a major breakthrough for 
perceptual defence experiments by virtue of the re- 
evaluation of the recognition threshold concept. A 
similar advance seems necessary for the concept of 
stimulus affectivity as this appears to be certainly 
for experimental psychology, a relatively neglected area.
The aims of the present study were:
1. to replicate the findings of other workers wherever 
possible, in order to establish that the data was 
comparable, despite differences in the nature of the 
word list and the method of presentation of stimuli and 
measurements of associative reaction time
2. within this framework, to examine two methodological 
issues; a) the use of absolute versus relative reaction 
time as a complex indicator
b) the use of differing independent methods to evaluate 
stimulus emotionality
5. as Brown, to take the work of Levinger and Clark a 
step further, but not by intra-stimulus analysis but 
rather by adding more stimulus and response variables 
into the factor analysis.
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RESULTS:
1. The role of associative difficulty: Laffal's main
finding was that response faults were highly correlated 
with the entropy of the response hierarchy (H) and with 
the number of different responses available to the 
stimulus word (D). The nature of the response hierarchy 
was characterised by use of the information theory concept 
of average information (entropy) so that H = -S p^ log^ P^  ^
where p^ is the probability of occurrence of a given response.
A stimulus word to which a group of subjects as a whole 
gives few different responses, with high probabilities for 
such responses, will have a response hierarchy of low 
entropy. The values of H and D for the 44 words are given 
in tab. A. 5-1 which summarizes their characteristics with 
respect to a total of sixteen variables. Laffal correlated 
H, L, reaction time faults (RT >2.5 sec) reproduction 
faults and number of responses faulted. Tab. 5-1 shows 
the pro duct-moment correlations between H, D (measured on 
the basis of 158 responses), reaction time faults (both 
relative i.e. RT^ > ~ S.D. above mean and absolute RT > 2.0 
Sec), reproduction faults and total number of responses 
faulted for the 44 words used.
The values, considering that Laffal used 100 words, 
are very similar. Laffal ' s finding, that there was a 
higher correlation with D as compared to H, is replicated.
The correlations obtained using absolute as opposed to 
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On balance faults based on absolute reaction time 
give marginally higher correlations. 21.4% of responses 
involved absolute reaction time faults (20.7% with 
relative reaction times) as compared to 16.1% in Laffal's 
study. His data included 16.9% reproduction faults 
(forgetting only) as compared to 19.4% in the present 
study (including S- and R- repetition. Forgetting alone 
occurred in 13-5% of responses). The similarity of the 
crucial comparisons is all the more striking when the 
following differences between the two studies are 
considered
1) the present study involves smaller numbers: a total of 
44 X 50 = 2200 responses as compared to 80 x 100 = 8000 
responses. U.K. students rather than U.S. students took 
part.
2) only 43% of the words used in the present study were
of comparable frequency to Laffal's i.e. having frequencies 
of 10-25 per million.
3) Laffal used a criterion of 2.6 sec for LRT (reaction 
time fault) as opposed to 2.0 sec in the present study, 
although the use of key and stop-clock may make 2.0 sec 
equivalent to 2.6 sec measured using the traditional 
verbal and stop-watch method.
4) D and H were calculated in Laffal*s study on the basis
' - I
of 80 responses per word. In the present study they were 
measured on the basis of 158 responses per word i.e. 
those of the fifty experimental subjects plus those of 
the 108 controls who provided pencil and paper responses.
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5) Reproduction faults in the present study included 
8- repetition and R- repetition while Laffal only 
included failure to remember.
6) Co-occurrence also differed in a similar fashion.
That is to say, using the differing methods of measuring 
reproduction failure Laffal reported a ratio of co­
occurrence of reproduction and reaction time faults in 
27-7% of the responses which involved reaction time 
faults whereas the corresponding figure in the present 
study was 28.5% (using absolute reaction time - 28.7% 
using relative reaction as a time-fault measure).
2. Relative and absolute reaction times as indicators
Hull and Lugoff's study is mostly of a correlational 
nature also. Rather than use the product-moment correlation 
method, these authors (thus producing "an enormous saving 
in labor of computation") used the tetrachoric r : 
r = cos  “fT (where a, b, c and d were cell-
^  - jbc
totals in a two-way contingency table) to measure the 
"strength of the association tendency." Compared to Laffal's 
value of +0.665, Hull and Lugoff found a coefficient of 
association between long reaction time and defective 
reproduction of only +0.26. The frequency of occurrence 
of indicators in the present as compared to Hull and 
Lugoff's data is shown in tab. 5-2.
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Tab. 5-2. Comparison of frequency of indicators: 

















RT > 2.0 sec RT >2.6 sec
The only striking difference is in the percentage of 
response repetitions. Hull and Lugoff defined response- 
repetition as "response with the same reaction word at two 
or more different stimulus words", and it seems probable 
that the very high value obtained by them is due to their 
failure to reject frequent occurrences of response 
repetition related to similarities between stimuli. This 
view is reinforced by the fact that response-repetition in 
their study produced low coefficients of association with 
the other measures. Hull and Lugoff themselves concluded 
that both response repetition (as they measured it) and 
very short reaction times were "alleged signs ... which —  
may be a weakly allied diagnostic group, significant with 
respect to the reaction word itself and not to the stimulus 
word, as is assumed to be the case with the other signs."
Tab. 5-5 shows a comparison of the findings when 
absolute and relative reaction time is used to examine 
co-occurrence, i.e. LRT is compared with all other indicators, 
and the four response frequency values of co-occurrence
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(namely LHT + one other indicator)^LET only, any other 
indicator only and no indicator, are tabulated and the 
coefficient of association calculated. Hull and Lugoff's 
data is provided for comparison.
Tab. 5-3" Association of LRT with other indicators:
present study compared with Hull and Lugoff
Present data Hull and Lugoff '
Absolute RT Relative LRT LRT
No. of responses
with LRT + some 109 10? 840
other indicator
Responses with poxi poq 1200
LRT only
Responses with
other indicator 559 349 1510
only
No indicators 1451 1455 6450
Coefficient of +0.337 ■ +0.539 +0.408
association
There appears to be no difference between absolute 
and relative reaction when used as a criterion and the 
coefficients are of the same order as that obtained by 
Hull and Lugoff. The finding in the previous section, 
that a replication of Laffal's data reveals no difference 
between correlations using relative or absolute reaction 
time, appears to be confirmed. However, as pointed out 
in the introduction, correlational data alone provides 
inadequate evidence to demonstrate the point convincingly.
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Tab. 5-4 shows an analysis of the critical co-occurrences, 
those between LRT and forgetting, response-repetition and 
stimulus-repetition, the percentage frequencies being 
given separately for E and N words using the two methods 
of measurement.
Tab. 5-4. % frequency of co-occurrence:
Absolute and relative reaction times
% LRT X for­
getting
%  LRT X R-rep.










E words N words
2.9 5-5 2.4 5-2
0.7 0.6 0.9 0.6
1.0 0.8 1.0 0.8
4.6 4.7 4.5 4.6
Again the proportions are virtually identical both 
across neutral and emotional words and across classes of 
co-occurrence. It must therefore be concluded that Hull 
and Lugoff ' s premise is correct and in view of this 
absolute RT only is used henceforth in examination of the 
data from the present study as a means of measuring RT 
faults (LRT). The similarity in coefficient of association 
tentatively confirms the suggestion made above, that with 
the present method of presentation of stimuli and measurement 
of RT, 2.0 sec is equivalent to 2.6 sec obtained using 
the traditional procedure.
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3* A priori classification and subject rating of 
emotionality
Brown makes several important points with reference 
to the work just described. The correlational approach 
is unsatisfactory for analysing patterns of co-occurrence 
among indicators because each response made needs to be 
treated as a separate case; what is needed is analysis 
of intrastimulus associations as well as interstimulus 
correlations of pairs of indicators. A weakness of 
Hull and Lugoff's study of association is that in a 
table of X (rows) x Y (columns) cells when there is 
significant inter-stimulus correlation between the two 
indicators studied, estimates of in a 2 x 2 table 
condensed from the X x Y table may seriously under­
estimate the true ' s of co-occurrence over the entire 
X X Y cells. Brown attempted to overcome this problem 
by calculating ' s separately for each row of the 
original tabulation and summing the X values of thus 
obtained. Furthermore a deficiency of the previous studies 
is that co-occurrence of indicators at an above chance 
level did not demonstrate their validity as emotional 
indicators. Brown states that "the findings strongly 
suggest that the indicators share a common determinant 
but cannot help to identify that common determinant as 
emotional disturbance or associative difficulty or anyd:hing 
else, for the want of criterion measures of these possible 
determinants." While the measures D (and H) probably have 
some validity as measures of associative difficulty.
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Brown admits that the emotional factor had to he mani­
pulated in a relatively gross manner in his experiment. 
Words were classified as E or IT on a priori grounds and 
some confirmation was obtained for this procedure by 
having fifteen students rate the words on a 7-point 
emotional-unemotional scale. The biserial r between 
mean ratings and the original classification over 60 
words was +0.89.
An attempt was made to replicate most of Brown's 
data. Firstly, the correlations between stimulus rating 
and complex indicators are shown in tab. 5*5, with Brown's 
results for comparison.
Tab. 5"5" Correlations of mean stimulus ratings of 44-
words with frequency of occurrence of complex 
indicators
Unique R LRT R-rep. 6-rep. Forgetting
Present study -0.00 0.06 0.24 *0.25 -0.09
Brown (-1965) -0.05 0.09 0.55* 0.21 0.40*
*p 0.05 *P < 0.01
Brown's conclusion from his data was that R-repetition and 
forgetting were more sensitive to emotion than the other 
indicators. In the present study, based as it is on only 
one third (2200) of the responses (6000) used by Brown, 
there is general though weak agreement with his data apart 
from the forgetting category. There is no evidence of any
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relationsiiip between emotionality and forgetting although 
this provided the strongest correlation in Brown's study.
In order to investigate this finding and to examine 
the relative value of a priori versus subject rating of 
emotionality the mean frequencies of the indicators were 
examined and subjected to t test (tab. 5-6). The original 
(a priori) classification of 24 E and 20 IT words has been 
given in experiment 4. On the basis of emotionality rating 
by thirty-one control subjects (see tab. A.5-1 for values 
and detail of those words re-classified as emotional) 27 E 
words (incorporating 21 of the a priori E words) and 17 IT 
words (14 of the a priori group) were selected.
Tab. 5-6. Hean frequency (expressed as % i.e. frequency per 
100 responses) of five indicators among responses 
to E and IT words: comparison figures from Brown
(1965)
N = Unique R LRT R-rep. S-rep. Forgetting
A priori E(24) 19-5 22.3 2.7 4.2 11.4
A priori N(20) 21.4 20.0 2.2 5.2 15-4










Brown's E (30) 21.7 18.4 * 7.2 ** 3.5 ** 13.7 **
Brown's N (30) 17-8 12.2 4-2 1-5 6-7
t value gives p < 0
* *
-05 p < 0.01
No significant differences appear between the a priori 
groups. Scrutiny of the table as a whole shows that the 
groups divided on the basis of independent subject ratings
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yield values consistently closer to Brown's findings than 
those from the a priori groups. In other words it seems 
that other subjects were perhaps better at predicting 
subject performance as regards emotionality than was the 
experimenter- Comparing the results for rated groups 
with Brown's data, again the greatest difference is with 
regard to forgetting, there being no evidence in the 
present study of any difference between E and h groups 
for this variable.
Using the rated groups, measures of inter-stimulus 
correlation and intra-stimulus association between pairs 
of indicators were obtained (tab. 5-7) adopting Brown's 
technique for measuring 's in the latter case (where 
< 5» Yate's correction was used in calculation of X^ ).
The inter-stimulus correlations for indicators which co­
occur with unique responses were similar to those of 
Brown although of a lower order. The only other correlation 
that was significant (LRT x forgetting for neutral words) 
was but one of ten significant correlations present in
V
Brown's data.
As for the intra-stimulus associations, again, the X^  
values for E and N words for co-occurrence of unique 
responses with other indicators were highly significant as 
Brown found also. However, in Brown's study, three pairs 
of indicators (LRT x forgetting, R- x S- repetition and 
R- repetition x forgetting) were also significant for E 
words but not for N words. Ho such finding was obtained 
in the present study.
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Tab. 3» 7« Measures of inter-stimulus correlations and 
intra-stimulus association between pairs of 
indicators (cf Brit. J. Psychol. (1965) p.406)
Interstimulus Pairs of Intra-stimulus
correlation (r: df 42) indicators associations(X^ :1 df)
E words H words E words h words
0.712** 0.773** Unique R x LRT 26.19** 56.76**
0.295 0.119 " X R-rep. 8.59* 18.84**
0.197 0.541+ " X S-rep. 1.05 0.17 ■
0.244 0.560* " X Forgetting 88.91** 64.27**
0.159 0.154 LRT X R-rep. 0.52 1.09
0.200 0.420 LRT X S-rep. 5.13 0.15
0.192 0.701** LRT X Forgetting 0.18 0.20
-0.050 -0.047 R-rep. X S-rep. 0.02 ( 1
0.105 0.128 R-rep. X Forgetting 2.73 1.59
0.505 0.580 S-rep. X Forgetting 1.89 3-75
■•■p < 0.02 *p < 0.0-1 **p < 0.001
So far it appears that the data linking complex 
indicators with associative difficulty has been replicated 
by the present study but not the data which finds specific 
differences which may be a function of emotionality, i.e. 
significant differences in the occurrence and co-occurrence 
of indicators between neutral and emotional words have not 
been found.
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4. The factor analytic approach
To recapitulate, Levinger and Clark (1961) presented 
the following data for each of thirty neutral and thirty 
emotional words: Thorndike-Lorge count, frequency of zero 
recall*, mean G-SR, mean RT, mean emotional rating (by 27 
subjects) and two measures of response variability.
Associations to emotional words, both on a priori and 
subject ratings were forgotten more often than associations 
to neutral words (correlation between the two emotivity 
measures was +0.76), the difference being significant at 
beyond the 0.1% level. The relation between response 
variability and forgetting was also significant at a 
similar level. Therefore normalized scores for each of 
the above variables (except frequency) for the sixty words 
were submitted to principal components factor analysis and 
rotation to oblique structure matrix. GSR, zero recall and 
mean RT loaded on both the main rotated axes, one of which 
was also loaded with the emotivity measures the other being 
loaded with response variability measures. It therefore 
seemed that complex indicators were related both to 
emotionality and to response variability but in a relatively 
independent manner.
*
NOTE: It appears that Levinger and Clark have been misled in
their interpretation of the procedure used by earlier workers. 
They state "Instead of asking Ss merely to associate any word 
upon the second presentation of the stimulus list - which is 
the traditional procedure (e.g. Hull and Lugoff, 1921; Jung, 
1905; Keet, 1943) - Ss were asked to remember their first free 
associate (the procedure used by Rapaport et al, 1946)." This 
statement contains a serious error - both Jung and Hull and 
Lugoff quite clearly describe their reproduction procedure and 
it is the same as that later used by Rapaport et al-
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Procedure The scores for the 44 words on 16 variables 
are shown in tab. A. 5.1. The variables (labels in 
brackets) are: 1) Thorndike-Lorge frequency (F) - scored
as AA = 1, A = 2, > 25/million = 5, < 25/million = 4.
2) Word length (L) - number of letters per word, 5, 5 or 6.
3) Response entropy (H). 4) Associative difficulty (D) - 
total number of different responses for 158 subjects.
5) Emotive rating (Er) - mean rating on a seven point 
unipolar scale, 0 = unemotional, 7 = very emotional.
6) Number of unique responses (U) - the values for this 
and variables 7) to 11) are frequency of occurrence in 
responses from fifty experimental subjects.
7) Number of long reaction times (Er) - RT > 2.0 sec.
8) Number of occurrences of Perseveration (Pe) - S - 
repetition or R - repetition.
9) Number of occurrences of Forgetting (Fo).
10) Co-occurrence (Co) - the number of responses where Lr,
OaA/
Pe [o r Fo co-occurred. 11) Total number of responses 
faulted (El). 12) Sum of 50 reciprocal reaction times (RT).
15) Evaluative rating (Ev) - mean rating by 17 subjects on 
a seven point bipolar scale: good = 0, bad = 7*
14) Strength rating (Str) - mean rating by 17 subjects on 
a seven point scale: strong = 0, weak = 7-
15) A priori emotive rating (Emp) - neutral scored zero, 
emotional scored 1. 16) Part of speech (POS) - words were
classified* as adjective (scored one), verb i.e. word could 
only be verb (scored 2), verbal noun i.e. word could be verb
NOTE: following Cramer's summary of the findings regarding 
relative handling of these parts of speech.
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or noun (scored 5) and noun (scored 4).
The data was analyzed using a Friendly Factor Analysis 
program written hy Richard Stephens and Ray Meddis of 
Bedford College, University of London. The full correlation 
matrix is shown in the appendix, tab. A.5-2, as are the 
principal axis factor loadings, tab. A.5-5 (the first four 
axes only were extracted, extraction ceasing when the 
variance explained by the lost axis was less than one.
The four axes accounted for 65-6% of the total variance). 
Although point biserial rather than product moment 
correlations (which tend to underestimate the value of r) 
are more appropriate to the correlations involving factor 
15 (Emp) it was not deemed necessary to complicate the 
program as on inspection of a pilot run of the correlations 
involving this factor no correlation approached the 5% 
significance level (with the number of correlations involved 
a minimum acceptable significance level worJLd be 1%) except 
for that with emotional rating (r = +0.65, P < 0.001, 
cf. biserial r = +0.?8).
Results : The program rotates principal axes to approximate
simple structure using Kaiser's Varimax procedure. The 
varimax factor matrix is then rotated to approximate oblique 
simple structure using the "promax" method described by 
Hendrickson and White (1964). Tab. 5-8 shows the four 
factors obtained from the oblique structure matrix (which 
describes the composition of the factors in terms of the 
tests or variables).
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Tab. 5-8. Factor analysis: oblique structure matrix
Factors :
Variables:
1 F -17 -.17 - a -.41
2 L -.10 - 3 7 -.19 .18
5 H - a . 0 3 -.12 .10
4 I) - 2 1 -.06 -.01 -.05
3 Sr -.26 -95 .16 -.14
6 U -.64 -.01 -.12 -.06
7 Lr - . 2 2 — .14 -.10 -.01
8 Pe -2Z -27 -25 -.28
9 Fo -22 -30 -.46
10 Co -28 -.07 -.58
11 SI —  86 -05 .24 -.22
12 RT • M .20 -31 -19
13 Sv -Ü2 -.16 .01
14 Str .08 .4^ -.09 .00
13 Emp -.07 -.11 -.09
16 PCS .07 -.00 - • 2 2 . -19
% variance 28.25 12.44 10.50 7-06
accoun eJLfor by each factor
The main finding contradicts that of Levinger and 
Clark.' All the traditional complex indicators load on 
factor one, which also loads heavily with the associative 
difficulty measures, The unemotional-emotional and 
empirical ratings of the words, together with the potency 
measures are the main variables that load on factor 2.
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The other two factors are much weaker, accounting together 
for less than 18% of the total variance hut their careful 
analysis pays dividends.
Factor three loads with frequency, part of speech, 
forgetting and co-occurrence of indicators. Reference to 
the correlation matrix reveals that forgetting correlates 
highly with co-occurrence (+O.71, p < 0.001) and just 
significantly with frequency (-0.54, p < O.O5) while 
frequency correlates significantly with part of speech 
(+0.59, p < 0.01), these being the only significant 
correlations. If the whole group of words are subdivided 
by frequency (AA vs rest) it is found that associates to 
AA words (N = 25) are more often forgotten (mean 7-84;
SD: 5"3") compared with those from infrequent words (N = 19 
mean forgetting 5-26; SD; 5-28 t = 2.51 (p < 0.02)), a 
surprising finding. However 56% of AA words are verbs or 
adjectives compared to only 16% of infrequent words. 
Associates to adjectives and verbs (N =12) are forgotten 
more (mean forgetting 8.5; SD: 5-12) than those to nouns 
(N = 52, mean forgetting 5-94; SD: 5-44 t = 2.20 (p < O.O5)). 
This finding is of great importance as examination of the 
studies of Brown (1965) and Levinger and Clark reveals 
that in both cases adjectives and verbs predominate in the 
words categorized as emotional while nouns predominate in 
the neutral category. The words from Brown’s study, analyzed 
in this fashion are shown in appendix 1 (tab. A. 5-4).
The difference between E and N words is significant 
(X^  = 7.59, p < 0.01). Levinger and Clark's list yields
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an even l a r g e r , p < 0.001 (adjectives and verbs account 
for 18 out of 30 emotional words compared with only 7 out 
of 30 neutral words). This finding suggests that important 
qualifications on the results of both studies are needed 
with respect to the forgetting^associates.
Factor four loads weakly with frequency, forgetting 
and evaluative rating. It appears that forgetting loads 
on this factor in the opposite direction to frequency 
compared with factor three. This puzzling result is 
explained when the relationship of the three variables 
is examined more closely. Associates to frequent words 
are forgotten more often and AA words are rated more 
good than infrequent words (mean ratings 5-65, SD 0.93 
and 4.73, SD 0.84 respectively t = 4.99 (p < 0.001)), 
so that it might be assumed that good words are forgotten 
more. Tab. 3-9 shows frequent and infrequent words 
divided into good and bad words about the median 
evaluative rating for each group. Only 16 infrequent 
words are included because three words shared the median 
value.
It can be seen that within each frequency group 
associates to 'bad' words are forgotten more often, the 
relationship explains why the correlation matrix shows a 
weak negative correlation between forgetting and frequency, 
a positive correlation between frequency and evaluative 
rating (+O.5I, p < 0.01) but no correlation (+0.16, n.s.) 
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These findings point up the weaknesses of the 
correlation method, commented on by Brown (1965)
(although used almost exclusively by him in his 
subsequent three papers. Brown and Ogle, 1966;
Brown and Ure, 1969 and Brown, 1971») There are, 
it must be added, theoretical grounds for treating 
the factor analysis data presented here and elsewhere 
with some care. Comrey (1975) lists fifteen common 
errors in the use of factor analysis (pp. 209-11) 
and the two studies so far discussed, together with 
that of Smith and Harleston (1966: see below) all 
involve three or more of these errors.
Discussion:
Previous studies Cramer (1968) reviews the literature 
on stimulus affectivity and comes to the conclusion that 
stimulus affectivity (negative) has been shown to have 
the following effects:
1. RT increased
2. response availability, m, decreased
3. response heterogeneity, D, increased ■
4. associative disturbances increased
5. number of emotional responses increased
6. other indicators, e.g. GSR (as a measure of 
psychophysical disturbances) and response reproduction 
errors are also increased. Cramer also reviews the 
effects of stimulus familiarity (HP words tend to have 
faster RT, lower D but produce more response reproduction 
errors), concluding that the effects of familiarity on
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associative responses may be masked by the effect of a 
second stimulus dimension such as emotionality. Finally 
she looks at the effects of part of speech and semantic 
level of the stimulus. Few of her findings in that 
area are relevant here apart from D  being greater for 
other grammatical classes than for adjectives and nouns 
and reaction times for verbs > adjectives > nouns.
Before discussing her conclusions, the papers which 
provide her data on stimulus affectivity will be 
discussed from a methodological vievjpoint.
Methodology of association studies There are six 
features of word association experiments that need 
examining:
Procedural elements
1. Technique of measuring RT: the traditional method of 
measuring RT in the WAT is for E to use a stopwatch.
If E has hypotheses as to the relative handling of 
emotive and neutral words this could well bias his own 
reaction time and make -it not simply a constant element 
which could be subtracted. The same argument applies to 
the traditional technique of E reading out the words to 
the subject. If E has hypotheses as to handling of 
emotional and neutral words he may be supplying S with 
contextual cues as he reads out the words.
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2. Method of demonstrating reproduction error: although 
the traditional method is to present the stimuli once 
more immediately after completion of the test, careful 
examination of the literature reveals that some of the 
more striking demonstrations of differences in 
reproduction may he partly due to procedural deviations 
e.g. presenting stimuli visually in the main session 
and then verbally in the reproduction test.
3. Population: word association studies have been carried 
out on normal subjects, psychiatric subjects and mixed 
populations. Again, some of the more significant results 
involving stimulus affectivity come from studies involving 
susceptible groups, such as schizophrenics, but this is 
not usually emphasized in literature reviews, which tend 
to lump studies together if they show the same effect.
Stimulus differences
4. D and *(- : several studies claiming to demonstrate RT
differences between emotive and neutral words can be 
partly explained in terms of a failure to control for
D a n d - f  , which are known to tend to differ between E and 
N words.
5. Part of speech: as part of speech may also affect both
forgetting and RT, again, failure to equate E and R lists 
for this factor casts doubt on results obtained.
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6. Rating of emotionality: in the theoretical discussion
above, the importance of context in determining emotivity 
was stressed. In the word association test words are 
presented entirely out of environmental and syntactic 
context, so that the context likely to be relevant is 
the internal (idiosyncratic) schema of the subject.
One could therefore postulate that a) individual 
differences might well cancel out across subjects and 
b) rating of emotionality by a separate group of subjects 
or by E is of very limited relevance to the experimental 
situation. In only one study (Levinger and Clark) did 
subjects themselves rate the words (27 out of 34 subjects 
returned four months later and gave ratings).
These six points between them cast grave doubt on 
the validity of virtually all previous word association 
tests. Points 1 and 4 relate to RT findings, points 2 
and 5 to reproduction error findings and points 3 and 6 
to the generality of findings. To illustrate the 
conclusion more explicitly the findings of seven RT 
experiments and six reproduction error experiments are 
summarized in tabs 3-10 and 5-1^- It can be seen from 
tab. 5-10 that Brown's study of RT comes closest to being 
satisfactory, but still leaves room for the possibility 
of uncontrolled factors such as experimenter bias, part 
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It can be seen from tab. 5-11 that more than half of these 
studies involve departures from the "traditional" i.e. 
immediate reproduction test. Appelbaum's study is 
probably the nearest to being acceptable.
Recent studies Smith and Harleston (1966) presented 
sixty words to 40 undergraduates. The words were presented 
visually but E activated the recording clock. The 
reproduction procedure involved a ten minute gap between 
associates and test. Although procedure is therefore 
suspect on two counts, stimulus variables were carefuJLly 
controlled. T - L frequency and response communality 
(across the 40 subjects) were measured and some attempt 
made to control for number of syllables and judged 
pleasantness. Emotionality was rated by a group of 24 
students and POS was controlled for as all stimuli were 
nouns. Words were also divided by two judges into concrete 
and abstract so that twenty concrete neutral, twenty 
abstract neutral, ten concrete emotional and ten abstract 
emotional words were used. Snith and Harleston found on 
analysis of variance that abstract words were significantly 
higher on forgetting and communality of responses and gave 
longer reaction times than concrete words. There were no 
differences between emotional and neutral words. A factor 
analysis showed that abstractness, forgetting, association 
time, communality and GSR (but not emotional rating) load 
on factor I and emotionality and GSR only loading on factor
II. Factor three loaded weakly with abstractness and strongly 
with forgetting and recall time but in view of the procedure
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adopted this is best ignored. The conclusion was that, 
with abstractness controlled, stimulus emotivity is not 
in and of itself a significant determinant of performance 
in a WAT.
Abstractness as a variable Woodworth and Schlosberg 
(1954) review five early studies (1889-1915) which looked 
at part of speech and abstractness in relation to reaction 
time. A consistent finding was that HT for abstract nouns 
> verbs and adjectives > concrete nouns. There is a strong 
relationship between abstractness and the POS categories 
chosen in the present study. By rule of thumb, 75% of 
the adjectives and verbs qualify as abstract compared to 
19% of the nouns (X^  = 9-81; p < 0.005)- As Smith and 
Harleston observe, Osgood (1955) suggests that abstract 
forms would cause more difficulty than concrete objects 
because of a) the comparative availability of the correct 
mediation process and b) the comparative degree of inter­
ference among potential mediators. In contrast to the 
responses to concrete stimuli the responses to abstract 
stimuli have low associative strength when defined by 
conventional measures (latency and agreement i.e. hetero­
geneity). With a weaker associational strength there is 
also a smaller probability that the response will be made 
a second time than would be the case if the responses were 
of high associative strength. Finally, Brown and Ogle (1966) 
showed that concrete nouns had higher m-values and produced 
shorter ART's than abstract nouns with frequency controlled.
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the RT effect being larger when single rather than 
continuous ART was used.
A retrospective study To conclude the survey, the 
results of the present study are compared with those 
presented in a study by Brown (1971)- He reviewed the 
work of past researchers and he had subjects rate the 
stimulus lists in the experiments on various seven point 
scales including pleasant-unpleasant, emotional-neutral 
and concrete-abstract. Frequency was quantified by 
taking the log. of the Lorge magazine count. The word- 
association performance variables considered were response 
heterogeneity, associative reaction time, GSR (where 
measured) and incidence of emotional indicators (mainly 
reproduction errors). The present data are fairly 
comparable with other studies. Brown and Ure (1969) 
showed that pleasant-unpleasant ratings of 650 words 
correlated with good-bad ratings +0.958. The mean P 
score for present data is 5.89 (S.D. 1.05) and mean E 
score 5-35 (S.D. 1.30), the former being slightly lower 
than most studies except that of Laffal (mean P.= 3-55), 
the latter very similar to the other studies cited by Brown. 
Henceforth Ev correlations are labelled P but given the 
opposite sign because Brown scored pleasantness positive 
while Ev was scored with good = 1. Similarly frequency 
correlations were reversed in sign to correspond to Brown's 
values where high frequency had a higher value. As regards 
variable inter-correlations, frequency correlates with P
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significantly (+O.5I, p < 0.01) as it does in 8 out of 10 
studies, but not with E (-0.04 n.s.) as in all ten studies 
listed by Brown. P correlates with E -O.17 (n.s.) also 
in a manner comparable fashion to all ten studies.
If the POS measure is assumed to be roughly similar 
to concreteness, as measured by Brown, the findings of 
the present study can be compared with those of Brown 
(the only other study where both frequency and D value 
of words were matched across lists). POS correlates with 
P significantly (-0.39 P < O.OI) and not with E (-0.14 
n.s.) and P and POS correlate +0.01 (n.s.). This suggests 
that POS is not identical with abstractness as Brown 
(and other studies) found a positive correlation between 
C and F  and in Brown's study P and G correlate +0.24
(p < 0.05).
The conclusion that POS does not correspond to 
abstractness (concreteness) is borne out by consideration 
of the correlations between stimulus variables and word- 
association measures. The correlations in the present study 
between P, P and E on the one hand and B, RT and forgetting 
on the other, are very similar to those quoted e.g. agreeing 
closely with Smith and Harleston's correlations in seven 
out of nine cases (the correlations can be directly compared 
by referring to Brown's paper and tab. A.3-t- The 
correlations between POS and D, RT and forgetting are quite 
unlike those obtained from other studies with the exception 
of forgetting x POS, r = -0.29, which is lower than that 
obtained by other workers. Scored as it is, on a four point
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'scale' which is not a continunni, PCS is, after all a 
relatively crude measure.
Using Brown’s criterion of 4.0 (the midpoint of the 
scale) exactly half of the words in the present study 
can he classified as pleasant and half as unpleasant, 
emotional words comprising 37% pleasant words, neutral 
71% pleasant words. Differences between pleasant and 
unpleasant word subsets are similar to those described 
by Brown e.g. P correlates with E +0.81 within pleasant 
words but -0.75 within the unpleasant word subset.
Brown concludes that concreteness may be the most 
important variable and it is possible that emotionality 
effects may be entirely explicable in terms of the 
correlation between emotionality and abstractness- 
concreteness. It must be re-iterated here that the 
correlation method used by Brown has serious limitations. 
Given that there are at least six stimulus variables which 
may affect HT, given that none of the studies cited 
controls for more than half of these variables i.e. 
within each study variables are represented to differing 
extents and most importantly, given that linearity has 
not been demonstrated, there being direct evidence of non- 
linearity within one variable i.e. Brown has shown that 
some of the correlations consistently differ to a 
significant extent between pleasant and unpleasant subsets 
(as in the example given above), any comparisons of variable 
intercorrelations across studies can only have limited value
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Explanation of findings in terms of a mediation model
Cramer summarizes the effects of affective stimuli 
as follows l) (negative) affective stimuli elicit more 
idiosyncratic first responses hut have a smaller pool 
of additional associative responses available. The 
converse is true for neutral stimuli. 2) the greater 
number of errors in reproduction of the original response, 
as well as in producing a new one when requested reflects 
in part difficulty in maintaining a response set and 
partly increased response variability which is associated 
with relatively weak associative linlcages.
3) RT, Cramer feels, is very important in detecting 
differential associative effects. Increased reaction time 
to an affective stimulus may be due to the need to over­
come an implicit avoidance response (part of the r^ for 
that word : Pollio and Lore, 1965) - but Cramer observes 
that this accounts only for the first half of the associative 
process as it were. She postulates that the avoidance r^ 
generalizes to words of the same meaning category, making 
them less available as, responses. Thus, decreased 
associative reservoir size and increased HT can be explained 
by generalized conditioned avoidance,while implicit avoidance 
responses are responsible for description of the usual 
response set giving rise to a necessity to adopt a different 
response strategy, which adds to the reaction time and 
increases the number of unusual or idiosyncratic responses^ 
as well as the number of response reproduction errors.
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The parallel with work on attention and arousal is 
very close. Galloway and Stone (I960) reviewed their 
work on narrowed attention in the light of Broadhent's 
1958 model. They had found, as will he discussed later, 
that drugs such as methylamphetamine which cause an 
increase in electro-encéphalographie arousal have the 
effect of increasing processing within the centre of the 
attentional field with a decrease in the utilization of 
peripheral cues. Atropine, which has the opposite effect 
on EEG is associated with increased peripheral cue 
utilization.
Calloway and Stone predicted from their model that 
"anxious people may show reduced flexibility but may at 
the same time have difficulty in maintaining set. This 
apparent paradox is resolved if one assumes that the total 
ensemble of expectancies is reduced (reduced flexibility) 
while all members of the remaining limited ensemble are 
treated as if they had more nearly equal probabilities of 
occurrence (thus, greater probability of shift in set)." 
Calloway and Stone thus predict that under arousal 
conditions there will be a limited number of stimuli 
attended to but inconsistent response bias, a very similar 
conclusion to that of Cramer, applied to a different 
situation.
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Although Cramer's exposition is concerned with response 
habits and Calloway and Stone's paradigm to input processes 
it can be argued that the distinction between stimuJLus and 
response is an unnecessary one (as Easterbrook, 1959, does 
in liis review of the effect of emotion on cue utilization 
and the organization of behaviour, p. 188). This argument 
has been mentioned in the PD review.
basically, at higher 
levels of processing within the organism the distinction 
between stimulus and response processes becomes less and 
less real when such processes are assumed to represent the 
input and output of some central "black box". Both 
neuroanatomical and neuroph;}^ siological data suggest that 
above brain-stem or beyond retinal level (as arbitrary 
demonstration points) neural organization is such that 
centrifugal and centripetal connections exist in both those 
pathways which are supposed to represent input and those 
representing so-called output. It seems most parsimonious 
to argue that "attention" in the sense of filtering or in 
the sense of facilitation of activity in certain pathways 
relative to others can operate in a similar and probably 
directly related way across the whole system.
Hockey (1970 a,b) has shown that noise, acting to 
increase arousal, can produce the same effect on attention 
as that demonstrated by Calloway and other workers.
Subjects performed a dual task, a primary pur suit-tracking 
task situated centrally in the visual field and a secondary 
multi-source monitoring task which involved the whole of
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the visual field. Under normal conditions attention is 
directed principally towards the intake of primary task 
information with relatively little secondary task 
scanning. When noise is present, this bias towards 
the primary task is increased resulting in a kind of 
"attentional narrowing" in the secondary task with more 
accurate detection of signals in the central area but 
less peripherally. Hockey argues that central sources 
are scanned more frequently in noise because they have 
a higher subjective probability since they are detected 
more frequently in the quiet (actual probabilities 
between centre and periphery are equal). When continuous 
hold signals are used, distribution of signals can be 
seen by S to be biassed centrally or equiprobable.
Under the former condition latencies are consistent with 
the previous experiment but in the latter condition there 
is no difference between changes (increase) in latencies 
to central and peripheral stimuli- Hockey concludes that 
funnelling of vision does not occur in states of high 
arousal but funnelling of attention does, peripheral cues 
being neglected only when they are of low relevance.
Thus Cornsweet (1969) showed that increased use of 
peripheral cues occurred with high arousal (threat of 
shock) .when the peripheral cues were highly relevant to 
efficient performance of the task. Hockey feels that 
increase in selectivity with noise (and high states of 
arousal in general) seems best described as an enhancement 
of attention paid to sources already being given priority, 
with a resulting withdrawal of attention from low priority 
sources.
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An interpretation of the effects of stimulus emorionaliry
In the light of this data Cramer's conclusions will 
he re-interpreted in a slightly different way. If stimulus 
relevance is a directing element under arousal conditions 
it appears that Hull's concept of the multiplicative effect 
of drive is valid in that it correctly predicts that 
dominant responses will have a higher probability when 
the subject is aroused. How does this apply to the word 
association paradigm? For a particular subject it is 
likely that those responses most relevant to the stimulus 
will be dominant ones. In the case of unpleasant words, 
these are just the responses that S will avoid (we can 
postulate that - r^ would be stronger for relevant stimuli 
because they would be more threatening). These responses 
would therefore be inhibited (repressed). This has two 
effects, firstly (Noble ' s) is smaller and secondly D is 
larger. The first point follows direct from the preceding 
statement and the second also follows logically and does 
not need to be explained in terms of a search for a more 
socially desirable response (Geer and Tlollenauer, 1964) 
although this process may contribute. If the subject is 
avoiding the (relevant) dominant response or responses, 
then his choice of associates must come from among the less 
probablç, associates to that word- The effect across subjects 
(which is how D is computed) will therefore be to produce 
a "low profile" pattern with many responses all having low 
probability.
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V/liile tliis explanation is satisfactory for unpleasant 
words it is contradictory for pleasant emotional words.
Here one would predict that the dominant responses would 
be those chosen, the "sharpening" effect of drive causing 
both D and m to be smaller for these words. This has 
limited confirmation from the present data. Within the 
emotional word group, for pleasant words (H = 10) D and 
emotionality are negatively correlated (r = -0.4?) while 
for unpleasant words (H =1?) the DE correlation is 
virtually zero (r = -0.07). Unfortunately the numbers 
are too small to produce a significant result - increasing 
the numbers by less than ^Çf/o would do so. There is room 
for a well-designed word association experiment which 
would help to answer some of the questions raised by this 
interpretation. A carefully selected word list, balanced 
for emotionality (as rated by the experimental subjects 
if possible), part of speech, frequency, abstractness, D 
and pleasantness would be presented visually with the 
subject recording his or her reaction time. Such an 
experiment would allow comparisons of correlations between 
stimulus attributes and indicators within balanced sub­
sets which might provide some definitive answers. Eor 
example, if the negative correlation between D and E for 
pleasant words holds, will RT also be quicker and there be 
less response faults or does arousal produce these indicators 
in some other way?
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To talie reproduction faults as an example, the 
explanation of failure of reproduction in terms of 
response variability or failure to maintain response 
set seems a weali one. Again, experiments on arousal 
and memory provide a more acceptable explanation.
The experiments which began with ICLeinsmith and Kaplan 
(1963) have been discussed earlier. These e:cperiments 
predict that a high arousal word will be less available 
for recall immediately after initial presentation due 
to trace consolidation processes. A similar argument 
can be made regarding the associative linlcage between 
an arousing word and its associate. Following from this 
it is predicted that although RT might be shorter in a 
pleasant/emotional subset of words there would still be 
more reproduction errors than among neutral words.
Individual or group differences?
To conclude this brief survey, while such an eirperiment 
as was suggested above appears to be necessary, there may 
be a case for arguing that individual differences should 
have preference over group differences and with which they 
may not coincide. This is an issue when words are selected 
as emotive stimuli in the psychological experiment. As 
has been discussed above, context is crucial for defining 
emotionality and in the case of the isolated word stimulus, 
the internal context fulfils this role. The problem of 
defining emotional stimuli then arises with the accompanying 
danger of circularity. Emotionality rating by other subjects
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would appear to be logically invalid unless there were a 
very high degree of similarity across subjects in respect 
of the schemata associated with the words in question.
One possible method is to isolate a few words for 
each particular subject which are judged to be emotional 
for them on the basis of the co-occurrence of traditional 
complex indicators. Such words would be chosen from a 
group judged by other subjects as emotional. This would 
exclude some words that were idiosyncratically emotional 
for S but would enable careful matching of such a word 
for stimulus variables with a neutral word selected in a 
similar way (by group rating and lack of emotional 
indicators). The reliability of such a procedure is 
partially demonstrated by consideration of the S word 
and word data from Experiment 4 (tab. 5-12. For full 
HT data see tab. 4.5).
Tab. 5-12. Stimulus characteristics of E and words (IT = 26)
Mean D (S.D.) Heanj- (S.D.) Mean POS (8.D.) %  U words
E words 59.15 (16.65) 2.58* (1-588) 5-19 (1-27) 77% **
words 60.50 (16.6?) 1-42 (0.98?) 2.88 (0.82) 19%
*t = 2.87 (df 50) p < 0.01 **X= = 17.33 (df 1) P < 0.001
E words were selected on the basis described above but 
unfortunately not matched exactly with the neutral words 
for stimulus characteristics as can be seen. Nevertheless 
the two unmatched characteristics, frequency and POS are
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not normally assumed to have a large effect on HT. Sign 
test for the difference in HT between E and IT words 
yielded p < 0.001, i.e. 22 out of 26 subjects gave 
longer reaction times to emotional words a week after 
the emotional indicators were first elicited. There 
is very little data on the reproducibility of word 
association data. Heplication of these procedures 
would establish whether they are indeed appropriate 
for selecting words which can be confidently assumed 
to be emotive stimuli for a particular subject in a 
subsequent psychological experiment.
. . . / . a -  f  I : . ' ÿ
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EMOTIOHAL STIIIULI M B  AWAREtTESS: COCTCLUSIOIiS
Theoretical issues Two examples of the response to 
emotive stimuli have been examined in this section; 
perceptual defence and word association fa^ xLts. Both 
the changes in recognition threshold and in associative 
behaviour resulting from the presentation of an emotive 
stimulus have been shown to be explicable in terms of 
the interaction between selective attention and the 
arousing properties of the stimulus.
These traditional indicators, recognition threshold 
and associative response, have given rise to a plethora 
of conflicting data because both involve a grievous 
methodological flaw; namely that the same paradigm is 
used for investigation as for demonstrating the phenomenon. 
In the case of perceptual defence the emotive stimulus is 
the agent which affects the threshold for phenomenal 
representation of itself. In an analogous manner, in the 
word association test, the emotive stimulus both gives 
rise to so-called complex indicators and is defined in 
terms of them. In both cases more sophisticated methodology 
has or can potentially circumvent these difficulties.
In the former situation the inherent problems of measuring 
recognition threshold have been avoided by using other 
indicators, for example the change in awareness threshold 
to a simultaneous neutral stimulus or the effect on 
processing of a simultaneously presented neutral stimulus 
when it is used to mask an above threshold emotive stimulus.
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In the word association situation the main strategy has 
been to attempt to partial out as many as the "non-emotive" 
factors i.e. non-specific stimulus and situational elements, 
as possible and demonstrate that a substantial effect 
remains which can be ascribed to the emotivity of the 
stimulus.
Nevertheless, in neither situation is the issue of 
defining stimulus emotivity adequately tackled. This 
may have arisen because individual differences have not 
been given sufficient emphasis. Individual differences 
can contribute to the response to emotive stimuli in two 
ways: firstly, individuals vary (with some consistency) 
in their strategy for dealing with emotive stimuli and 
secondly, the word or stimulus represents or is associated 
with a schema unique to the particular individual's 
experience, so that both associative hierarchy and 
arousal potential may show wide idiosyncratic variation.
This raises a very basic question in psychological
research, the nomothetic-idiographic dilemma (Allport,1961).
1
Allport suggests that a psychology of personality should 
seek an equilibrium between the extremes of universal law 
and individual uniqueness. In a similar way, the problem 
of defining stimulus emotionality perhaps reduces to a 
question of decreasing the size of the units which are 
studied i.e. defining more specific groups. Where subjects 
have been chosen at random what differences there are may 
well cancel each other out. Greater definition of subject
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groups may not only prevent this occurring hut also enable 
a closer look at the fine structure of the interface 
between the ego and the external environment.
Experimental findings The perceptual defence paradigm 
was superficially investigated. The experimental technique 
used, the demonstration of increased HT in a cognitive 
task simultaneous with presentation of a subliminal emotive 
stimulus, might perhaps be better labelled "perceptual 
interference". The tentative demonstration of subsequent 
differential remembering of the supraliminal stimuli does 
suggest however a 'defensive' type of effect. It has 
been carefully stressed that a 'defensive' element in the 
strictest sense is not a necessary condition for the effect. 
It can be seen from the model that whether or not the 
perceptual response has a defensive component, the postulate 
of a memory element ensures that stimulus emotivity has a 
specific effect. The memory element implies that an 
arousing stimulus will be reinforcing in that the response 
associated with it will be enhanced or at least sustained 
on a subsequent presentation, although this is largely 
conjecture as the exact significance or role of the 
differential remembering of arousing stimuli needs further 
study.
The attempt to study the effects of subliminal stimuli, 
both pictorial and verbal, proved to be fairly unsuccessful, 
although valuable lessons were learnt. In the main part of 
Experiment 3b the weaknesses were those which operate in the 
word association paradigm. The emotivity of the stimuli had
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not been adequately defined, nor had the non-emotive 
factors such as the overall frequency and idios;>uicracy 
of associative responses to the pictorial stimuli.
Handler and Parnes (1957) bave demonstrated that 
pictorial stimuli can be investigated in exactly the 
same way as verbal stimuli in this respect. Experiment 
4 produced results indicating that, in principle, Brown's 
recommendation for selecting emotive words was feasible.
Here, the lack of an adequate alternative hypothesis and 
other methodological shortcomings (e.g. emotive stimuli 
not sufficiently masked) severely limited the value of 
the findings. Finally, Experiment 5 provided some data 
which supported the contention that the non-emotional 
verbal features that affect the occurrence of the 
traditional complex indicators are indeed complex.'
It is to be noted that of all the experiments reviewed 
in the discussion of Experiment 5? in only one did those 
best qualified, the subjects themselves, rate the crucial 
stimuli, although even this procedure has some limitations.
Future research The. general conclusion that can be 
derived from the material in this section is that although 
the experimental designs chosen were by and large^potentially 
sound, the main flaw was one of orientation. Individual 
differences, the author now believes, are a key factor 
where emotive stimuli are concerned, not a subsidiary one, 
as a proper study of the theoretical issues would have shown. 
Unless procedure is modified accordingly, the information 
obtained regarding the processes under investigation, such
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as the operation of perception without awareness, is 
likely to he greatly reduced.
In specific terms, there are three major points 
which can he made. Firstly, the experimental treatment 
outlined at the end of Experiment 5 could he carried 
out, to define more precisely than has been achieved 
previously the role of the non-emotive factors in word 
association. So far the principle of converging 
operations has not been mentioned in this context, but 
clearly the appropriate application of such a principle 
would go a long way towards helping to define emotivity.
One difficulty is the lack of definition of the concept 
of emotion itself. Operationally this need not affect 
matters greatly, provided the method chosen to define 
emotivity yields consistent results, as the stimulus 
properties so determined could then be investigated in 
turn in order to shed more light on the nature of 
emotivity. For example, the details of the exact role 
or function of the interaction between arousal and 
memory should be a useful area for further research.
With respect to individual differences, two points 
can be made. Firstly, as a method of studying individual 
differences in the handling of emotive stimuli, the Byrne 
repression-sensitization scale seems singularly unsatisfactory. 
Not only is it tedious to fill in and to score but the 
available evidence suggests that the main construct it 
correlates with is neuroticism, although it probably also 
correlates less strongly with extraversion. Byrne (1964)
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argues that a psychometric test cannot be strictly 
invalidated - the nearest thing that can occur is a 
change in the name of the test. Nevertheless, the 
instrument may be evaluated with respect to both 
reliability and relational fertility and simply 
rejected in favour of a better one. Given these 
considerations it is possible that the Eysenck 
personality inventory would be more useful, because 
not only is it simpler to administrate but it yields 
orthogonal measures of extraversion and neuroticism, 
which is of some importance if the surmise that these 
factors affect recognition threshold in different ways 
is true. This leads on to the second and final point, 
which is that the limited literature available on 
cognitive controls, particularly the more recent work 
from the Menninger Foundation (e.g. Shervin et al, 1971) 
seems to have produced overall much more consistent 
results than that involving other personality measures, 
although sometimes the number of subjects tested have 
been rather small. It would be extremely interesting to
i
investigate the relation between arousal and the functioning 
of cognitive controls and one method would be to look at 
the links between cognitive controls and a construct such 
as extraversion. Meldman (1970) feels that "the concept 
of field orientation and psychological differentiation 
appear to be a useful framework with which the relationships 
between psychological and neurophysiological organization 
may be studied (p.111)." He remarks that, in attentional
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terms, extraverts seem to be more controlled by input, 
while introverts of the type described in the research 
literature seem to be more selective and more controlled 
by internal variables. From a scrutiny of the 
characteristics of sharpeners and levellers it appears, 
however, that sharpeners are those which are more 
stimulus bound, levellers more introverted. As the 
available data shows that extraverts and levellers are 
the groups more likely to respond to subliminal stimuli 
by repression, the relationship is evidently not a 
simple one.'
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Section V  : SELECTIVE ATTENTION AITD PERCEPTION
WITHOUT AWARENESS
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Once the concept of perception without awareness 
is accepted, new avenues open for the interpretation 
of everyday perceptual events. In particular the 
phenomenon of selective attention can he viewed in a 
different light. For certain kinds of process there 
is value in limiting the amount of information entering, 
or being processed by, the system e.g. decision processes. 
A corollary of this is that it would be extremely useful 
if information could be processed at as high a level as 
possible before being excluded by competition within a 
limited capacity channel, or better still, contribute to 
ongoing activity without the necessity (i.e. the mechanism 
would exist) for entry into the awareness structure. To 
demonstrate such functions would go a long wa;)- to removing 
the label ’ epiphenomenon' from subliminal perception.
On the one hand it is possible by introspection to provide 
many examples of like mechanisms e.g. we are rarely aware 
of balance and yet under specific conditions such as rock- 
climbing the mechanism which normally functions quite 
automatically can be brought under close voluntary control 
and dominate awareness. On the other hand, perception 
without awareness must entail something more than the 
above, namely, the notion of inputs that are normally 
quite unamenable to the focus of attention because either
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a) they are consistently masked by concurrent activity or
b) they are not of large enough signal strength to allow 
recognition. Secondly, unlike propreception, a level of 
cognitive analysis is involved which implies some kind 
of semantic processing, if only at the most global level 
of discrimination of meaning.
The two brief experiments that follow represent a 
very tentative first step in examining one area where 
perception without awareness might be operating in the 
manner described. The distinction between this aspect 
of perception without awareness and that investigated 
in the previous section is perhaps a subtle one, or 
reduces merely to a verbal rather than a real distinction. 
This issue will be discussed in the last part of this 
section which looks briefly at some aspects of the recent 
work on selective attention which might throw light on 
the problems discussed here.
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Experiment 5. Restricting effects within awareness
Abstract:- One example of trade-off within the visual
system (Haber and Hershenson, 1973) may occur at the level
of figure-ground extraction. In a visual search task,
if a secondary target is immediately adjacent to the
first target, the search time for the former may be
affected by the necessity to disinhibit the area
surrounding the first target. To demonstrate the
effect independent of the distance between primary
and secondary targets it was postulated that the
amount of interference at the boundary of the primary
target would increase as the size of the primary target
decreased. Therefore, with a three-letter word in a
6 x 6  letter matrix as secondary target, search times
could be compared for two conditions, when the primary
target was a letter (LW condition) and when it was a
three-letter word ( W  condition). It was predicted that
the LV/-WW difference would be greater when primary and
secondary targets were adjacent than when they were
1
separated by several rows of letters.
Although the findings as a whole tended in the 
predicted direction (post hoc analysis yielded E = 3.23, 
df 1,114; p < 0.05, 1-tailed test for appropriate planned 
comparison) an unexpected finding was that the LW-W 
difference was smallest for the fastest position in both 
conditions i.e. secondary immediately below the primary.
It is suggested that the area bounded at any one time
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includes an additional effect operating in the direction 
of the habitual scanpath (Noton and Stark, 1971 a,b). 
Further, the 'restricting' effect may be a property of 
Neisser's preattentive processes, but both findings are 
amenable to an additional or alternative hypothesis, 
that of semantic processing outside of awareness.
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IInFTRODUGTION
The restricting effects of awareness (%>ence and
b
Holland, 1962: Hilgard, 196^ have been discussed 
earlier. Using the orientation favoured by Haber and 
Hershenson (1975) in their discussion of the visual 
system, it is possible to suggest that even within 
awareness there is a trade off such that certain dis­
advantages are accepted in return for fine discrimination 
at the level of pattern extraction. Two particular 
mechanisms have been reported which may illustrate 
this point. Neisser (1967) proposes that preattentive 
processes are important in maintaining the segregation 
of a figure from the ground for detailed processing. 
Eeisser sees these "preattentive mechanisms of figurai 
unity" as the first level of pattern analysis. More 
recently Holers and Lewis (1972) have claimed that 
"bounding" of letter sequences in a flow of information 
enables processing but imposes a definite limit on 
simultaneous processing of other parts of the field.
I
On neurophysiological grounds it might be expected 
that the lateral inhibition involved in isolating the 
figure would make scanning of an immediately adjacent 
area impossible for a short interval of time because 
of the disinhibition and re-definition necessary. The 
most effective mode during visual search would therefore 
be a rapid change in fixation point - a saccade.
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This experiment was originally merely a pilot for Experiment 
7 hut, following the line of thought presented above it was 
decided to test the hypothesis that when there are two 
targets in a scanning task, the secondary target will 
take longer to find if it is immediately adjacent to the 
primary target than when it is at a distance from it.
An early finding which might be relevant (Woodworth and 
Schlosberg, 1954 p. 104) is that in indirect vision close 
spacing of adjacent letters causes interference (reduction 
of recognition accuracy) which disappears when the spacing 
is increased.
Two experiments (Reicher, 1969; Wheeler, 1970) have 
shown that when a word is exposed briefly, with a visual 
noise mask to limit processing time, the letters of a 
meaningful word are processed faster and more accurately 
than when a single letter is presented. Haber and Hershenson 
feel that this is an artifact of the experimental arrange­
ments and that single letter presentation is not relevant 
to the scanning hypothesis of information processing.
Whether or not the letters of a word are scanned or 
processed in parallel, it seems likely that a word is 
treated as a unit for analysis and Haber and Hershenson 
give evidence to support this although they conclude that 
the issue is not definitely settled (1973, P- 264).
Following the argument presented above it might be predicted 
that one element in Reicher's and VJheeler's findings was 
that greater inhibition is necessary to discriminate figure 
from ground if the unit is small, a letter, than if larger, 
a word. Given that inliibition is necessary to allow
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discrimination of the features which allow matching or 
recognition of the.unit, inhibition would probably 
interfere with adjacent areas less for the larger than 
for the smaller unit because of the greater redundancy 
involved with the former.
If time to report primary and secondary target in a 
letter matrix is overall faster if the primary target is 
a three-letter word than if it is a single letter (with 
secondary target a three-letter word and relative positions 
of primary and secondary targets the same in both cases) 
the effects of lateral inhibition would be made evident 
by subtraction of search times. The difference between 
search times for secondary target at a distance from 
primary target would reflect the difference in processing 
and recognition time for word versus letter as primary 
target (the two conditions are henceforth labelled 
condition WW and LV respectively). On the other hand, 
it is predicted that the difference between search times 
for the secondary target in condition W  and LV would be 
greater when it was adjacent to the primary, reflecting 
the greater amount of interference in the LV condition 
than the W  condition i.e. the extent to which inhibition 
must be deactivated and then reinstituted.
It was argued (following bonder’s subtraction method: 
see Sternberg, 1959) that the totsüL search time would 
represent three processes 1) time taken to find, recognize 
and name the primary target plus 2) time taken to search
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for secondary target plus 3) time taken to isolate, 
recognize and name secondary target. The first part 
should he relatively invariant partly because the 
primary target had a red colour which would probably 
be used as a cue. The second part would be a function 
of the actual distance between targets together with 
individual search strategies; differences in the latter 
probably cancelling out across subjects. The third 
would reflect the differences in processing, inhibition, 
scanning etc discussed above.
nSTHOD
6 x 6  letter matrices were typed onto postcards with 
a red letter or red three-letter word as primary target 
and elsewhere in the matrix i.e. adjacent or separated by 
several lines, a three letter word as secondary target, 
in black, like the surrounding letters. The subject held 
a thumb-switch and looked into a tachistoscope. Pressing 
the switch caused the card to appear, replacing a noise 
field. Subject named the primary target when they found 
it, then looked for the secondary target and pressed the 
switch when they found it, calling it as they did so. - 
Pressing the switch replaced the card by the noise field 
again and stopped a chronotron which had been started by 
the initial switch-press and thus showed total search 
time.
Two separate groups of subjects were run, one in 
each condition.
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Materials and Apparatus: Stimuli in the two conditions
are shown in Fig. 6.1 and Fig. 6.2, the only difference 
between stimuli for letter-word (L¥) and word-word (W) 
conditions being the nature of the primary target.
Fig. 6.1. Layout of stimuli
a) Four possible positions b) Five possible positions of 
of primary target secondary target
1 2 3 4 3 6 1 2 3 4 3 6
1 - 1 A B 0 X X X
2 A B 2 X X X A G G
3 3 B E L X X X
4 4 X X X X X X
3 G D 3 D I S D I A
6 6 X X X X • X X
Fig. 6.1a shows the four possible positions of the primary
target and b) relative to the fist position, the five
*
possible positions of the secondary target, ABOve, BELow, 
ACGross, Above or Below at a Distance and DIAgonally opposite. 
Thus 20 cards were devised for each condition, examples 
being shown in fig. 6.2. The pairings of letters and words 
and words with words are shown in tabs. A.6.1 and 2 in the 
appendix.
*
NOTE: In the above position for primary position A and B, 
and the below position for positions G and D both 
targets were displaced one row inwards so that the 
secondary target was never on the outermost line.
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Fig. 6.2. Sample matrices (red letter(s) underlined,
rest black)
Sample matrix E Y V Q T R
from condition N R D B K M
LW L J G G Z X
B M Z I) T w
S I P V N G
W Q H X Y L
Sample matrix R X Y B J L
in condition C 0 L G H W
W H w K R V P
T z B F J Y
X Q P S U N
F D V G M Z
The matrix was so constructed that the only vowels were 
those in the three-letter words, these were the only ’real' 
words that could be made even when read other than horizontally 
(although subjects were told that the words would read this 
way) and the consonants of the targets were not repeated 
elsewhere in the matrix. Matrices were typed in black 
upper case, primary target in red and each matrix measured 
40 X 35 mm. Matrices were visualized in a Cambridge 
tachistoscope connected via an RS components miniature 
push to make two-pole switch to a Venner millisecond time- 
clock type TSA 3314.
(
Procedure Each subject was seated in front of the tachisto­
scope and was told ’this is an experiment on visual search.
Hold the thumb switch in your right hand (use of switch 
demonstrated). Now, the sequence of events is as follows: 
press the switch to see the picture. The picture is a
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6 by 6 matrix of letters. The primary target is the only 
red letter (or a three-letter word in WW condition) in the 
matrix, all the other letters are black. When yon have 
found it, say it aloud. The secondary target is a common 
three-letter word but in black letters embedded horizontally 
elsewhere in the matrix. There is only one. As soon as 
you find it (and this is the tricky bit), stop the clock 
by pressing the switch and then say it, or say it at the 
same time as you press the switch. O.K.? The sequence is: - 
press switch, find red letter/word and say it, find black 
lettered word and press switch, say word. Don't worry, 
there are two practice trials.' Any questions?"
Each subject was given two practice trials. All subjects 
were responding correctly after the second trial. "Good.
The rest of the experiment is just 20 cards like the previous 
ones. As soon as I've inserted the new card. I’ll say ’O.K. ’ 
and then you can press the switch to start the sequence."
The experimenter recorded the total time for each presentation, 
with a rough estimate of the time to say the primary target.
At the end of the experiment subjects were asked for their 
comments and about their scanning strategy and the purpose 
of the experiment was explained.
Introspective data: No subject failed to report either
primary or secondary targets correctly. A wide variety of 
scanning strategies wc^^ reported.
Subjects Two groups of twenty male and female psychology 
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Tab. 6.1 shows the means for each condition, converted 
back from reciprocals (= harmonic mean). Each harmonic 
mean represents 80 scores (20 subjects x 4 primary positions).
Tab. 6.2 shows a summary of the analysis of variance, 
a split-plot analysis with repeated measures on the position 
variable. (raw data is shown in tab. A.6.3).
Tab. 6.2. Summary of analysis of variance
Source Sum of Squares u^Ug P p
Between subjects
Conditions 4.810 4.810 1,38 8.844 <0.01
Subjects within 20.666 0-544
conditions
Within subjects
Positions 2.738 0.690 4,132 3-700 <0.001
Positions x
conditions 0.409 0.102 4,132 < 1  n.s.
Positions x subjects 18.339 0.121
Times for the LW condition are consistently longer than in 
the WW condition. (P = 8.84 (df 1,58) p < O.O1) The positions 
sum of squares is also highly significant (P = 5-7) (df 4,152) 
p < 0.001) because within each condition the search times 
rank consistently:- secondary below < above and across < 
distant positions.
The positions x conditions interaction is not significant. 
Planned comparisons are shown in tab. A. 6.4- The critical 
comparison is near positions- versus distant (comparison one) 
across conditions, P = 2.66 (1,132) p > 0.1 and is not
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significant. Scrutiny of tab. 6.1 shows that this is 
because the LW-W difference for position 2 (secondary 
below primary) is not consistent with the hypothesis.
Discussion
The results are in general consistent with the 
hypotheses initially stated 1) WW times are all faster 
than the corresponding LW search times and 2) LW-W 
differences are greater for positions 1 and 3 (when 
targets are adjacent) than for positions 4 and 5 (when 
targets are separated). Position 2 yields the fastest 
search times in both conditions - the puzzling finding 
that the LW-W difference here is smaller than for 
positions 4 and 5 niay be explicable in terms of scanning 
strategies. If across subjects there were a general trend 
to scan downwards and across, the area immediately below 
the primary target might be in some way free from the 
inhibition which elsewhere demarcates the target. To put 
it another way, the area bounding the primary target might 
have an extension in the direction of the habitual mode of 
scanning, to facilitate continuous search. Although this 
implies a degree of parallel processing of input this need 
not be above the level assumed by Ueisser (196?) for his 
"preattentive processes." Although this is a tentative 
suggestion, there is some evidence to support it.
Uoton and Stark (197^ a,b) review evidence that pattern 
perception and recognition is a serial operation in which 
the brain processes the pattern feature by feature, although 
operations may become more parallel and holistic with patterns
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which are simple or well-known. Normally this processing 
is largely internal and beyond investigation but if 
patterns are presented to the subject under conditions 
of poor visibility, so that he is forced to look directly 
(foyeally) at each feature to which he wishes to attend, 
then the position of his eyes will reveal the features 
processed. Of course this situation forces the subject 
to view the pattern serially, but given the assumption 
that processing is normally an internal serial process, 
the subjects saccadic eye movements from feature to 
feature will reveal the order of processing.
During initial viewing or learning of a pattern, 
subjects' eyes were found to follow intermittently but 
repeatedly a fixed "scanpath" characteristic of that 
subject viewing that pattern. When the subject was 
later presented with the same pattern for recognition, - 
the first few movements usually followed the same scanpath 
as previously established. Noton and Stark suggest that 
the subject's internal representation or memory of the 
pattern is an alternating sequence of sensory and motor 
memory traces recording alternately a feature of the pattern 
and the next eye movement required to reach the next feature. 
When the scanpath appears in the initial eye movements 
during recognition the subject is matching the internal 
representation with the pattern by reproducing the successive 
eye-movement memories and verifying the successive feature 
memories. Under more normal viewing conditions the eye 
movements are assumed to be replaced by shifts of an internal
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attention mechanism processing successive features of the 
pattern. The hypothetical format for the internal 
representation of a pattern is closely related to the 
"schematic diagram or map" of Hochherg (1968, 1970) 
discussed previously.
Haher and Hershenson (1975) criticise this account 
on the grounds that it is difficult to see how perceivers 
store information on the sequence of their eye fixations.
Even if this information were stored, it would seem to 
be a very complex way of coding information. As with 
regressive eye movements in reading, the order of the 
movements in picture reading - the sequence of inputs - 
must be relatively independent of the organization we' 
construct for them. Though this argument seems valid it 
does not necessarily detract from Noton and Stark's 
hypothesis. The assumption of an internally-represented 
perceptuomotor analog implies that only limited sampling 
would normally be necessary to check input against a 
particular anticipatory schema, this after all is its 
functional value. Only under some condition of uncertainty, 
such as poor visibility, would input bear some correspondence 
to internal representation; this is the point that Noton 
and Stark start from.
Clement and Schiereck (197^) provide data which support 
the idea that the internal operations that initiate a 
scanning pattern are fairly consistent across subjects.
Forty subjects were run individually for 480 trials of a
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16 - alternative forced choice signal detection task 
( 4 x 4  array). Ordinal differential sensitivity to 
target locations (indicated by d ' values) across all 
subjects pooled was similar to that previously found 
by Clement and Hosking (1971), = 0.90, indicating
high stability for ordinal sensitivity in the display 
for data pooled across the individual subject. The 
outcome indicated that the consistent part of the 
scanning strategy was a combination of fixation effects 
and reading habits, with the scan operating from the 
upper-left corner to the lower-right corner of the 
display. The scan was post-exposural as the exposure 
duration (200 msec) was too brief to allow more than 
one fixation.
These findings lend a modicum of support to the idea 
that the 'below-adjacent' position might be expected to 
yield different results from other adjacent positions.
It was decided therefore, to perform a post hoc analysis 
on the data, excluding the 'below-adjacent' position and 
comparing the other two adjacent positions with the two 
distant positions of the secondary target. Tab. A.6.3 
in the appendix shows the analysis of variance summary 
table. The conditions sum of squares is significant 
(F = 9*84; df 1,38 p < O.Ol) but the positions sum of 
squares now yields F = 2.0 (df 3,1^4) p = 0.1. The 
positions x conditions sum of squares yields F = 1.12 
(df 3,114) U.S. The planned comparisons are shown in 
tab. A.6-6. The crucial comparison yields F = 3-25
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(df 1,114) P < 0.05, 1-tailed test, of border-line 
significance if the direction of the difference had 
not been predicted.
If the results obtained do reflect a property of 
figure-ground extraction, it could be concluded with 
Eolers and Lewis (1972) that "an active process of 
bounding occurs to establish unity or identity of a 
sequence of stimuli and that this process interferes 
with other perceptual and récognitive activities (p.122)" 
This bounding process seems to correspond closely to 
the level of parallel operations that Neisser labels 
prearrentive processes, which form (and maintain as an 
integral unit) the objects of focal attention.
The limitation of both models is that they reject 
the possibility of any processing outside of awareness. 
Neisser rejects the idea mainly, it would seem, because 
he sees perception without awareness as a passive process 
which threatens his concept of active analysis by synthesis. 
His actual refutation of the notion of subliminal perception 
is weakly argued, as Dixon has shown. Eolers
and Lewis are tilting at-a different windmill, namely, 
the bifunctional model of visual information processing 
(Hochberg, 1968). Briefly, this proposes that analysis 
in the periphery of the visual field proceeds in parallel 
to the more detailed forçai analysis, the periphery acting 
as a ranging instrument to locate the portion of the 
stimulus that is to be looked at next. From their finding
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that when two sequences of letters are shown simultaneously, 
only one sequence can he reported correctly, Eolers and 
Lewis conclude that the hifunctional model cannot he 
sustained if it asserts that centre and periphery both 
process information at a semantic level that is derived 
from different linguistic units simultaneously. They 
conclude that the signal for ballistic eye movements 
may not even be created by semantic scanning but from 
information that is qualitatively different from that 
extracted by the detail-reading centre of the eye. In 
short, Eolers and Lewis do not consider the possibility 
that the qualitative difference lies in the capacity to 
report the information rather than to process it.
Parallel semantic processing outside of awareness would 
subserve the function suggested by the bifunctional model 
and still be consistent with Eolers and Lewis's findings.
281
Experiment 7* The effect of embedded words in a brief 
visual display .
Abstract:- An experiment of Eagle et al. (1966) was 
repeated with additional controls. Subjects in a group 
were shown one of two 7 % 7 letter matrices. The 
experimental group were shown a matrix with the words 
FUCK and PAIN embedded in it and the control group shown 
a very similar matrix containing the words DUCK and RAIN.
The task for subjects was to find a primary target (red 
letter) and then scan and later reproduce as much of the 
matrix as possible. A pilot (Experiment 6) had shown 
that with a 6  X  6  matrix it was virtually impossible for 
subjects to identify an embedded word secondary to the 
primary target with a 1.0 sec. exposure. It was argued 
that even with two 1.0 sec. exposures separated by a 
tliree-second gap the words would probably fall on the 
retina briefly, but subjects would almost certainly not 
be aware of them. After a brief period of associative 
activity subjects were then shown an ORT card and asked 
to write a brief story describing it.
Four groups of subjects, totalling 80 male and female 
undergraduates and sixth formers participated. Two additional 
groups, totalling 44 subjects, acted as 'supraliminal' controls. 
The procedure here was identical except that stimuli were 
twice exposed for 10 sec. instead of 1 sec.
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The stories from each group of subjects were given to 
five judges with varying knowledge of the ORT. Judges 
were asked to distinguish between stories from the 
experimental and control groups on the basis of their 
content. Stories from the 'subliminal' groups yielded 
a cumulative z of 2.027 (p < 0.025) whereas 'supraliminal' 
groups were only discriminated at chance level (z = O.O71).
A more objective measure was provided by having other 
judges rate all the words contained in the 124 stories as 
neutral, pleasant or unpleasant and then determining the 
frequency of the 349 words consistently judged as non­
neutral. Experimental and control stories in the 
' subliminal ' sessions yielded approximately the same %  
of non-neutral words (7-65% and 8.31% respectively) but 
55% of these were unpleasant in the former situation 
compared with 40% in the latter (X^  , df 8 = 20.48: p < O.Ol).
In the 'supraliminal' sessions there was no difference
between experimental and control groups (X^  , df 4 = 4.48 :p > 0.3)
The relevance of these findings to previous experiments
I
and to theories of selective attention is discussed.
INTRODUCTION:
In Experiments 1 and 2 one of George Klein's experiment's 
(Smith et al. 1959) was repeated using apparatus which enabled 
stimuli to be presented above threshold but outside of 
awareness. In an attempt to cover at least some of the
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previous criticisms of the technique, within awareness 
controls were used and it was possible to confirm to a 
limited extent that the effect of a stimulus outside of 
awareness differed qualitatively from that of a stimulus 
of which the subject was aware.
As the mechanism by which perception without awareness 
operates was under investigation, it was considered 
important that the phenomenon should be demonstrated in 
a situation more like every-day life than the previous 
experiment.
One of the main points that Dixon makes in favour of 
the a priori 'probability of subliminal perception is that 
the .individual is, waking or sleeping, recipient to a 
barrage of stimuli of which only a fraction achieves 
phenomenal representation. Taking this argument a step 
further, when viewing a picture, or simply looking out of 
the window, the observer is faced with as complex an 
information problem within one modality as when receiving 
simultaneous information in several modalities. While 
organization of percepts into gestalten goes a long way 
towards simplifying the problem, the limited capacity of 
the phenomenal register means that what the observer can 
say he is aware of at any one time must still be merely 
a fraction of that contained within the retinal image.
The classical model that derives from selective 
attention experiments largely involving the auditory 
modality teaches that irrelevant information i.e.
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information with which the limited capacity channel
b
cannot cope, is quickly lost - even Norman (I969j) 
postulates that memory for unattended to digits in 
a shadowing experiment persists solely in short term 
memory for not more than 20 secs. However, (as pointed 
out previously) this argument only holds if the 
'irrelevant' information is handled in exactly the same 
way as information within the phenomenal register.
There is evidence to show that this is not the case.
An example is the fact that stimuli which may he 
unperceived at the time of their occurrence can be 
retrievable under conditions which favour the operation 
of primary thought processes (Fisher I960; Silverman and 
Silverman, 1964). To return to the above analogy, while 
the observer may only be able to report a certain portion 
of the perceptual events within his field of vision at 
any one time, the 'irrelevant' information i.e. information 
of which the observer is not aware, using accepted criteria 
of awareness (e.g. see Dixon p. 18) can still be retrieved, 
after a considerable period of time, if appropriate methods 
are used. A celebrated experiment by Haber and Erdelyi 
(1967) illustrates this point.
Haber and Erdelyi showed subjects a complex picture 
for 100 msec and then asked them to draw what they had seen. 
Subjects did another drawing 55 mins later, after either 
intensive associative activity or playing darts. There was 
an additional control to allow for elaboration effects.
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Associative activity appeared to facilitate recovery of 
hitherto unreproduced items and some associations dnnring 
the 55 niin period were shown to be related to items 
occurring in the second session only. They therefore 
conclude that "... it has been shown that much of this 
below conscious material whether preconscious or unconscious 
continues to exert a significant influence upon the 
perceiver's behaviour - in this case fantasy production 
of the free association type (p. 526)."
In another experiment George Klein and his associates 
(Eagle et al. 1966) looked more specifically at the effects 
of a part of the stimulus display of which the observer 
was not aware. They used an embedded figure (a duck in a 
tree) which produced significantly more 'duck-related' 
items in subsequent imagining of a nature scene than did 
a control figure, even though subjects were unaware of the 
source of their imagery. They concluded "... connotative 
aspects of the ground, although apparently unperceived, 
may become manifest in non-perceptual response modes such 
as imagery (p. 859)-" Of importance to the selective 
attention model is the level of analysis which such an 
effect implies.
It was decided to use a similar technique to Eagle et 
al. but to take their study a stage further in two ways.
Firstly, a within awareness control group was used, to 
attempt to show a qualitative difference between the two 
situations and secondly, embedded emotive words were used, 




Subjects were tested in groups, subjects within each 
group being arbitrarily divided into two equal subgroups 
labelled 'A' and 'B' respectively. Group A (experimental 
group) were shown a matrix of letters with two emotive 
words, FUCK and PAIIÎ embedded in it. Group B (control 
group) were shown a very similar matrix except that the 
embedded words were DUCK and RAIII. Both subgroups then 
wrote down as much of the matrices as they could remember 
and then the first ten words that came into their heads. 
The whole group was then shown an ORT card and asked to 
write a brief story about it. Stories were collected, 
typed and randomized and blind judges with knowledge of 
the procedure were asked to assign the stories, on the 
basis of their content, to group A or group B. It was ' 
argued that the emotive words would affect the content 
of the stories given by group A sufficiently for judges 
to be able to distinguish between stories from the two 
subgroups to a significant extent-
Fig. 7.1. Stimuli used (white upper case letters on black
• background except for two red 
letters marked thus *).
Stimulus A:
R X H G B R D
T *E Y J q L R
Z S V P A I H
W D B M T q Z
J H R Y G V S
q T X F U 0 K
L M Z D J B M
Stimulus B:
P X H G B P F
Y *0 T J q L H
Z S V R A I N
W F B M T q Z
J H P Y G V S
q T X D U C K
L M Z F J B M
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Materials : As described in Experiment 6 a 6 x 6 letter
matrix, with a red letter in one of the four quadrants 
and a three-letter neutral word in differing relation to 
it, had been shown to subjects tachistoscopically.
Subjects pressed a thumb-switch which illuminated a 
card bearing the matrix and started a stop-clock. S 
then reported the initial target (red letter) verbally 
and pressed the thumb-switch when he or she found the 
secondary target (neutral word - reporting it verbally 
as a check), thus stopping the clock to register total 
search time. The fastest time from 240 trials (12 x 20 Ss) 
when the word and letter were not actually adjacent, was 
1.55'Sec., mean time 2.91 sec. It was therefore argued 
that with a 7 X 7 letter matrix and S not aware that words 
were present in the matrix a 1 sec exposure, even if 
repeated, would make it virtually impossible for Ss to 
report the embedded words. On the other hand it is likely 
under these conditions that Ss would have performed several 
saccades during the one second period and therefore an 
image of the area of the matrix containing the embedded 
words would have fallen on the retina. Yarbus (1967) 
showed e.g. that during a 5 sec. period the observer of a 
complex picture changed points of fixation 18 times. This 
is consistent also with Eagle et al's finding that an 
exposure of 10 msec, which only permits one fixation, 
produced effects of only borderline significance compared 
with an exposure of 1.0 sec.
288
The stimuli are shown in Fig. 7.1. These and ORT 
cards B2 and B3 were mounted as 2 x 2" slides and 
projected onto a screen at an average distance of 12'5" 
from the projector. The apparatus was as detailed in 
previous experiments, a 500 watt Leisegang magazine- 
loading projector with Frontor shutter connected via a 
voltage stabilizer to a Devices digitimer. Subjects 
were given protocol sheets (see appendix 2 form 7.1) 
which merely had a 7 x 7 open matrix in the top left 
corner and below, the numbers 1-10 for the association 
exercise.
Procedure: Subjects were tested in groups of between 15
and 24. Alternate subjects were handed protocol sheets 
and told "you belong to group A (or B), please write your 
letter in the right hand corner of the sheet. " Having 
divided subjects into equal groups and checked that no S 
was red colour-blind, E said "I am now going to show you 
a matrix of letters. Somewhere in the matrix will be a 
red letter which is your primary target. As soon as you 
have found the red letter, try and see as much of the rest 
of the matrix as you can. I'll show you the matrix very 
briefly, twice, separated by a few secs. Immediately 
afterwards I want you to write down as much of the matrix 
as you can remember in the space provided. Write as many 
letters as you can, even if you're not quite sure they're 
right, beginning with the red letter. Now, here's the 
difficult bit, for which I need your co-operation. I'm 
going to show the matrix to group A first and while I'm
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doing this I want group B to look down at the desk or 
contemplate their navels - anyway, promise not to look.
As soon as group A are trying to write down what they 
saw I shall show group B a similar matrix. So the 
procedure will he: group A look at the board, group B, 
look down. Then, group A try and write down what they 
saw, group B look at the board. Any questions?"
At the command "group A look at the board, group B 
look down", group A were shown one of the two matrices 
(see tab. ?.1., below) twice for 1.0 sec., separated by 
a gap of 5 secs. Approx. 15 secs after group A were 
first shown their matrix, group B were shown the other 
of the two matrices. After approx. 2 minutes Ss were 
told "if you've written down as much as you can remember., 
now write down the first ten words which come into your 
head, in the space provided. When you have finished, turn 
your sheet over."
V/hen all Ss had finished they were told "I am now 
going to show you a picture. After you have seen it I 
want you to write a short story, about 6-8 lines, about 
what you think is happening. That is. I'd like you to 
write about two lines on how you think the situation came 
about, four to six lines on what is happening now and 
about two lines on what you think will happen next."
Ss were shown one of the two ORT pictures for 10 sec. and 
then wrote their stories. Protocols were collected and Ss 
were asked what they thought the experiment was about and 
then its true nature was explained.
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Four groups of subjects, totalling 80 subjects, 40 
experimental and 40 control, were tested in this manner.
On checking the protocols, without exception all subjects 
had written down the correct red letter (either an E or 
an 0) corresponding to their status as group A or B.
No subject had written down either of the embedded words 
in full. On questioning no subject was aware that 
embedded words had been present.
In the 'supraliminal' session, two groups of subjects, 
numbering 20 and 24 Ss were tested. The procedure was 
exactly the same except that each exposure of the matrices 
was for 10 sec. instead of 1 sec. By questioning and from 
scrutiny of the protocols it was established that a total 
of ten subjects of the 44 had seen and reported one or 
both of the stimulus words. With respect to response 
suppression it is interesting that PAIN was reported five 
times, FUCK four times, RAIN three times and DUCK not at 
all. This is consistent with Eagle et al's finding that 
with a 30-second exposure and the information that "there 
is a duck somewhere in the picture," well over half of 
the subjects failed to recognize the duck.
The exact details of procedure for the six groups are 
summarized in tab. 7.1.














15 Female psychology B2
students
24 Psychology students,B3 
mixed sex
16 Sixth former and B3
teachers, mixed sex
24 Female sixthformers B2
Undergraduates, B3 
mixed sex
Undergraduates (few B2 
psychology students)
E matrix 1st 
G " 1st 
E " 1 s t  
G " 1 s t
E matrix 1st 
G " 1 s t
The stories for each group were randomized and typed 
and were sent to five judges with details of procedure.
The judge's task was to suggest, by reference to story 
content, which came from the experimental group and 
which from the control group. The five judges for each 
group of stories were two naive judges (NJ) i.e. usually 
psychology students with no knowledge of the ORT technique; 
two expert judges (EJ), psychoanalysts with knowledge of 
ORT and one semi-experienced judge (SJ), a psychology 
lecturer with some knowledge of the ORT. A total of 14 
judges were used for the 30 judgements.
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RESULTS
The results for each group of stories were organized 
into a contingency table according to the number of judges 
making a correct judgement on a particular story.
(Tab. 7-2.)
Tab. 7'2. Contingency table for group 1
Experimental group Control group
5 judges correct 2 0 0 judges correct
4 n It 2 1 1 I I
5 It It 1 2 2 I I
2 It t 1 5 5 It I
1 It It 0 1 4 It It
0 It t 2 1 5- t It
8 8 N = 8 + 8 = 16
(the other contingency tables are given in appendix 1 : 
table A. 7-'I-)
Each table was then analyzed for significance using 
Kendall’s Tau (with correction for ties) and the result
expressed as a z score using the formula: 
S ____     XIZ = —^  where Var S =
7 ^  8
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Table 7-3* shows the number of correct judgements 
by each of the 5 judges and the S and Z values resulting, 
together with the cumulative Z score (Z^ ).
Over a total of 80 subjects, judges were able to 
distinguish between the two groups to a significant 
extent, Z = 2.027 (1-tailed p < 0.025)* When matrices 
were shown to Ss for a longer period, judges were unable 
to distinguish between stories coming from the 44 subjects, 
Z = 0.071 (n.s.). Of 20 judgements in groups 1-4, only 
1 (5%) was less than 5(% correct, whereas out of 12 
judgements for groups 5 and 6, 5 (25%) were less than- 
50% correct. If the expert judges are compared with 
others (tab. 7»4) it can be seen that other judges differ 
little in accuracy between 'subliminal' and ’supraliminal' 
sessions (4^0 and 55% over 50% correct, respectively). 
Comparing judgements below 5O70 correct with those 50>a 
correct or better for expert judges yields p = 0.0647 
(Fisher's exact probability test), approaching statistical 
significance.
Tab. 7-4. Psychoanalysts vs. other judges
' Subliminal ' ' Supraliminal '




Less than 50% 
correct
EJ other EJ Other
7 5 1 2
1 6 1 5
0 1 2 1
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These findings lend tentative support to the 
suggestion that stories given after brief exposure to 
hidden emotive words are different to those following 
exposure to hidden neutral words and that longer 
exposure to the words reduces the effect. However, 
the exact nature of the difference is difficult to 
determine as each judge used his own criteria for 
assessment. There was, nevertheless, general agreement 
that stories following exposure to the words FUCK and 
PAIN showed more disturbance, whether violent themes, 
uncertainty, conflict or loss, than stories following 
exposure to the words DUCK and EAIK. In an attempt to 
provide a more objective demonstration of differences 
between the two groups of stories, a content analysis 
of the 124 stones was performed.
Content analysis From 124 stories, average length 80 
words, approx. 1500 different words were extracted.
These were randomized and presented to 7 judges who were 
asked to rate them as Pleasant, Neutral or Unpleasant.
It was decided to take as criterion a minimum of three 
judgements of U or P, with U and P judgements cancelling 
each other out if they co-occur. In fact of 549 words 
qualifying as U or P words, only 17 (< 5%) were not 
uniformly judged by a minimum of three judges (the others 
judging the word as neutral).
The stories were then scored for content of Unpleasant 
or Pleasant words. The scores for individual stories are 
given in Appendix 1. (Tabs. A.7- 2-7)
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In sum, for the first four groups, stories from 
Experimental and Control conditions (N = 40 in each 
condition) were on average 82.0 and 76.5 words long, 
respectively and contained 251 (7*65%) and 254 (8.31%) 
non-neutral words respectively. Corresponding figures 
for the supraliminal groups (N = 22 in each condition) 
were 78«7 and 84.6 words length respectively containing 
104 (6.00/0 and 136 (7-51%) non-neutral words, 
respectively. Overall, story lengths and proportion of 
non-neutral words are very similar although E and C 
conditions differed less within sessions than across 
sessions.
Tab. 7-5 shows the total numbers of U and P words 
for the stories in the 'subliminal' sessions (groups 1-4). 
With the exception of group 2 stories, there were 
consistently more Unpleasant words in experimental group 
stories and more Pleasant words in control group stories; 
of the non-neutral words 45% and 609o were pleasant words 
in experimental and control groups, respectively.
I
Tab.‘7-5" Non-neutral words in stories from groups 1 - 4  
Experimental Control
U P U P
Group 1 25 11 21 29
2 58 57 45 55
5 52 16 18 59
4 44 28 19 52
TOTAL 159 112 101 155
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Tab. 7-6 gives corresponding figures for the two 
'supraliminal' group s.
Tab. 7.6. Non-neutral words in stories from groups 
5 and 6
Experimental Control
U P  U P
Group 5 22 31 32 40
6 24 27 35 41
TOTAL 46 38 65 71
In this session the proportion of pleasant to 
unpleasant words is very similar in both groups with a 
slightly higher proportion of pleasant words in the 
experimental group stories (56%) than in the control 
group stories (52%).
Following a suggestion from Mr. J.D. Valentine, each 
story was assigned a 'difference score' which represented 
the proportion of pleasant to unpleasant words as follows:
P — Uindex = and could vary between -1 and +1
P + U
Within each of the experimental subgroups indices (shown 
in Tabs. A. 2-7) were compared using the Mann-Whitney test.
Tab. 7*7 shows the mean index values, U values and one­
tailed probabilities for the four 'subliminal' groups. 
Probabilities were summed using the formula = -2 log^ Pj_ 
which yielded in this case (df 8) = 20.48 (p < O.Ol).
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Tab. 7.7. mean index scores (S.D's in brackets)
Group E Group C (N) U= P=
Group 1 -0.20 (0.77) 0.31 (0.81) 8 x 2 20 0.12
2 0.16 (0.58) 0.12 (0.56) 12 X 2 70 0.55
3 -0.53 (0.57) 0.13 (0.72) 8 x 2 11 0.01
4 -0.18 (0.71) 0.30 (0.75) 12 X 2 40 0.04
Table ?.8 shows the corresponding scores for the 
'supraliminal' groups. The summed probabilities 
yielded (df 4) = 4.48 (p > 0.3).
Tab. 7« 8. mean index scores 'supraliminal' groups 
(S.D's in brackets)
Group £______ Group 0 (IT) U= P=
Group 3 0.064 (0.392) -0.036 (0.539) 10 x 2 55 0.648
6 0.061 (0.686) 0.033 (0.804) 12 x 2 55 0.164
Table 7-9 shows subliminal and supraliminal session 
totals expressed as a % of the total number of words in 
the stories.
Tab. 7»9» Frequency of U and P words expressed as % of
total no. of words in stories
Exp erimental Control
U P U P
'Subliminal' session 4.24 3.41 3.30 ^ 5.00
'Supraliminal' " 2.66 3.35 3.50 3.82
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From the table it appears that the emotive stimuli produce 
stories with more Unpleasant words while the neutral stimuli 
produce stories with more Pleasant words. When the words 
approach awareness i.e. some subjects are able to report 
them, the % of pleasant words in the experimental condition 
and unpleasant words in the control condition are unchanged. 
The larger fall in the %  of unpleasant words in experimental 
supraliminal group stories could tentatively be ascribed to 
a 'defensive' response, suggesting a quite different handling 
of the emotive stimuli when they are on the borders of 
awareness than when subjects are totally unaware of them.
DISCUSSION
The findings appear to confirm those of many previous 
workers (see reviews by Fisher, 1960 and Dixon, 1971) that 
marginal or incidental stimuli, like subliminal stimuli, 
may be registered without awareness and can be recovered 
in a variety of modes of experience and behaviour - in this 
case, symbolically transformed as imagery in a story.
The use of suitable controls make explanations of the 
phenomenon in terms of partial cues or 'fleeting' 
perceptions improbable. As Eagle et al. comment, 
perceptions too fleeting to be reported would seem to 
be operationally indistinguishable from stimulus 
registrations without awareness.
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It can be argued that some of the subjects in the 
'supraliminal' sessions should havebbeen responding to 
the stimuli in the same way as subjects in the 
'subliminal' sessions, as they were unable to report 
the stimuli subsequently. The z scores for judgements 
of groups 5 azid 6 are however both lower than that for 
group 4, the lowest of the 'subliminal' groups and it 
would appear that the incidental stimuli had a much 
weaker effect when presented near the awareness threshold. 
This is consistent with the findings of Paul and Pisher 
(1959) and others, that the subliminal effect increases 
as stimuli are presented further below threshold.
Erdelyi (1972 a,b) has recently suggested that the 
recovery effect via fantasy (Poetzl phenomenon), both 
with pictorial and letter stimuli, is not a unique 
phenomenon, but operates somewhat like an inefficient 
guessing indicator, tapping low confidence (below criterion) 
traces. He claims to show that although postassociational 
free recall from an experimental group produces significantly 
more recovery than free recall from a control - group which 
had been employed otherwise (throwing darts) if both groups 
are then given a forced recall protocol the overall recovery 
increases to become very similar for both groups. Thus, 
the only advantage of the use of fantasy recall appears 
to be that it is a more effective means (e.g. associated 
with less resistance from subjects) of realizing below 
criterion reports. Whatever the interpretation of Erdelyi's
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results (his recovery procedures are hardly designed to 
maximize the effects of marginal stimuli), his demonstration 
of an increased number of correct items twenty minutes 
or more after a stimulus presentation of not more than 
50 msec duration tends to support the findings presented 
here.
In the present experiment a considerable number of 
factors contribute to error variance. To give two examples, 
the Pleasant-Unpleasant measure is very rough and ready; 
and secondly, the word RAIE may have a strong effect with 
some subjects when followed by OPT card B2 (Phillipson, 
1973)- Pather than detract from the findings, this 
observation suggests that the approach holds the possibility 
for a more sophisticated methodology which may contribute 
better to an understanding of the mechanism underlying the 
effect and facilitate a considerable reduction in error 
variance. Por example, if the individual subjects were 
tested with the OPT before the experiment, to obtain base­
line profiles, the specific effect of the incidental stimuli 
could then be assessed and this procedure would enable use 
of objective scoring methods, which are available 
(Phillipson, 1973).
The implications for theories of selective attention 
are two-fold. Firstly, the findings tend to confirm that 
incidental stimuli may be recovered or have an effect after 
a period exceeding that normally associated with short term 
memory. Allers and Teler (1924) claimed to demonstrate
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recovery of unreported elements of a picture after more 
than twenty-four hours and their findings have been at 
least partially substantiated in recent times by (among 
others) Piss et al. (1965) and Haber and Erdelyi (1967). 
Secondly, the difference between experimental and control 
groups appears to depend on subjects discriminating words 
of very similar structure but different meaning.' This 
confirms findings in previous experiments which suggest 
that incidental or ’irrelevant' stimuli are processed to 
a high level of analysis.
Finally, experiments such as this suggest that in 
everyday life the individual is the recipient of a stream 
of incidental stimuli of which he is more or less unaware, 
some of which at least, particularly those that have 
valence for him, may mould subsequent behaviour. Further 
experiments are necessary to determine the extent to which 
this mechanism operates and the precise nature of its 
adaptive function, but a clue has been provided by the 
previous experiment, in that the findings of the present 
experiment tend to support a claim that simultaneous 
semantic processing outside of awareness can accompany 
visual processing within awareness.
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Mrs. P. Antonis, Mr. V.B. Kantor, Dr. M. Lawlor, Mr. H. 
Phillip son, Mrs. A.M. Sandler and Dr. J. Sandler.
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SECÆCTIVE ATTENTION
"The word 'attention' has had more varied usages 
than perhaps any other in psychology (Meldman, 1970)."
For the purposes of this discussion, selective 
attention will he equated with the limited capacity 
channel aspect of awareness discussed in section A.
To recapitulate, the awareness structure has a limited 
capacity for the simultaneous handling of information 
which is appropriate to its function as the site of 
decision processes, which include the selection of 
information or competing inputs from both internal and 
external environments. Although restricted, this 
approach to attention does enable coverage of the four 
main phenomena that Dixon (1971) lists under the heading 
of attention, that is, the ability of the organism to:
1. Focus attention upon a very limited aspect of 
the external world, and to avoid distraction by, 
or interference from, irrelevant ideation or - 
sense data.
2. Broaden or narrow the range of attention and to 
shift attention from one channel to another
5. Respond to important messages occurring in a 
non-attended to channel.
4. Retrieve temporarily rejected messages from 
a short-term store.
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Is your filter really necessary?
The kind of data that Experiment 6 provides suggest,
with reference to the first of these points, that the
focus of attention is very definitely circumscribed
during a particular serial task such as visual search.
As Kolers and Lewis (1972) point out, the physical
characteristics of such "bounding" depend on the nature
of the perceptual units for which the mechanism is set.
The findings of Experiment 7 on the other hand, suggest
that detailed discrimination (stimuli were pairs of words
differing considerably in meaning but only to a small
extent in structure) can occur outside of awareness, as
evidenced by subsequent activation of at least some
component of the meaning of the stimuli. Such
considerations lead the author to the conclusion that
if the entry of a percept into the phenomenal register,
the end-process of perception, is viewed as a response,
some portion of the selective mechanism must act at this
level. This orientation is more in line with attention
theorists such as Deutsch and Deutsch (196$) and Norman 
b
(1969^ than with those who support the idea of a 
perceptual filter.
Hochberg (1970) proposes an alternative to the notion 
of a filter, wherever its site in relation to the analysis 
of meaning, namely, selection which occurs according to a 
fixed anticipatory strategy or plan. The idea of antici­
patory encoding entails that exclusion of material occurs 
at the level of the translation of phonemes to morphemes.
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thus explaining for example why tapping to a word in the 
secondary channel is performed poorly (Treisman and 
Geffen, 196?) but tapping to a tone is not (Lawson, 1966)T 
Treisman and Geffen have explained these findings equally 
simply, by arguing that differences in physical 
characteristics must be analysed before the filter 
selects the attended message. However, Hochberg goes 
on to suggest that when filter theory is modified to 
become a two-stage process, with the filter acting to 
alternate the secondary channel prior to a speech 
recognition process which acts on sounds in both 
channels, the distinction between "perception" and 
"response" has essentially disappeared. By the time 
all the addenda to the filter model are taken into 
account there is little difference between either 
kind of filter model and an anticipatory encoding 
model, apart from the fact that the former continue 
to rely on the notion of a filter. Hochberg concludes 
that this notion does not add anything, as the loss 
of another set of sounds that has remained unencoded 
does not seem to call for any special agency.
^FOOTNOTE: Although the validity of Lawson's results has
been questioned (Broadbent, 1971 PP* 152-$), this 
does not seriously affect Hochberg's argument.
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Although Hochberg‘s approach seems worthwhile in both 
its application to certain kinds of perceptual processing 
and in the points he makes regarding filter theory and 
the perception-response distinction in attention, his 
model has certain limitations. For example, it is 
difficult to incorporate the second phenomenon mentioned 
above, that is, changes in the range or band-width of 
attention.
Two viewpoints of the range of attention Deutsch and 
Deutsch's model of selective attention seems to be of 
value because they attempt to integrate their theory with 
what is known of the physiological substrate of attentive 
behaviour. Briefly, they argue that a message will 
reach the same perceptual and discriminating mechanisms 
whether attention is paid to it or not, and such information 
is then grouped or segregated by these mechanisms. The 
problem of selection of relevant inputs into awareness 
is tackled by assuming that the level of arousal is 
affected by incoming signals in proportion to their 
importance weighting. This is a concept derived from 
the Deutsch's link-analyzer theory of learning and 
motivation which does not seem to differ greatly from 
that of Treisman's differentially activated dictionary 
units. Whether a signal is attended to depends both on 
the level of general arousal and the importance of the 
message. With low levels of general arousal only very 
important signals can break through into attention
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(e.g. someone’s name called when they are asleep) while 
with high arousal a whole range of signals could he 
attended to, hut the specific alerting mechanism 
(importance weighting) gives precedence to important 
signals.
This treatment of attention is of interest for two 
reasons. Firstly, it is superficially consistent with 
the work on the interaction between arousal and attention 
(Calloway and Stone, Hockey etc.) outlined in the 
discussion of Experiment $. Superficially, because 
Deutsch and Deutsch do not attempt to consider the 
operation of the mechanism they propose over the whole 
range of general arousal i.e. they do not consider the 
downward sloping limb of the arousal-performance curve. 
Secondly, this approach is appropriate in that it is 
possible to apply it to investigation of altered states 
of awareness, in particular the perceptual deficit in 
schizophrenia.
Broen (1968) has reviewed the literature on the 
interaction between arousal and attention in schizophrenia 
in great detail. This area is extremely complex and 
regrettably only a very short account of Broen’s 
conclusions can be given here. Broen explains the 
increased frequency of idiosyncratic responses given by 
schizophrenics in terms of a partial collapse of response 
hierarchies. This concept views schizophrenic behaviour 
as due to a greater equivalence of appropriate and competing
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(more idiosyncratic) responses, resulting in disorganized 
response patterns. It is argued that schizophrenic 
behaviour is affected by the same factors as normal 
behaviour. Thus, increasing arousal will at first 
have a facilitatory effect on dominant responses 
(multiplicative effect of drive) but a response- 
strength ceiling effect causes relatively greater 
facilitation of competing responses at higher levels 
of arousal. In schizophrenia both general level of 
arousal is postulated to be higher and response- 
strength ceQ.ings to be lower.
Secondly, the disorganization of attention is 
explained in terms of a two-factor theory which views 
attention as a joint product of a) range of scanning, 
which controls the range of stimulus imput and b) 
organization of attention within the stimulus input 
(in the sense of selection of appropriate responses), 
with acutes and chronics both deficient in ability to 
organize attention and chronics having more restricted 
scanning. In this theory, high arousal does not directly 
cause reduced scanning. High arousal is one of the 
factors (complexity is another) that may cause attention 
hierarchies to collapse. When, as in acute schizophrenia, 
this collapse is more extreme than can be handled by a 
person's normal habits of reduced scanning in complex 
situations, then the result is overly broad attention.
The reduction in scanning from early to late schizophrenia 
is seen as an attempted coping response by the chronic 
schizophrenic to continued extreme response interference.
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As may be appreciated, the theory of cue utilization 
which Broen discusses overlaps with Silverman's multi­
dimensional attention model which was briefly discussed 
in section A. Both models emphasize rauge of scanning 
and ability to organize attention selectively as important 
and separable variables. Silverman's theory is noteworthy 
because it accounts for heterogeneity in schizophrenia, 
that is, the range of conditions such as process-reactive, 
paranoid-non-paranoid and acute-chronic which come under 
the heading of schizophrenia and which can be ascribed 
to differing styles of attention. Silverman (1964) has 
emphasized the continuity of an individual's attentional 
style from normality through early schizophrenia; the 
changes are exacerbations of long-term response dispositions. 
The data on differences in attention deployment comes 
from the work of Gardner et al. as has been discussed 
in the section of perceptual defence. The reader is 
referred to a sizeable review by Silverman (1970) which 
discusses some recent investigations of both the 
sharpening-1 evening and the scanning-extensiveness 
parameters which have been mentioned earlier.
This sub-section was begun by referring to an 
attention theory, that of the Deutsche, that has close 
links with a theory of schizophrenic function based on 
the interaction of arousal and attention. It seems 
therefore just to conclude with a discussion of an 
attention theory relevant to Silverman's theory of 
attention in schizophrenia. Rapaport's theory of 
attention cathexis was first described in section A.
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To help make it clearer, the notion of cathexis will he 
explained further.
Attention cathexis Hilgard (1962^ reviews the 
characteristics of primary and secondary processes in 
thought. Traditionally there are two kinds of 
organization of memory which become reflected in two 
kinds of thinking; drive organization (primary process) 
and conceptual organization (secondary process). The 
primary process is coordinated with the pleasure 
principle and "reigns unrestricted in the id" while 
the ego endeavours to substitute the reality principle 
with which secondary process is coordinated. Primary 
process involves "mobile cathexis" and the manipulation 
of large quantities of energy; secondary process involves 
"bound cathexis". "The term cathexis in Freudian theory 
is used for some kind of energy charge but the analogy 
with physical energy is not a close one, the meaning is 
much more that of interest or attention or of Lewin's 
valence ... The notion of mobile cathexis ... is that 
... the search path or drive that can cause one idea to 
be cathected may as well cathect another one. Hence one 
idea easily substitutes for another in a dream. An idea 
and its cathexis are more closely bound when.secondary 
process operates: when one idea is searched for in memory, 
or somehow comes across the threshold because of the state 
of its cathexis in relation to competing ideas, it comes 
in stable, reliable form (Hilgard, 1962; p. 482)".
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To recapitulate from section A, broadening and 
narrowing of attention is seen as a dynamic process; 
both range of perceptual content and intensity of 
perceptual experience will vary according to the 
balance of a) activated drive b) control and c) defence.
These concepts can be expressed in energy terms as 
a) the balance between mobile energies (drives) and 
bound energies (reality-adaptive motivations) b) rather 
inadequately described energy distributions that 
constitute the different kinds of adaptive cognitive 
styles and c) the anticathectic energy distributions 
that together constitute the different kinds of 
defensive organizations. Within this framework the 
amount and deployment of attention cathexis among ego 
structures determines conscious experience. This is 
the central point, the idea of awareness or consciousness 
as a cathexis or attention - dispensing function of the 
ego system. In terms of this concept it becomes logical 
to think of the content of awareness as the end-product 
of complex perceptual and thought processes and of the 
structure of awareness as the mechanism that determines 
which of the competing inputs are selected at any one 
instant.
Where does perception without awareness fit into this 
scheme of things? In the preceding pages we have digressed 
through the areas of schizophrenia research and modern 
psychoanalytic theory because it may be that the latter 
represents the best integrated model of the process and 
content of awareness and the former area illustrates the 
kind of problem which an integrated investigation of
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arousal and attention, normal and pathological, can
tackle. The two areas also illustrate alternative
viewpoints of range of attention, in one case explained
in terms of arousal and factors such as stimulus
complexity, in the other, explained in terms of the
interaction of psychic process and psychic structure.
Lastly, the above also illustrates the possibilities of
research into perception without awareness discussed in
the introduction to this thesis. An investigation of
subliminal stimulation has led both to an attempt to
understand the nature of consciousness better and to an
attempt (or rather the suggestion for an attempt]) to
explore further the bases of psychological phenomena
such as arousal and attention. What little has been
added to the putative understanding of perception
without awareness will be discussed after the final
area has been reviewed, namely, the response to messages
*
occurring in a non-attended to channel.
The un-attended channel
The well-known experiment of Treisman and Geffen (196?) 
can be interpreted as demonstrating that "an experimenter's 
instructions can so programme a listener's selective 
mechanism as to produce differential perceptual blocking.
*
NOTE: To dispose briefly of the fourth point itemized at 
the beginning of this section, the relationship of memory 
and attention is of obvious importance but there is no 
o p p o r t u n i t y  to discuss it here. The role of memory in 
the recognition process has been referred to at the end 
of section B. '
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Or, putting it another way, why, if there is no response 
competition, should shadowing one input impair the 
reception of signals on other channels, and this even 
when the subject is presumably motivated to detect 
critical signals on either channel. One can only 
conclude that it is not the shadowing per se which is 
responsible, but rather that the need to shadow 
programmes the auditory system in a particular way 
(Dixon, 1971 ; p. 292)." In this subsection some of 
the literature of the last five years is examined to 
see if it adds anything to the understanding of the 
rale of perception without awareness in normal functioning.
A. Criticisms of the dichotic listening paradigm.
Apart"from the criticism just mentioned, several other 
drawbacks of shadowing as an experimental technique have 
been noted. Lewis (1970) comments that many of the dichotic 
listening experiments have been inadequately controlled, 
so that when subjects have been able to report stimuli from 
the unattended message, one questions whether they could 
have temporarily switched attention to that message during 
the task. On the other hand, nearly all of the experiments 
which have indicated that the unattended message is not 
processed, thus supporting a peripheral filter hypothesis, 
have been based on the rather insensitive method of recall 
or on a method requiring subjects to make an overt response 
to unattended stimuli, while simultaneously responding to 
an attended task.
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Greenwald (1970) feels that the suitability of the 
selective listening task as a technique for studying 
focal attention to one of two separate input channels 
may be questioned on two grounds. First, recent studies 
(e.g. Treisman and Riley, 1969) indicated that selective 
attention to one ear becomes quite difficult when 
contextual cues, such as voice quality or grammatical 
continuity, that discriminate the two messages are 
removed and word onsets are synchronized; the functional 
separateness of right-ear and left-ear sensory pathways 
is thus questionable. Second, an undesirable complication 
of the subject's auditory information-processing task is 
created by the fact that the subject's own voice feedback, 
as he is repeating aloud one of the two messages, provides 
a third auditory input source that is distributed to both 
ears and can therefore cause interference in processing.
Underwood and Moray (1971) echo these points. They 
argue further that during shadowing the listener is making 
a continuous verbal response to a continuously changing 
verbal stimulus and has his information processing capacity 
taxed to a much greater extent than in a monitoring situation. 
In monitoring, simply listening to a relatively long message, 
the task is essentially passive and unless signals are 
presented at a very fast rate the listener requires little 
effort to analyse the components fully. If the listener 
has a fixed amount of processing capacity available and 
different amounts of the total capacity are taken by 
monitoring and by shadowing, then different residual amounts 
are available for the experimental target detection task.
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With relevant variables (e.g. type of material, instructions 
to subjects) held constant, they found consistently better 
target detections in the unattended channel during 
monitoring as compared to shadowing. In support of their 
overall hypothesis, some data was obtained which suggested 
that attentional strategies in the two types of task were 
similar, so that differences were more likely to be related 
to differences in processing load than to switching of 
attention.
Underwood (1972) investigated the disruptive aspects 
of a continuous response by comparing attended and unattended 
message analysis over three modes of subject participation: 
monitoring (no response required), remembering i.e. one 
trial serial recall (covert response) and shadowing (covert 
and overt response). Detection of semantic- targets (digits) 
in the attended and unattended messages from the remembering 
condition were quantitively similar to those from the 
monitoring condition, suggesting again that the low 
detection rates in the unattended message when the subjects 
are shadowing are a function of the higher processing 
demands of the overt response organization required by 
this task.
Finally, Holloway (1972) makes the familiar point that 
shadowing of prose passages probably entails grouping of 
responses into phrase lengths, which enables the listener 
to monitor the output from a word recognition system in 
order to assemble meaningful phrases before overtly responding, 
aided by the general redundancy of prose passages.
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Holloway argues that if random sequences of words are used 
it should he possible to eliminate the operation of any 
monitoring function and obtain a more realistic estimate 
of the extent and nature of the difficulty of dichotic 
listening. Treisman showed that with strings of random 
words to each ear matched for onset to within 1 msec, a 
high error rate occurred associated particularly with 
the occurrence of responses corresponding to words from 
the irrelevant message. Holloway showed that the random 
words themselves as well as exact matching for time of 
onset could cause comparable errors. Holloway feels 
that a more detailed error analysis is necessary in any 
investigation into the cause of performance decrement in 
dichotic listening.
B. Experiments in more than one modality.
There is evidence that if processing capacity is limited 
within a particular modality, when attention is divided 
between modalities the available processing capacity may be 
greater. The implications of this could be that some 
parallel processing is taking place, but no model of* 
attention has yet specified how processing across modalities 
might differ from that within a given modality. Allport 
et al. (1972) showed that people can attend to and repeat 
back continuous speech at the same time as taking in complex 
unrelated visual scenes or even while sight-reading piano 
music. In both cases performance with divided attention was 
very good and in the case of sight-reading was as good as 
with undivided attention. Allport et al. conclude that a
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more appropriate model than the single channel hypothesis 
would he that of a number of independent, special-purpose 
computers (processors and stores) operating in parallel 
and, at least in some cases, capable of accepting only 
one message or "chunk" of information for processing 
at a time.
Lewis (1972) repeated his earlier experiment (Lewis, 
1970) with separate audio and visual channels. Verbal 
RT's to attended words, as previously, indicated that 
unattended words were interfering selectively with the 
words attended to. When audio was attended and visual 
ignored, the ordering of RT's was exactly as found in 
the dichotic experiments (see below). When visual was 
attended and audio ignored the results were significantly 
different indicating that the pattern of interference 
was not symmetrical for the two modalities.
Results from Greenwald (1970) and Sail and Swane (1973), 
who also used bimodal presentations, only serve to add to 
the confusion and will not be discussed here. As might be 
expected, the use of different modalities allows greater 
possibilities of variation in experimental methodology and 
hence contradictory results. Although both the experiments 
cited suggest that some degree of parallel processing can 
occur, the order of effects is quite different. However, 
processing capacity was controlled very differently. In 
the Allport experiment subjects shadowed continuous prose 
passages and had either to remember pictures (n.b. Haber, 
1970) or play the piano (a task of complex i.e. unspecified,
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demands). In Lewis* experiment, shadowing was closely- 
controlled in three ways a) sequences of unrelated 
words were used rather than prose with unspecifiable 
redundancies; b) presentation rate was established 
such that subjects could not switch to the unattended 
channel without losing part of the attended message 
and c) relatively errorless shadowing was required.
C. Support for a response competition hypothesis.
Posner and Boies (1971) divided the study of attention 
into three parts, representing the components of alertness, 
selectivity and processing capacity. They used a primary 
task of sequential letter matching (same-different) and 
attempted to measure the attention demands of the task 
by presenting a probe (burst of white noise) at different 
temporal positions in relation to the first and second 
letters. RT's to match and to probe were measured.
Encoding of the first letter did not seem to interfere 
with the probe task and this was the case even when the 
first letter was shown briefly, so that the subject had 
to encode quickly. This suggested that encoding of a 
letter did not require processing capacity, as defined 
by Posner and Boies. Probe times were systematically 
increased at certain points. Probes which occurred 
shortly after the second letter were always long. This 
suggested that subjects had trouble processing the probe 
during the response phase of the letter-match task.
Posner and Boies concluded that attention in the sense
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of central processing capacity is related to mental 
operations of which we are conscious, such as 
rehearsing or choosing a response, but is not related 
to the contact between the input and long-term memory 
that leads to (in the case of their primary task) the 
letter name.
Lewis (1970) had subjects shadow lists of single­
syllable words and similar lists were used as unattended 
messages. The criteria used to control attention were 
as described above in Lewis' 1972 experiment. In a 
particular sequence certain pairs of words were related 
as (a) low-associative-strength non synonym associates,
(b) high-associative-strength non-synonym associates 
and (c) low-associative-strength synonyms. Mean RT's 
for attended words as a function of relationship to 
unattended words were in the order (c), (a), (b), with 
synonyms yielding the longest RT's. Lewis concludes 
that this is support for the hypothesis that unattended 
messages are processed at a semantic level, implying a 
sequence of processing of an unattended message whereby 
perceptual (semantic) analysis occurs followed by 
selection (e.g. filtering, attenuation etc) then storage 
for admission to awareness. These results were replicated 
by Lewis (1972) as discussed above.
Corteen and Wood (1972) used GSR as a measure of 
perception and processing of the unattended channel 
without awareness. City names were shock associated and 
then embedded in material presented to the non-attended 
channel in a dichotic listening situation. It was
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found that shock-associated city names gave rise to a 
significant number of autonomic responses even though 
subjects were not aware of them. Non-shock-associated 
city names also produced significantly more responses 
than controls although in the control procedure where 
no shock-associated process preceded the dichotic 
listening, responses to city names did not differ 
significantly from those to other nouns. Shadowing 
efficiency (as measured by error and omission rates) 
was not impaired at the time of responding to the non- 
attended channel material (production of GSR). Corteen 
and Wood ' s findings seem to imply at least the analysis 
of word class and the assigning of appropriate significance 
to that class for non-attended words. Their procedure 
unfortunately is less well controlled than that of Lewis. 
Although subjects were told to ignore the irrelevant 
channel, that it was there to distract them a) the 
shadowing task was relatively easy (continuous prose 
passage) and b) for some reason the two channels were 
'labelled' physically, a male voice reading the critical 
nouns and a female voice providing the prose passage.
It would be interesting to see if the results could be 
replicated when the demands on processing capacity in 
the attended channel were greater.
Rothblat and Pribram (1972) provide data from animal 
experiments, using electrophysiological recordings from 
monkeys trained on Pribram's automated discrimination 
apparatus (DALTA). Physical differences in the stimulus
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display were reflected in stimulus locked analyses of
electrical recordings from the striate cortex but such
differences were not reflected in the electrical
recordings made from the inferior temporal cortex.
By contrast, response locked analyses were considerably
richer in content. When taken from the striate cortex 
-el
such records show^ ]^ whether a learned responseü&s to the 
right or left and whether itW&s correct or incorrect.
When a particular stimulus dimension (such as colour or 
form) must be attended and selected from others, response 
locked analyses showj^ the electrical activity of the 
inferior temporal cortex to be involved in the process. 
Initially these dimensionally related differences w?e 
not found in recordings made from the striate cortex. 
However with subsequent overtraining, both prestriate 
and striate recordings come to reflect these dimensional 
changes.
Rothblat and Pribram conclude that the results help 
clarify the issues posed by the input filter and response 
theories of selective attention: the selecting process 
is response, not stimulus locked. Initially the inferior 
temporal, not the striate cortex, is involved. However,
*
NOTE: stimulus locked activity was electrical activity
recorded on every trial for $00 msec following 
the stimulus flash. Response locked activity 
was the record of activity which occurred between 
2$0 msec before and 2$0 msec after the response 
(recording was of course continuous).
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the striate cortex does become involved in the selection 
process once overlearning has taken place. Thus both 
the response and the input filter theories are supported; 
during learning, selection occurs subsequent to analysis 
of stimulus attributes in the striate cortex but then 
becomes encoded (by overlearning) in the input mechanism 
where it can act as a filter.
Finally, Henley and Dixon (197^) performed an 
experiment where the unattended channel was outside of 
awareness (subjects actually manipulated the level so 
that they were unable to detect any sound) and effects 
of words in this channel were looked for in imagery 
reported in response to a passage of music which was 
played simultaneously with the unattended words (subjects 
were only aware of digits in the unattended channel.
After the level had been adjusted before awareness the 
experimental words were substituted). The positive results 
provide evidence for auditory perception without awareness 
and the assimilation of meaning to subsequent imagery 
(cf. Experiment 7)- Henley and Dixon feel that the results 
appear highly relevant to theories of selective attention 
for they strongly imply the role of preconscious factors 
in selection. Material on the unattended channel must 
both be analyzed for meaning and some decision made 
concerning its relevance to the ongoing task before a 
response is made. As Dixon has observed, since selective 
attention implies selecting for consciousness the selective 
process cannot itself be an event in consciousness.
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D. Support for alternative hypotheses.
Deutsch and Deutsch (1967) raised the objection to 
Treisman and Geffen's experiment that the instruction to 
shadow as well as to tap to attended targets would have 
increased their importance weighting compared with the 
unattended targets and so have produced more efficient 
responding. Treisman and Riley (1969) repeated the 
experiment with the addition that the subject had to 
tap to but not repeat a particular target letter in 
either channel i.e. stop shadowing when a target letter 
was detected. Subjects did detect a considerably higher 
proportion of unattended targets than those in the 
previous experiments, an estimated '^y/o compared to 8% 
previously.
These results are interpreted by Treisman and Riley 
as supporting the hypothesis that the chief effect of 
attention in tasks with competing speech messages is to 
limit perception of the verbal content of the secondary 
message, rather than to restrict responses or memory.
On the other hand, only 70% of letters in the attended 
channel were correctly detected, which is partly accounted 
for by the high proportion of intrusions associated with 
the synchronized stimuli. This suggests that unless 
competing channels are identified in some way, selection 
becomes impaired and switching or fusion of inputs is 
more likely to occur. The situation would be clearer if 
Treisman and Riley had not failed to provide adequate 
information as to the pattern of errors of response
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(e.g. false positives to either channel, error patterns 
to the unattended channel etc). If detection of the 
occurrence of a letter instead of a digit can occur 
outside of awareness, the percept must nevertheless he 
brought into awareness for a motor response to be made 
(as evidenced by the ability to report correctly 76% 
of letters tapped to in the unattended channel). When 
the target letter occurs in the unattended channel this 
means that material from a physically separate source 
has had to be brought into awareness, a procedure which 
must differ in some way from the situation where a letter 
follows a digit in a channel that is being attended and 
responded to, even though a verbal response to the target 
letter is not required. At a moderate presentation rate 
of 1.8'digits/sec it seems reasonable to argue that this 
switching of input to awareness (which is quite different 
from switching attention to monitor the unattended channel, 
as input switching, it is suggested, happens after 
occurrence of the letter) could account for the drop in 
efficiency of responding from 70% to $$%.
Glucksberg and Cowen (1970) had subjects shadow prose 
in one ear and attempt, after delays ranging from 0.$ to 
20.5 sec,to recall single digits that had been embedded 
in prose presented to the non-attended ear. Recall 
performance decreased from 0 to $ sec with no memory for 
the non-attended material apparent between $ and 20.5 sec.
CL
This differs from Norman's (196^) findings but one difference 
in procedure was that in the latter study, the non-attended
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chaimel was silent except for the presentation of memory 
material. Glncksberg and Cowen conclude that their data 
do not •unambiguously discriminate between ’early’ and 
’late’ theories of selective attention. Proponents of 
’early’ selection might argue that only sensory features 
are stored, with no further processing - a position that 
Glucksberg and Cowen favour with the assumption of an 
echoic or precategorical memory system where material 
may either be processed for further analysis or be lost 
by either decay or interference from subsequent inputs. 
On the other hand, proponents of 'late' selection could 
argue that the stimuli had been fully analyzed but that 
the output of the analyzers involved either was not 
stored or was stored but was not available. One might 
add that the output perhaps was not available to the 
same retrieval process as input occurring simultaneously 
but having access to awareness. The problem of storage 
of inputs processed outside of awareness needs to be 
tackled, as will be discussed below. Glucksberg and 
Cowen comment that although the ’late’ explanation seems 
unlikely to them, it does explain the lack of context 
effects, the failure to retrieve categorical information 
and the absence of temporal information, all of which 
suggest a memory store slightly different to that 
involving attended material.
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Davis and Smith (1972) decided that in order to 
avoid some of the defects in testing for unattended 
material (which have been discussed earlier) the extent 
of unattended-channel processing should be determined 
indirectly by observing the effect that the presentation 
of the unattended had on recall of the attended. It was 
concluded that unattended items are excluded from 
primary memory since they little affected the extent or 
shape of the recency effects for attended items.
Davis and Smith felt that the evidence contradicted 
Norman's theoretical position that all sensory inputs, 
attended or not, excite their representation in primary 
memory. Notwithstanding, they consider that the abundance 
of evidence for parallel semantic analysis of both attended 
and unattended channels has to be accounted for. They put 
forward an intentional forgetting paradigm where subjects 
may be momentarily aware of each TBI (to be ignored) event, 
including its 'meaning', but may be able to quickly and 
efficiently forget it. What corresponds to the cue to 
"forget, the physical tag of ear origin, may be apprehended 
simultaneously with (or immediately after) perception. 
Short-term memory might then be considered item - or chunk - 
sensitive only with respect to the retention of TBR (to be 
remembered) items. While entry of unattended input to 
awareness is not actually necessary to this kind of 
argument, it does underline the need to consider physical 
tagging, which may be very important. Much of the data 
discussed in this subsection could be explained in terms
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of the physical tag of ear origin having a more powerful 
effect on switching of input to awareness than meaning 
has, when the subject is set to respond to the input 
from one particular source, most of the time.
Lastly, MacKay (1973) has proposed a two-stage model 
to capture some of the basic relations between attention, 
comprehension and memory for sentences. According to the 
model, the first stage of linguistic processing is carried 
out in short-term memory (Ml) and involves a superficial 
analysis of the semantic and syntactic features of words. 
The second stage is carried out in long-term memory (M2) 
and involves application of transformational rules to 
the analyses of Ml so as to determine the deep or under­
lying relations among words and phrases. According to 
the theory, attention is an M2 process : preliminary analyses 
by Ml are carried out even for unattended inputs but final 
analyses by M2 are only carried out for attended inputs.
The properties of Ml are consistent with Norman’s 
findings regarding memory for the unattended channel and 
also with the work on the unattended channel discussed in 
the previous subsection. In addition MacKay provides 
supporting evidence of unattended processing of lexical 
meaning. Subjects shadowed sentences containing ambiguous 
words (for example, ’They threw stones towards the bank 
yesterday”) and key words for interpretation of the 
ambiguity were presented to the other ear (in this case, 
either MONEY or RIVER). Subjects shadowed several
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experimental sentences and then undertook a recognition 
exercise where they had to approximate the meaning of 
the original sentence by choosing between sentences 
with different meanings (for this example, "they threw 
stones towards the savings and loan association yesterday" 
or "they threw stones towards the side of the river 
yesterday"). Significant results were obtained.
Although subjects were unable to report the contents 
of the unattended channel, it had a significant effect 
on the processing of the attended channel.
The limit on processing of unattended inputs, that 
deep structure relations between words are only processed 
when the input is attended, goes against the Deutschs' 
model, which is why it is discussed in this subsection, 
although HacKay's experiments only seem to provide a null 
hypothesis proof. Nevertheless, N1 must have access to 
some form of long-term memory in order to look up the 
form class(es) and semantic features of a word. Thus the 
model predicts that hippocampectomized patients can 
retrieve long-term lexical traces established before 
their operation. Access to the internal dictionary for 
their native language is unimpaired. However, hippocampal 
patients will be unable to learn or fully process the 
underlying relations of semantic structures they have not 
encountered in the past. MacKay has some clinical evidence 
in support of this prediction.
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MacKay's model has the advantage that it has 
predictive power but can still be modified to incorporate 
other features; for example, parameters such as arousal 
level and rehearsal are easy to introduce in the model 
(MacKay, 1973 P«37)« A filter or attenuation mechanism 
to reduce the strength of input signals is not necessary 
to the model. Rather it is suggested that attended 
signals are simply processed at deeper levels, resulting 
ultimately in awareness and long-term storage in M2.
The relevance of selective attention experiments
Very briefly, the consideration of selective attention 
in this section has provided additional evidence that 
semantic analysis of input can occur outside of awareness. 
Unfortunately, only a little has been contributed to such 
crucial questions as the storage characteristics of such 
data or the normal role of these processes. A basic
reason for this, taking the dichotic, dichoptic or .
CoAb roles
bimodal situations, is the lack of strict methodological^, 
particularly of the extent of the load on processing 
capacity. The other major problem is the lack of an 
adequate theory of selective attention, as most theories 
are not sufficiently specific to deal with the weight of 
conflicting data, even though a proportion of the data 
can be rejected on the grounds of poor methodology.
It may be that an adequate theory of selective attention 
will only be possible when perception and recognition 
processes are better understood. The orientation of 
Posner and Boies seems a valid one and has already
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contributed some valuable insight into the above 
mentioned processes (see review by Posner, 1969)- 
The model which MacKay has outlined may prove 
valuable in a modified form as it includes an 
approach to the interaction of memory and attention, 
is consistent with much of the selective attention 
data so far obtained and, as has been mentioned, it 
is amenable to the introduction of other parameters 
such as arousal. Finally, the model is consistent 
with the concept of perception without awareness, 
as will be discussed in the next section.





Two questions were alluded to in the introduction to 
this thesis. The first was, what is the normal function 
of perception without awareness? The second was, why 
does structure seem to dominate over meaning in the 
recognition process, even when there is only partial 
awareness? The experimental and theoretical work 
presented here does not enable a satisfactory answer 
to either of these questions (as promised in the 
introduction^). Notwithstanding, a tentative model 
can be put forward.
Passive Inactive analyses Morton has observed that his
model of the recognition process (Morton, 1969; Morton and
b
Chambers, 1973) is very similar to that of Norman (1969^ 0•
The basic unit in Morton's model is termed a logogen, a 
device which accepts information relevant to a particular 
word response irrespective of the source of this information. 
When more than a threshold amount of information has 
accumulated in any logogen, that particular response becomes 
available for awareness. The cere of Norman's model, by 
comparison, is a storage system into which sensory inputs 
and 'pertinence' inputs are sent. The elements of the 
storage system are almost identical to logogens in their 
properties. Further, the sensory analysis systems in both 
models are conceived of as passive, or autonomous. Morton 
suggests that whereas Norman refers to his as a modified 
analy si s-by- synt he si s model, the synthesis in Norman's
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model is in terms of expectations and as such takes a 
different form from other analysts-hy-synthesis systems 
(such as that of Hochherg, 1971) which require that the 
synthesized anticipation is in the same code as the input.
Norman, in fact, deals with the discrepancy between 
descriptions of passive and active models by allowing 
that both may actually be present. "We can suppose that 
passive devices ... are able to extract sufficient 
information about sensory signals to restrict the set 
of possibilities to a small, manageable number. 
Simultaneously, we suppose that an active device can use 
the meaning, context and expectations extracted from 
previously analyzed material to reduce the number of 
possible signals that need to be considered at any one 
time to a small, workable set. If we combine the set of 
possible items proposed by the stimulus analyzing 
mechanisms with the set proposed by the active analyzing 
procedure, we should find the overlap of items to be very 
small, perhaps unique (Norman, 1969 P* 179)."
Norman's proposal is of interest but can perhaps be 
reinterpreted. The mechanism of passive analysis via 
logogens, storage units, dictionary units or whatever 
seems to be appropriate to the recognition paradigm where 
a variable amount of information calls for a perceptual 
response to enter awareness. While such a system can 
operate efficiently with high probability items it is 
particularly suited to uncertainty situations where the
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sum total of information available will eventually trigger 
the most likely response. The analysi s-by-synthe si s or 
active mechanism seems on the other hand to be most suited 
to continuous operation, where redundancy is an important 
element. The concept of a perceptual strategy such as 
anticipatory encoding depends on a degree of familiarity 
and redundancy in the incoming information for efficient 
operation.
The systems have in common two essential features 
related to input and output respectively. Both systems 
can be pre-set intrinsically and extrinsically, that is 
to say, there are built-in biases which make one unit or 
one schema more likely to be activated than another and 
also units or scehmata can be biassed by information 
arriving at a particular moment. Secondly, both systems 
are consistent with the notion of a limited capacity 
channel without the necessity for postulating any special 
kind of perceptual filter. The characteristics of the 
systems are such that only a limited amount of information 
can be handled simultaneously and this must partly by a 
function of the fact that their output is within awareness, 
MacKay (1973) has proposed a two stage model of perceptual 
analysis with a short-term memory system (Ml) analyzing 
superficial lexical meaning outside of awareness and a 
long-term store system (M2) analyzing deep structure 
within awareness. MacKay's M2 system can be visualized 
as operating at a late stage in, or on the output of, the 
systems just described, as it seems from his limited 
description that it operates largely within awareness.
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Processes of attention The above partly answers the 
difficult question which MacKay avoids, namely, which 
part of the contents of Ml is operated on in M2.
Selective attention is seen as operating at the level of 
entry to awareness while range of scanning or focus of 
attention is pre-set and operates at the level of input 
to passive or active analysis systems. An important 
point now appears. The contents of Ml represent one 
kind of preattentive process, but this is quite different 
from the type of preattentive or bounding process 
envisaged by Neisser (1967) or Kolers and Lewis (1972).
The early stages of the perceptual process according 
to the present author can be conceptualized as follows: 
the input from stimulus analyzers represents a perceptual 
code of physical features such as colour, size, line 
orientation and location. This information would normally 
be quite sufficient to allow selection of items to be 
further processed via their spatial location whether this 
involves the bounding of an area of the visual field or 
the selection of one of two competing auditory inputs.
The same input from stimulus analyzers would be processed 
in Ml to at least the level of lexical meaning. Thus, two 
kinds of preattentive processes operate; a large proportion 
of the stimulus input is analyzed in Ml (let us label this 
PPl) while a portion of the stimulus input corresponding to 
the output of Ml is pre-selected on the basis of physical 
tags or location (Snyder, 1972) for simultaneous structural 
analysis (let us label this process PP2). The 
characteristics of selective attention
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are therefore fulfilled firstly by the operation of PP2 
on the input to the passive or active analysis systems 
and secondly, by the limited capacity channel characteristics 
of their output. It is possible that PP1 has a role in 
the switching of direction of attention, as will be 
discussed below.
Subliminal perception as an epiphenomenon If physical 
features from the stimulus analyzers can determine which 
portions of the input are selected for analysis to 
awareness, what is the role of M1? A consideration of 
the material surveyed so far yields four possible effects 
that Ml may have. Firstly, by analyzing lexical meaning 
Ml can bring about a specific change in arousal level, 
signal ahead the arrival of emotive material perhaps by 
causing a rise in the threshold of specific logogens or 
by altering the characteristics of response hierarchies. 
Secondly, analyses performed by M1 can be assimilated to 
the further analysis of other material. Examples of 
this are evident in Experiments 1 and 2 of this thesis 
and the results of Lewis (1970), MacKay (1973) and others 
in the selective attention field. Thirdly, analogous 
with this, switching of attention can occur due to Ml 
operations. If Ml represents a system where context is 
continuously monitored, in that lexical and surface 
ambiguities can be resolved, M1 can easily cause a switch 
to the unattended channel in a dichotic situation, in order 
to bring a simultaneously occurring word into awareness 
when it fits into the context of the attended message.
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This is a not uncoinmon shadowing error which is not 
easily explained on the basis of random switching.
Finally, as demonstrated in Experiment 7 and in 
several previous experiments from the subliminal field, 
analyses made in M1 during simultaneous cognitive 
operations in awareness can be recovered after a 
considerable period. This feature seems to bring 
present conceptions of memory organization into question, 
as it is totally inconsistent with a simplistic view 
of M1 as a short-term memory store in the accepted sense 
of the term. By specifying different properties for H1 
and M2 MacKay's theory is in accord with the views of 
other workers, in that long-term memory is not simply 
short-term memory crystallized into more durable form.
As mentioned earlier, the findings of Experiment 7 suggest 
that while the contents of Ml are not retrievable in the 
same way as those of M2 this may mean that the storage 
and retrieval characteristics are simply different, not 
that retrieval and/or storage does not occur.
The orientation in the preceding paragraphs places 
perception without awareness in rather a different light. 
What has been labelled as perception without awareness can 
be seen as an essential early stage in perception. The 
properties of the M1 system as it has been defined here 
are entirely consistent with what is known of perception 
without awareness; furthermore, such a viewpoint removes 
the element of mystery from the phenomenon, as it is
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well known that much of the perceptual process must occur 
prior to awareness. In relation to the aspects covered 
in this thesis, the findings of section A illustrate the 
second mentioned property, that of assimilation of 
subliminal inputs to cognitive structure; the findings 
of section B relate to the first mentioned property, the 
signalling of emotive stimuli, with resultant effects on 
awareness thresholds, recognition and memory ; while 
section J) hints at the fourth and perhaps most interesting 
property, that of long acting effects.
Subliminal perception in the general context of this 
model can be seen as an epiphenomenon in as much as many 
of the subliminal experiments have been attempts to 
demonstrate the properties of the Ml system in isolation 
under conditions where the later stages of the perceptual 
process could not operate; that is, where processing 
could not continue to awareness because either stimulus 
intensity was too low or the input was masked by 
simultaneously presented material. Although the effects 
previously demonstrated can be viewed as epiphenomena 
this does not at all imply that they are of small import. 
Rather, perception without awareness, as conceptualized 
here, is an essential aspect of the perceptual process. 
This can be further illustrated by reference to the 
questions posed in the introduction and alluded to at 
the beginning of this section.
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Structure and meaning A very tentative explanation
can be offered for the central issue, which is why 
structure dominates perceptual analysis when conditions 
are such that perceptual processing can proceed to 
awareness. It seems superficially logical that when 
awareness cannot occur, the analyses possible are 
meaning or context-related. There is an element of 
paradox here, as to discriminate meaning, structure 
must be analyzed. This can be resolved by reference 
to the model; the analysis of structure or the output 
of feature analyzers must be distinguished from the 
representation of structure in awareness, which, 
whether passive or active analysis is involved, is 
postulated to be a constructive process. Meaning can 
therefore be extracted from the output of the stimulus 
analyzers in M1 and then be fed into the passive or 
active analysis systems in which structure is constructed 
directly from the output of the stimulus analyzers.
This notion of context and structure being processed 
separately at first is consistent with the findings of 
Posner, thus "subjects can be matching the visual aspects 
of simultaneous letter pairs and at the same time referring 
them to past experience in order to obtain the name ... 
these codes (physical and name identity) are separately 
stored, have their own time courses, and can be interrogated 
separately (Posner, 1969 p. 95)- "
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One way of viewing this idea is to conceive of the 
analysis of context and structure respectively as slow 
and fast components of perception. It is proposed that 
the stimulus field is normally sufficiently redundant 
for anticipatory schemata to be mobilized, utilizing a 
minimum of feature elements. This system has the 
advantage of speed of response, which is necessary for 
rapid scanning, reading and the like. Meaning analysis, 
as it involves extended search through memory stores, 
is seen as acting as a follow-up and may occasionally 
be responsible for the 'second-look' phenomenon, where 
an unfamiliar (out of context) object or word is initially 
taken for a familiar one but then we look again. Normally 
the system would be fairly efficient although proof­
reader's error will sometimes happen, when the onward 
direction of the system over-rides the feedback from 
context analysis. When the amount of uncertainty in the 
situation increases, further analysis would take place 
and the meaning component would be utilized directly, 
perhaps in the passive analysis type system. This concept 
is supported by the finding of Rothblat and Pribram (1972) 
that during discrimination learning selection occurs 
subsequent to analysis of stimulus attributes in the 
striate cortex but then becomes encoded (by overlearning) 
in the input mechanism.
This framework for discussing perception without 
awareness goes some way towards explaining its function 
but still leaves questions unanswered. It seems that not 
only are the results of analysis of meaning denied access
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to awareness unless there is structure to which they will 
he assimilated but that even then, as in the partial 
awareness paradigm, expectation will apparently pre­
dominate. The word 'apparently' is used because this 
could be the answer. If subjects were exposed to 
similar common and uncommon words, such as HAPPY and 
HARPY, in a partial awareness situation it would be 
worthwhile to test the level of confidence of subjects 
giving the response 'happy' in both conditions. It may 
be that subjects giving the response 'happy' in the 
HARPY condition would feel less certain about the 
correctness of their response. If this is so, we 
might have an explanation of how "intuition" sometimes 
operates. "Having a feeling about something" might 
represent the discrepancy between a dominant (structural) 
perceptual response and the concomitant analysis of 
meaning which has taken place. This does not seem a 
totally satisfactory explanation but a greater under­
standing of the workings of the perceptual process and 
the analysis of meaning is obviously necessary before 
the question is elucidated.
The points so far covered go a fair way to answering 
the criticisms of Dixon's account which GoItheart (1972) 
raises. Responses to a subliminal stimulus cannot be 
qualitatively the same as those to a supraliminal stimulus - 
an early stage in the perceptual process cannot function 
as a watered down version of the whole process, except by 
accident, perhaps (i.e. exceptionally it may appear to do so.
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if the resulting effect happens to he very similar). 
Secondly, it is agreed that analyst s-by-synthesis and 
verbal encoding are not obligatorily conscious processes. 
Thirdly, Coltheart's criticism of Dixon's view of 
phenomenal experience as a system in parallel with 
processes mediating behaviour is also accepted - a 
similar point is made in Section A. Finally, some 
attempt has been made to meet Coltheart's last 
criticism, that of the need for more theoretical 
discussion of the concept. Nevertheless, the discussion 
presented here is sketchy in the extreme. No attempt has 
been made to provide a solid theory and what data there 
is could be made into a better model by theoreticians 
more skilled than the present author, no doubt. However, 
in his opinion, what is needed at the present moment is 
more data - facts before theorizing - and this thesis has 
been moderately successful, in that many more questions 
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H OH BL OS S H OH BL OS S H OH BL OS
-1 0 +1 +1 -1 +4 +2 -3 +3 -2 0 +2 -1 -1 -1
^2 +3 0 +1 +2 +2 -1 +2 -1 +4 0 +3 0 -1 0 +3
"5 -1 +5 0 0 +1 +3 0 0 +2 -1 +3 +2 +2 0 -2
-2 -1 +1 -1 -1 +3 -2 +1 0 0 +1 +1 0 +3 -1
+1 -1 0 +4 0 +2 -1 -1 -2 0 +2 +1 +1 0 +1
% +1 +1 +2 +3 -1 +2 -2 +1 +2 +2 +2 +4 +1 +1 +2
+1 -2 +1 -3 -1 -1 -1 -2 -2 0 0 +1 +1 0 -3
% -5 0 +3 +2 0 +1 -2 +1 -2 +1 +1 -1 0 0
0 0 0 0 +1 -1 -1 0 0 -1 +1 0 +1 0 +1
®10 +1 +1 +2 +2 0 -1 +1 +1 0 0 +2 0 +2 -1 -1
G11 +1 +5 +1 +3 +1 +3 +1 +2 +1 0 +3 +2 +1 0 -2
®12 0 -1 0 0 +2 -1 0 -2 +1 -1 0 -2 +1 -2 +2
^15 -1 0 +2 0 -1 0 0 0 -4 0 +2 0 0 —1 -2
+1 0 -1 +2 -1 0 +1 +2 0 +2 0 0 0 +2 +1
^15 +1 +2 0 +2 -2 +2 +1 +2 +1 0 +2 +1 +1 +5 +3
^16 +1 +2 0 -2 +1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 +2 +2 +4
^17 -1 -2 0 +1 +1 +2 -2 0 +1 -1 +2 +1 +2 +4 0
-2 0 -1 +2 +2 +2 +1 -1 0 -2 +1 -3 -1 -1 +2
1^9 +1 0 0 +1 +1 -1 +2 +1 +2 -2 +2 +2 -2 0 -1
®20
Totals
+2 -1 0 0 0 +3 +1 -4 0 +1 +1 0 0 0 +1
+3 +4 +12 +19 +4 +21 +2 -6 +10 -7 +28 +11 +9 +9 +7
365
366
Ta~b. A. 1-2. Session 1 : analysis of variance summarj
Source Sum of Squares mean square P
Conditions Ss 9.66 2.413 4,76 1.273(n.s.)
Subjects Ss 43.56 2.293 19,76 1.205(n» s.)
Error 144.14 1.897
Tab. A. Planned comparisons
Conditions planned comparisons:
1) +1 0 0 0 -1 2) 0 +1 0 -1 0
3) +1 +1 -4 +1 4) -1 +1 0 +1 -1
Conditions by sessions planned comparisons 
1) +1 0 0 0 -1 2) 0 +1 0 -1 0
-1 0 0 0 +1 0 - 1 0 + 1 0
3) +1 +1 -4 +1 +1 4) -1 +1 0 +1 -1
-1 -1 +4 -1 -1 +1 -1 0 -1 +1
367
Tab. A. 2.1. Session 1 ; analysis of variance summary
Source Sum of Squares Mean Squares -^^ 2^ ^
Conditions Ss 5.90 1.475 4,76 0.9 (n. s.)
Subjects Ss 82.55 4.554 19,76 2.65 P=0.C1
Error 124.5 1.658
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Tab. A. 2.2. Eav; data for Experiment 2
Session I II III
Stimuli ; 
Subjects:
H OH BL OS S II OH BL OS S H OH BL OS s
Si +3 +1 +2 0 +3 +2 +2 +3 +2 0 +1 0 +4 +3 0
Sg +4 +4 +2 +1 +1 +3 +2 +2 +3 +1 0
+2 +3 +1 -1
6% +1 +3 +2 +2 +2 0 +1 +2 +1 +5 +3 +2 +3 +2 +2V
S4 0 +3 +2 -1 +2 +1 +1 0 +3 +1 +2 +3 +3 +3 +3
<
%
+1 0 +2 0 -1 +1 0 +3 +3 -1 +2 +1 +3 0 +1
0 -2 +2 0 +4 0 -2 0 +2 -2 -2 —1 0 -4 -4
8^
+1 +1 +1 0 0 -2 -1 -1 +4 -2 +3 0 +1 +2 -2




+1 +2 +2 -1 0 +3 +2 +3 +3 +3 +2 +2 0 0 +3
0 -1 0 0 -1 +1 +1 0 +1 -2 -1 +1 0 -3 0






-2 +2 0 +3 -1 +2 -2 +1 0 +2 +3 +1 -2 0 +1
+3 0 +2 +1 +2 +2 +1 0 0 -1 +3 +2 +3 +1 -3
-1 +1 +2 +1 +1 0 +2 0 0 0 0 +2 +4 +1 0
+3 +3 +1 +1 +2 +2 +1 +2 +2 +3 +1 +2 +3 +1 +1
+2 0 -1 +1 +1 0 0 -1 +2 -3 +2 +1 +1 +3 0
-1 +2 0 0 +1 +1 +3 0 -1 0 +1 +2 +1 +3 +3




+1 +1 +1 +1 +2 +2 +1 +4 +2 +2 +2 +3 +3 +1 +2
+1 +1 +3 +4 +3 -1 -1 +2 +2 0 +2 -1 +2 -1 -2
+20 +27 +28 +15 +25 +21 +1? +21 +52 +2 +29 +22 +53 +14 +9
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Tab. A. 5.2. Stimuli by sessions : planned comparisons
1) +2 +2 -4 2) -2 +2 0 5) +1 +1 -2
-1 -1 +2 +1 -1 0 +1 +1 -2
-1 -1 +2 -r1 -1 0 +1 +1 -2
0 0 0 0 0 0 -5 -5 +6
4) -1 +1 0 5) 0 0 0 6) 0 0 0
-1 +1 0 +1 +1 -2 -1 +1 0
+1 0 -1 -1 +2 +1 0
+5 -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tab. A. 5.5. Stimuli by sessions by sex: planned comparisons
1) +2 +2 -4 2) -2 +2 0 5) +1 +1 -2 4) -1 +1 0
-1 -1 +2 +1 -1 0 +1 +1 -2 -1 +1 0
-1 -1 +2 +1 -1 0 +1 +1 -2 -1 +1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 -5 -5 +6 -5 0
-2 -2 +4 +2 -2 c -1 -1 +2 +1 -rl 0
+1 +1 -2 +1 0 -1 -1 +2 +1 — 1 0
+1 +1 -2 -1 +1 0 -1 -1 +2 +1 -1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 +5 +3 -6 -5 +3 0
5) 0 • 0 0 0 0 0 6) 0 0 0 0 0 0
+1 +1 -2 -1 -1 +2 XI +1 0 +1 0
-1 -1 +2 +1 +1 -2 +1 -1 0 -1 +1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Tab. A. 3.4. Randomized procedures for Experiment 3b
Sex order firstsession Eude/Clothed/Outlij
Subject 1 F 1 2 3 4 3 6 Cog. QOR YAD DIE
2 F 6 1 2 3 4 3 A ZIW ZALT YAD
3 N 3 6 1 2 3 4 A ziv; DIB X M
4 n 4 3 6 1 2 3 Cog. ZAll YAD VEM
3 F 3 4 3 6 1 2 Cog. XÂH ZIW DIE
6 n 2 3 4 3 6 1 A YAD VEM QOR
7 n 1 4 6 3 3 2 A v m DIE YAD
8 F 2 3 3 4 6 1 Cog. VEM QOR 2AiT
9 n 6 2 4 3 1 3 Cog. QOR ZIW YAD
10 h 5 1 3 2 4 6 A DIE QOR XALT
11 F 4 6 2 1 3 3 A YAD XALT ZIW
12 F 3 3 1 6 2 4 Cog. DIE ZIW XALT
13 M 4 2 6 3 3 1 Cog. ZIW VEM QOR
14 N 1 3 6 2 4 3 A QOR ZIW XALT
15 F 3 2 3 4 5 1 A QOR VEM DIE
16 H 6 1 2 3 3 4 Cog. DIE YAD VEM
17 F 6 4 1 2 3 3 Cog. YAD VEM ZIW
18 n 1 4 3 3 2 6 Cog. YAD DIB QOR
19 F 2 6 4 3 1 3 Cog. ZIW VEM DIS
20 M 3 3 1 4 6 2 Cog. XAIJ VEi QOR
21 F 5 1 3  6 4 2 A X M YAD ZIW
22 F 3 3 4 1 2 6 A VSM QOR DIB
23 F 2 3 3 6 1 4 A DIE QOR YAD
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Tab. A. 3-8. Planned comparisons: stimuli by sessions 
(Experiment gb)
-1) 0 +1 -1 2) 0 +1 -1
0 +1 -1 0 -1 +1
0 - 1+1  0 0 0
0 - 1+1  0 0 0
3) 0 0 0 4) +2 -1 -1
0 0 0 + 2 - 1-1 
0 +1 -1 -2 +1 +1
0 -1 +1 -2 +1 +1
5) +2-1-1 S) 0 0 0
- 2 + 1+1  0 0 0
0 0 0 - 2 + 1+1
0 0 0 +2 -1 -1
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Source Sum of Squares Mean Square P
Stimuli 2.680 0.893 3 , 1 2  2.49 U . S .
Subjects 30.107
Stimuli X subjects 4.309 0.339
Sessions 13.4-03 7 .703 2,8 17.64 <0.002
Sessions x subjects 3.306 0.438
stimuli X sessions 10.133 1.689 6,24 2.44 0.03
Stimuli X sessions x 
subjects 13.220 0.331
Tab. A. 11. Stimuli. X sessions planned comparisons: Kroup
Planned comparison Sum of Squares P P
1) IÎ vs. C+0: sub vs. sup. 0.139 1,24 < 1 n. s.
2) N vs. C+0: 1 vs. 2 2.333 1,24 4.281 <0.03
3) B1 vs. rest: sub. vs.
sup. ^-'90 1,24 2.160 n. s.
4) B1 vs. rest: 1 vs. 2 4.760 1,24 8.633 <0.01
5) C vs. 0 : sub. vs. sup. 0.963 1,24 1.764 n. s.
6) G vs. 0 : 1 vs. 2 0.693 1,24 1.264 n. s.
Stimuli X sessions 10.124 6,24 2.44 0.03
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Tab. A. 4.1. Mean ratings of emotionality
PAINT 1.90 GUILTY 3.26 RED 3.43
COD 1.58 HARPY 2.97 RUN 3.23
SAP 2.61 REMAIN 2.00 HATRED 3.74
BALLS 4.36 SHADOW 2.94 TIT 3.71
HÜBRY 3.8I WORTH 2.36 RATHER 4.94
WINTER 3.84 HAD 2.39 VANITY 3.32
SAD 3.43 CANCER 3.23 APRAID 4.94
LIVER 1.90 WATCH 2.23 BREAST 4.32
SCREW 4.32 CARRY 1.81 CARPET 1.38
REASON 2.39 PLANT 2.43
SPACE 3.13 HORROR 3.43
WET 3.23 MOTHER 3.22
DOLLAR 2.36 HOT 3.71
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Tab. A. 4.3. Planned comparisons used
1) -1 -1 -1 +1 +1 +1
2) +1 +1 -2 0 0 0
3) -1 +1 0 0 0 0
4) 0 0 0 +2 -1 -1
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Tab. A. Characteristics of 44 vjords
Rated emotional 
(subject rating) P L H D Er U Lr
PAIl^ T 1 5 4.093 42 1.90 9 11
COD 4 3 2.223 23 1-38 3 1
SAP 4 3 3.492 48 2.61 7 3
BALLS E 1 3 3.213 67 4.36 11 15
HURRY E 1 3 3.984 37 3.81 10 6
WINTER E 1 6 3.042 32 3-84 3 7
SAD E 2 3 3.748 47 3.43 3 8
LIVER 4 3 4.739 31 1.90 13 8
SCREW E 4 3 4.428 49 4-32 8 16
REASON 1 6 3-210 67 2.39 13 12
SPACE E 1 3 4.917 38 3.13 16 10
WET E 2 3 3.426 37 3.23 4 4
DOLLAR 1 6 3.813 38 2-36 3 3
WATER E 1 3 4.918 37 2.81 9 11
BRUSH 2 5 4.207 44 1-77 7 11
SAY 1 3 4.600 33 1.77 6 11
RAM E 4 3 4.378 34 2.90 7 9
HAPPY E 1 5 3.238 41 3.32 4 8
SHARE E 1 5 3-884 83 4-03 17 16
BENCH 3 3 3-644 34 1-42 7 7
MOUTH E 1 3 4.332 44 4-33 3 3
GUILTY E 3 6 4-394 62 3.26 16 13
HARPY E 4 3 6.137 98 2.97 24 24
RET'IAIN 1 6 2.828 39 2.00 11 9
SHADOW E 2 6 4-731 34 2.94 12 11
WORTH 1 3 4.296 49 2.36 12 16
HAD 1 3 3.297 67 2.39 17 21
CANCER E 4 6 4-889 39 3.23 11 8
WATCH 1 3 4-367 49 2.23 12 9
CARRY 1 3 4-349 31 1.81 11 12
PLAl'IT 1 5 4-380 33 2.43 11 16
HORROR E 3 6 3.433 46 3-43 13 9
MOTHER E 1 6 3-112 33 3-22 4 8
HOT E 1 3 2.800 38 3-71 9 3
CUP 1 3 2.9I8 32 1-43 6 3
RED E 1 . 3 4-710 33 3.43 9 3
RUN E 1 3 3.083 63 3.23 8 9
HATRED E 4 6 4.333 62 3-74 11 17
TIT E 4 3 4.326 47 3.71 12 17
RATHER E 1 6 3.1029 41 4-94 11 10
VAIHTY E 4 6 4.870 67 3.32 22 19
APRAID E 1 6 4.721 64 4-94 11 17
BREAST E 2 5 4.783 33 4-32 10 17
CARPET 4 6 4-108 47 1-38 10 11
Tab. A. 3"1" (Continued)
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Pe Ro Co El RT Ev Str Emp POS
PAINT 5 12 4 24 44.30 3.88 3.94 0 3
COD 0 3 0 4 33.49 4.00 4.06 0 4
SAP 1 6 2 10 46.34 4.18 3.39 0 4
BALLS 5 7 3 21 38.93 3.94 3.29 1 4
HURRY 2 11 4 14 46.03 4.71 3.06 0 3
WINTER 3 3 5 12 44.21 4.33 3.23 1 1
SAD 4 8 3 17 44.90 3.77 4.39 1 1
LIVER 4 3 1 13 39.00 4.39 4.33 1 4
SCREW 1 0 1 16 34.46 4.41 2.88 1 3
REASON 2 9 4 19 34.73 3.63 3.29 0 3
SPACE 2 3 2 13 37.17 3.29 3.00 0 4
WET 3 6 1 12 43.49 4.47 4.33 1 1
DOLLAR 0 2 0 3 41.34 3.88 3.47 0 4
WATER 3 11 4 20 39.03 3.06 3.18 1 3
BRUSH 3 6 1 19 37.30 3.76 3.94 1 3
SAY 1 11 3 20 36.39 3.82 4.33 0 2
RAM 0 4 0 13 37.41 4.47 2.33 1 3
HAPPY 2 8 3 14 42.92 1.39 2.94 1 1
SHARE 4 7 2 24 39.23 2.18 3.41 . 0 3
BENCH 0 3 1 9 40.34 3.94 3.88 0 4
MOUTH 8 3 3 13 41.42 3.00 3.18 1 4
GUILTY 3 3 3 20 36.86 3.41 3.06 1 1
HARPY 8 14 11 34 40.13 4.71 3.82 0 4
REMAIN 3 8 6 13 43.79 4.24 4.00 0 2
SHADOW 4 4 2 17 41.37 4.47 4.47 1 3
WORTH 4 8 6 21 36.03 4.00 4.18 1 4
HAD 3 13 6 33 32.69 4.24 3.94 0 2
CANCER 4 3 2 •13 39.06 6.29 3.06 1 4
WATCH 3 6 4 12 43.78 3.82 3.94 0 3
CARRY 0 11 2 22 40.71 4.33 3.41 0 2
PLANT 1 6 2 21 37.83 3.41 4.24 0 3
HORROR 3 8 2 18 42.19 3.63 2.47 1 4
MOTHER 0 2 1 9 43.69 1.88 2.94 1 5
HOT 3 7 2 13 49.67 3.39 2.23 1 1
CUP 0 3 2 6 46.27 3.87 4.73 0 3
RED 7 8 3 17 44.93 4.06 2.71 - 0 1
RUN 2 11 4 18 .42.91 3.94 2.94 0 3
HATRED 3 11 8 24 34.03 6.33 1.94 1 4
TIT 4 2 2 21 33.93 4.29 4.29 1 4
RATHER 3 4 4 13 41.80 2.12 2.76 1 4
VANITY 3 6 4 24 34.70 3.41 3.71 1 4
ARRAID 4 12 9 23 32.86 3.63 3.29 1 1
BREAST 3 3 3 22 33.89 4.06 3.82 1 4
CARPET 2 3 2 14 37.83 3.82 4.00 0 3
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Tab. A. 5« 2; Correlation matrix
F L H D Er U Lr Pe
F  1.00
L .02 1.00
H .04 .15 1.00
D .12 .15 ***.go 1.00
Er .04 .27 .02 .16 1.00
IT .19 *.31 ***.67 ***.78 .01 1.00
Lr .15 .27 ***.69 ***.75 .14 1.00
Pe .00 .18 **.40 **.45 *.34 **.40 *.55 1.00
Po ♦-.54 -.15 *.36 **.45 .06 *.55 *.55 .50
Co -.15 .21 **.39 ***.56 .19 **.52 ***.61 ***.58
El -.01 .11 ***.73 ***.78 .12 ***.70 ***.88 **.54
RT -.15 *-.32 **i.70 **±.62 **-.55 **±.78 -.17
Ev **.51 .06 .14 .18 .17 .24 .19 .22
Str .01 -.21 -.00 -.12 ***-.57 -.02 .03 -.04
Emp .21 .23 -.10 -.07 * * * .63 -.11 .11 .26








Tab. A. 3.2. (Continued)
POSPo Co El RT Ev str Enp
Po 1.00
Co ***.?1 1.00
El ***.66 ***.68 1.00 '
RT -.11 -.50 **±.64 1.00
Ev .16 .26 .25 -.18 1.00
Str -.05 -.09 .01 .05 .00 1.00
Enp -.28 -.05 .04 -.18 .19 -.25 1.00








Tab. A. 3.3. Principal axis factor loadings (imrotated)
1 2 3 4
p .10 .54 -.39 .51
L .23 .32 .01 -.26
H .81 -.10 -.21 -.19
D .89 -.05 -.10 -.08
Er .21 .73 .60 -.07
U .79 -.02 -.25 -.02
Lr .89 . 06 -.14 -.12
Pe .53 -13 .27 .13
Po .55 -. 36 .45 .31
Go .71 -.15 .32 .20
El .93 -.15 .09 .03
RT -.69 -.18 .23 .28
Ev .29 .28 -.07 .55
Str -.08 -.33 -.32 .11
m p  . - .03 .67 .24 -.01
POS .09 .18 -.47 -.11
Variance accounted for 5.53 2.03 1.66 ■ .95
Cumulative %  variance 34.37 47.23 37-64 63-36
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Tab. A. 3.4. Brown (1963) : data analyzed by POS
Emotional words





CHOOSE, STRICT, STUPID 
WICKED, GUILTY, APRAID 
PEMALE
Neutral words
NOTICE, OBTAIN, EMPLOY 
BRIGHT, AUTUMN, POSTER 
RUSTLE, BRANCH .




GRUDGE, EXCUSE, ATTACK 
MENACE, GOSSIP, CARESS 
GAMBLE, HEALTH, DOCTOR 
























N = 14 N = 22
= 7.39 P < 0.01
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Tab. A. 6.1. Targets in LW condition
Position: A B C D
Above: 1° V W Y X
2° SIP FUN BAG COW
Below : 1° Q G M z
2^ PAY SIP COW SIP
Across 1^ B N T L
2^ RED BAG RED FUN
At a distance: 1° G P S D
2° RED F U E RED COW
Diagonal: 1° J K F R
29 BAG SIP BAG COW
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Tab. A. 6.2. Targets in W  condition
Position: A B C D
Above SIX LAY CUE BET
20 KEY FUN BAG COD
Below 1° HOW JUT LAG HER
2^ PUN KEY COD SIP
Across ' CAT KEN VOW HUG
2^ SIP BAG KEY FUN
Distant LED JAY BUN ROW
2^ KEY BAG SIP COD
Diagonal 1^ BED MIX HOT SUN
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Tab. A. 6.4. Planned comparisons: positions x conditions 
interaction
1) +2 +2 +2 -5 -5 2) 0 0 0 +1 -1
-2 -2 -2 +5 +3 0 0 0 - 1 + 1
3) +2 -1 - 1 0  0 4) 0 +1-1 0 0
-2 +1 + 1 0  0 0 -1 + 1 0 0
Tab. A. 6.3» Summary table: post hoc analysis
Source Sum of squares P p
Between subjects
conditions 4.449 4.449 1,38 9-84 <0.01
subjects 17-177 0.432
Within subjects
’ positions ' 0.344 0.181 3,114 2.00 0.1
^ " ' ^ " " c o n & h o n s  ^ . 1 0 1  3 , 1 1 4  1 . 1 2  n . s .
positions x subjects 10.364 0.091
Tab. A. 6.6. Planned comparisons: post hoc analysis: 
positions x conditions
1) +1 +1 -1 -1 2) +1 -1 0 0 5) 0 0 +1 -1 
-1 -1 +1 +1 -1 +1 0 0 0 0 -1 +1
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Tab. A. 7.1. Contingency tables for grouns 2 to 6
(for group 1, see main text)
Group 2 Group 3
Experimental Control Experimental
5 4 3 0 3 2
4 1 0 1 4 1
3 2 2 2 , 3 . ' 1
2 1 1 3 2 3
1 4 1 4 1 . 1
0 0 3 3 0 0
12 12 8
Group 4 Group 5
Experimental Control Experimental
5 3 2 0 3 2
4 2 1 1 4 1
3 1 3 2 3 1
2 1 2 3 2 3
1 4 1 4 1 2




3 0 2 0
4 2 2 1
3 6 2 2
2 2 2 3
1 1 .1 4































































































































story words words. P + U
1 71 7 6 -0.08
2 64 1 3 +0.67
5 37 0 1 +1.00
4 108 5 15 +0.63
3 40 4 5 . -0.14
Group A 6 35 2 2 0.00
(experi­
mental) 7 40 2 0 -1.00
8 71 1 8 0.78
9 74 5 7 0I40
10 138 7 2 ’ -0.36
11 73 3 3 0.00
12 66 5 3 +0.23
1 103 8 5 -0J36
2 67 0 8 1.00
5 78 1 1 0.00
4 92 9 6 -0.20
3 80 2 9 +0.78
Group B 6 82 2 3 +0.43
(control) 7 79 4' 1 -0.60
8 63 0 3 1.00
9 102 4 5 -0.14
10 100 4 2 -0.55
11 63 3 6 +0.09
12 84 4 4 0.00
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P - U 
TTIT
1 96 2 6 +0.30
2 70 4 4 0.00
3 111 3 0 -1.00













7 79 3 0 -1.00
8 89 4 2 ^-0.33
1 71 ^ 6 2 yo.73
2 48 3 0 -1.00
3 61 1 1 0.00
Group B 4 63 0 7 1.00
(control) 3 93 2 8 0.60
6 38 1 12 0.83
7 112 4 8 _0.33
8 70 1 1 • . 0.00
Tab. A. 7-3- Group 4 ; content analysis
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Subject : Number of 








story words words P + U
1 84 0 2 +1.00
2 94 4 2 -0.33
3 60 2 0 -1.00
4 99 5 1 -0.66
5 • 73 4 3 -0.14
6 96 1 4 0.60
7. 96 11 1 -0.83
8 80 4 3 -0.14
9 134 5 2 -0.20
10 99 6 2 —0.30
11 113 0 8 1.00
12 75 4 0 -1.00
1 71 5 2 - 0.43
2 73 2 0 -1.00
3 83 2 5 +0.43
4 100 6 0 -1.00.
5 100 1 4 ■ 0.60
6 57 1 5 0.67
7 53 0 1 +1.00
8 90 .1 ■ 1 0.00
9 101 0 5 +1.00
10 54 0 5 +1.00
11 73 0 2 +1.00
12 67 1 2 +0.33
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P - Ü 
P + u
-0.55
2 66 2 1 -0.55
3 82 5 5 0.00
4 99 4 4 0.00
Group A 5 43 0 0 0.00
(experi­ 6 92 4 6 +0.20
mental)
7 65 5 1 -0.50
8 55 1 2 +0.55
9 66 1 5 +0.67
10 126 2 8 +0.60
1 ' 81 2 6 +0.50
2 94 4 5 -0.14
3 88 1 5 . .0.67
4 78 5 9 ' 0.28
Group B 5 88 4 7 0.55
(control) 6 95 2 1 • -0.55
7 105 4 7 0.55
8 81 5 1 -0.50
9 76 4 0 -1.00
10 104 5 1 -0.50
401
Group 6 : content analysis
-
ITumber of ' Index








1 105 2 8 0.60
2 101 1 2 0.53
3 72 1 2 0.53
4 85 3 2 -0.20
5 108 1 3 0.50
Group A 6 81 4 2 -0.53
(experi­
mental)
7 118 6 0 —1.00
8 51 0 3 +1.00
9 48 ' 2 0 -1.00
10 70 0 3 +1.00
11 . 111 3 1 —0.50
12 49 1 1 0.00
1 90 2 1 -0.53
2 117 4 5 0.11
3 115 3 1 -0.50
4 85 0 2 1.00
' 5 70 2 0 . -1.00
Group B 6 61 0 6 1.00
(control) 7 65 1 2 0.53
8 109 5 1 -0.67
9 55 0 5 1.00
10 53 0 6 1.00
11 65 9 1 -0.80
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Please rate the words below in terms of their emotional 
content. A seven point scale is provided, and yon should 
rin^ the appropriate number. 7 corresponds to 'very 
emotional' and 1 corresponds to 'completely neutral '. 
Thus, if you think the word 'Dollar' is only slightD.y 







IKEIAR 1 ( 
Please judra e y j
r*~MT 1 2 5
9 ) 3  4 3
)r% word.
4 3 6 7
6 7 m d  so on. 
23. HARPY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. COD 1 2 5 4 5 6 7 24. REHAUT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3- PAP
/I 2 3 4 5 6 7 23. SHADOW 1 2 3 4 3 6 7
DAI.LS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 26. WORTH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
r./* HUPki 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 27. BAD 1 2 3 /,T 5 6 7
6. WIiTTER '] 2 3 4 5 6 7 28. CANCER 1 2 3 IL 5 6 7
?.• Sad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 29. WATCH /] 2 %_/ 4 5 6 7
8. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 30. CAERY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. SOhS»/ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 51. PLANT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. REASON 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 32. HORROR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. O'*) , > 1 2 4 5 6 7 33 0 MOTHER ■ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. WET 1 2 5 4 5 6 7 34. HOT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1% DC'LTAH 1 2 3 4 6 7 35- CUP 1 2 3 4 3 6 7
14. WATER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 36. RED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15» BRUSH 1 2 3 4 6 7 37. BUN 1 2 3 4' 5 6 7
16. SAY 1 2 5 4 5 6 7 38. HATRED 2 3 4 5 6 7
17. PAli 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 39. TIT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
16, HAPPY < 2 3 4 5 6 7 40. PATHER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
19. SH/EE 1 2 5 4 5 6 7 41. VANITY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
20. BENCH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 42. APRAID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
21. MOUTH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 43* BREAST 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
22. GUILTY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 44. CARPET 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Fo Rm .7-
A, As much as you can renonberi -even if you aren^t sure)






B. The first ten words that cone into your head : 
1.
2.
5. ■ 
4. '
5-
6#
1.
8.
9,
10.
P.T.O.
